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Most countries in the world adopt policies in support of their agricultural sectors. In doing so, 
governments seek to influence farmers’ behaviour through various channels. While these policies and 
their incidence have long been monitored for member countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), there is scarce literature on those provided by the developing 
countries and especially in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA).  Yet, the food and agricultural policies adopted by 
governments in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) since their respective independences have gone through a 
number of phases characterized by changing objectives, intensities of state intervention in the economy, 
levels of protection or taxation in agriculture, and amounts of public spending and aid to agriculture. There 
has not been any systematic tracking of these changes and their implications for agricultural development 
and rural transformation, poverty eradication and food security, for example. 
In this respect, the work by Kym Anderson as part of the World Bank’s research project on Distortion to 
Agricultural Incentives constituted a major breakthrough. FAO’s Monitoring and Analysing Food and 
Agricultural Policies (MAFAP) programme followed this path with the objective of establishing country-
owned and sustainable systems to monitor, analyse, and reform food and agricultural policies to enable 
more effective, efficient and inclusive policy frameworks in support of agricultural development in a 
growing number of developing and emerging economies. Most of the research underpinning this 
dissertation builds on MAFAP data and analyses. The dissertation focuses on policy interventions 
essentially in the form of market price support or budgetary transfers, and their combined incidence on 
market price signal transmission, agricultural production incentives and the resulting supply response.  
Results presented in chapter 2 show that policies adopted by governments, for example, in response to 
price shocks in international markets altered the transmission of international price signals to farmers in 
developing countries. We also find that other factors play a role in this inadequate price transmission such 
as transport costs and changes in exchange rates. Moreover, it also appears that price changes in any 
particular country are not necessarily due to changes in world market prices, which suggests that domestic 
market conditions, largely determined by the policy environment, play an essential role. Finally, we also 
find that price movements in Africa exhibit different patterns than those in other regions, with higher 
levels of price variability for maize and rice mostly due to the domestic market conditions.  
Taking the case of rice and cotton which are two key commodities for several SSA countries, chapter 3 
shows that observed market distortions reflect the combined effects of market and policy failures. In the 
case of rice, these prevent border protection from reaching farmers while raising consumer prices. Cotton 
ginning and marketing is concentrated in a small number of private sector companies in most countries 
studied. Farm level nominal rates of protection (NRPs) provide evidence of market failures in these 
countries that may be mitigated by policies that set indicative prices and encourage competition. 
Interestingly, the NRPs point at non-market failures in the two countries that maintain parastatal 
monopsonies for cotton. 
Chapter 4 focuses on inputs subsidies which are found to be a widespread option of public support to 
agricultural production in SSA. Input subsidies have received close to 35 % of agricultural-specific spending 
on average. These expenditures have tended to get stuck into agricultural budgets over time, and exhibit 
sub-optimal execution rates. Input subsidies are primarily funded by national taxpayer money while 
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donors tend to invest more on public goods. These findings confirm that input subsidies tend to crowd 
out other spending categories likely more supportive of long-term agricultural development objectives.  
The effects of market price signals and policy interventions on the supply response of farmers in SSA are 
investigated in chapter 5. Results show that farmers in SSA are actually able to respond to higher prices 
with increased production even if with a limited intensity. Moreover, results show that direct price 
incentives arising from border protection and government intervention in domestic markets and price 
shocks at the border also influence farmers’ decisions and are more important than macroeconomic 
policies. Moreover, omitting marketing costs from the supply response function leads to an 
underestimation of the price elasticity. Conversely, using wholesale instead of farm gate prices as proxy 
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1.1 Motivations behind the research 
 
Most countries in the world adopt policies in support of their agricultural sector. In doing so, 
governments seek to influence farmers’ behaviour through various channels. Trade and domestic 
market policies intend to affect the prices farmers receive for their produce or the price of inputs they 
purchase. Governments typically also use budgetary transfers to support specific agents either directly 
or indirectly through investments in public goods (research, infrastructure, etc.). While these policies 
and their incidence have long been monitored for member countries of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), there is scarce literature on those provided by the developing 
countries and especially by Sub Saharan African (SSA) countries. This is largely because of the 
challenges in data availability and quality while a reliable and abundant dataset exists for OECD 
countries and a number of emerging economies. As a result, a substantial amount of research can, for 
example, be found for OECD countries on public expenditure in agriculture focusing on the efficacy 
and efficiency of input subsidies, or the return of public spending in agricultural research and 
infrastructure as opposed to transfer on private goods.  
The scarcity of policy relevant information for the agricultural sector in SSA makes it difficult to explain 
whether the economic growth that the sub-continent has exhibited for the last two decades is at least 
partly due to suitable policy reforms underpinning a long term transformative process of the sector. 
The relatively slow progress to transform the agricultural sector from a dominance of self-subsistence 
farming to a more commercial oriented agriculture is attributed to several factors including high 
population growth rate, political instability, inadequate policy frameworks, lack of market access in 
many areas, weak agricultural research and extension systems in most countries (FAO, 2012; Hollinger 
and Staatz, 2015). While the pace of development of the sub-continent has accelerated in the last 
decade, Sub Saharan Africa has not yet realized its potential in terms of production level, productivity, 
and, ultimately, food security (FAO et al., 2015).  
At the same time, agricultural and food policy reforms have been a constant feature in SSA for the last 
fifty years (Mellor et al., 1987; Friis Hansen, 2000; Kerallah et al., 2000; Kerallah et al., 2002). Indeed, 
just like in most other countries of the world, African governments have extensively intervened in 
markets through an array of regulations, price, trade, marketing policies or budgetary outlays to 
influence behaviour of economic agents (Wolf, 1979; Bates, 1981; Akiyama et al., 2003; Benson, 2004; 
Chamberlin and Jayne, 2011; Byerlee et al., 2013; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2013). Overall, agricultural 
policies in SSA countries generated production disincentives for farmers (Quiroz and Valdes, 1993; 
Anderson and Masters, 2009) and were characterised by an anti-trade, anti-rural bias until the late 
1990s, while many developed countries protected their agricultural sector. This trend was only 
gradually reversed in the middle of the 2000s. Then, the agricultural sector regained prominence in 
the development agenda (World Bank, 2007). The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
of the African Union adopted the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) 
as the overall policy framework to steer its continent wide strategy for agriculture led development. 
In this context, the Maputo Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security called governments to 
allocate at least 10% of their national budget in support of agriculture and rural development to 
achieve at least 6 % agricultural growth (African Union, 2003). This commitment was reaffirmed in the 
Malabo Declaration on accelerated agricultural growth (African Union, 2014).  
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However, most governments in SSA have demonstrated a preference for short term trade, market, 
and price policies as opposed to long term investments in public goods (Demeke et al., 2009; Maetz et 
al., 2011; Demeke et al., 2014). The extent of reforms and their effects on price incentives for 
producers of key agricultural commodities have been questioned as they were not systematically 
quantified and assessed. The role of policies to stimulate food production and agricultural productivity 
in SSA has been subject to extensive discussions during the last decades (Townsend, 1999; Anderson, 
2009; Sitko and Jayne, 2012). Due to limited reliable policy information, a number of technical and 
non-technical reasons have been proposed. Agricultural output growth is usually seen as the 
consequence of area expansion rather than productivity growth (Asenso-Okyere and Jemaneh, 2012). 
This situation contrasts with what happened in Asia where growth in agriculture was essentially due 
to increase in yields and South America where growth was sustained by increasing labour productivity 
(Bloom and Sachs, 1998; NEPAD, 2014). Moreover, as population growth in SSA outpaced production 
growth, most countries increased imports to respond to the rapidly expanding food demand.  
Yet, isolating the main determinants of production decisions by farmers has proved very difficult 
(Baffes and Gardner, 2003). As such, the issue of whether internal or external factors are the main 
drivers behind the weak production response of farmers in the region (Hall and Jones, 1997 and 1999; 
Di Marcantonio et al, 2014; Hollinger and Staatz, 2015) is still far from being closed in the development 
literature (Clover, 2003; Nin-Pratt and Yu, 2009; Onal, 2012). However, there seems to be a certain 
degree of consensus around a juncture of factors that are necessary to enable farmers to respond to 
market signals including effective price transmission (Baffes and Gardner, 2003; Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel, 2004; Dawe et al., 2015), adequate macroeconomic, trade and domestic policies 
(Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés, 1991; Quiroz and Valdés, 1993; Anderson, 2008; Anderson and Masters, 
2009; Nin-Pratt and Yu, 2011; Sitko and Jayne, 2012), supportive structural and institutional 
frameworks (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1997; Hall and 
Jones,1999; Poulton et al., 2006), easier access to complementary inputs, credit, and extension 
services, and investments where basic rural infrastructures are missing or appear underdeveloped 
(Bates, 1983; Sadoulet and de Janvry, 2000; Kherallah et al., 2002; Barret, 2008; Jacoby and Minten, 
2009; Mason et al., 2013; Ebata et al., 2015).  
Throughout these decades of policy changes, it has been difficult to assess the effectiveness of the 
various policy reforms as no system was available to systematically and continuously measure the 
effects of policy interventions on the basis of comparable indicators across countries and over time 
contrary to what existed since the 1980s for the OECD countries (Angelucci et al., 2013). In this respect, 
the work proposed by Kym Anderson as part of the World Bank’s research project on Distortion to 
Agricultural Incentives (DAI) constituted a major breakthrough (Anderson and Masters, 2009). It was 
then possible to confirm whether SSA countries were gradually moving away from situation of net 
taxation of agriculture. In the same spirit, FAO’s Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural 
Policies (MAFAP) programme started in 2009 with the objective of establishing country owned and 
sustainable systems to monitor, analyse, and reform food and agricultural policies to enable more 
effective, efficient and inclusive policy frameworks in support of agricultural development in a growing 
number of developing and emerging economies.  
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1.2 Objectives and research topics of the study 
 
In this context, the overall topic of this dissertation is about better understanding the level and 
composition of policy support to agriculture in SSA countries, its effects on agricultural production 
incentives and on market distortions. Most of the research underpinning this dissertation has focused 
on policy interventions essentially in the form of market price support or budgetary transfers, and their 
combined incidence on transmission of market price signals between the international markets and 
the farms, agricultural production incentives and the resulting supply response.  
The main research questions addressed in this dissertation are as follows: Are international price 
signals actually transmitted to farmers in developing countries? Are there any price behaviour 
specificities in SSA with respect to other regions of the world? Are policies adopted by governments, 
for example, in response to price shocks in international markets, actually altering price signals? Are 
observed market distortions in SSA primarily the result of policy or market failures? Are some forms of 
public support, such as inputs subsidies, more problematic than others and why? What are the 
combined effects of market price signals and policy interventions on the supply response of farmers in 
SSA? Are farmers in SSA actually able to respond to higher prices with increased production? Are there 
other factors beyond market price and policy support driving production decision by farmers?    
All the research activities in the context of this dissertation have taken the form of empirical analyses 
and have primarily built upon the quite recent dataset developed by FAO’s Monitoring and Analysing 
Food and Agricultural Policies (MAFAP) programme, complemented by the FAO’s Food Price 
Monitoring and Analysis (FPMA) Tool which provides a comprehensive dataset on prices at wholesale 
and retail levels. The added value of the MAFAP database is that it proposes a set of comparable 
indicators measuring the incidence of policies and market performances for farmers and other agents 
in different commodity chains, across SSA countries and over time (Balié and Maetz, 2011; FAO, 2014).  
As analysing the effects of policies on production incentives in SSA is a very broad research topic that 
could not be covered in an exhaustive manner through one dissertation only, it was decided to 
decompose this overall research in four components. As a result, the focus of the research has 
gradually and sequentially shifted from (a) the role of policies in the transmission of price signals from 
international to domestic markets (essay 1), to (b) the respective importance of policy and market 
failures in generating distortions to production incentives (essay 2), to (c) a discussion on the specifics 
of inputs subsidies as a typified and controversial form of producer support extensively used in SSA 
(essay 3), to (d) the final discussion on the supply response to price signals and other factors across 
nine SSA countries (essay 4).  
 
1.3 Outline of the chapters  
 
Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 form the main body of this dissertation and present the various aspects of the 
research in details.  
 
Chapter 2 investigates the respective roles of policies and market failures in transmitting, amplifying 
or muting price signals received by farmers and arising from the international market through changes 
in production incentives. Taking the case of cereals, the objective of this essay is to analyse available 
price data to describe the behaviour of domestic staple food prices since the world food price crisis in 
2007/08, including comparisons across regions and countries.  The chapter successively discusses (i) 
the broad patterns of domestic prices since 2007, including an assessment of how much domestic 
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staple food prices have increased since that time; (ii) the variability across regions and countries, as 
well as variability over time within countries (i.e., domestic price instability); (iii) a comparison of price 
movements in world and domestic markets; and (iv) a comparison of the domestic price indices with 
other food price indices.  
Based on domestic price data (adjusted for inflation) from a large range of low- and middle-income 
countries, results show that domestic staple food prices were higher in 2013 than they were in the first 
half of 2007: consumption-weighted real domestic rice, wheat and maize price indices increased by 
19, 19 and 29 percent, respectively. The domestic price indices broadly followed world price 
movements, but domestic price changes were attenuated to an important extent due to government 
policies, transport costs, changes in exchange rates and other factors. While world price changes thus 
overstate the impact on food security of farmers and consumers, the observed increases in domestic 
prices were still substantial for the poor. Domestic price changes have varied widely across countries, 
and the changes in any particular country were not necessarily due to changes in world market prices. 
Chapter 3 presents an empirical analysis of the nature of the distortions to production incentives 
arising from either policy or market failures. Using data from the MAFAP programme, this chapter 
reports nominal rates of protection (NRPs) for rice and cotton at wholesale and farm level across nine 
countries and between 2005 and 2010. Rice and cotton are two key commodities in SSA. Rice is 
typically an import substitute that has received high levels of border protection by the governments 
concerned while cotton is a key export crop which has been the focus of direct and indirect public 
interventions.  
For both commodities, the chapter provides evidence of both market and nonmarket failures. In the 
case of rice, these prevent border protection from reaching farmers while raising consumer prices. 
Cotton ginning and marketing is concentrated in a small number of private sector companies in most 
countries studied. The farm level NRPs provide evidence of market failures in these countries that may 
be mitigated by policies that set indicative prices and encourage competition. Interestingly, the NRPs 
point at non market failures in the two countries that maintain parastatal monopsonies for cotton. 
Chapter 4 investigates input subsidies as one of the most common policy option governments in SSA 
countries adopt to pursue their objective to support agricultural production growth. The chapter starts 
by recognizing the body of literature pointing at the policy failures resulting from unreasonable or 
misguided choices made by some African governments spending too much of their scarce resources 
on input subsidies at the expenses of other categories that would support agricultural growth and 
development more effectively and more sustainably. However, such strong conclusions are often 
insufficiently based on reliable, comparable and detailed evidence on the level and composition of 
spending on input subsidies. Using the dataset compiled by the MAFAP programme, this chapter 
examines the trends of input subsidies in terms of level, composition and budget execution rates in 
nine African countries between 2006 and 2013.  
Results show that input subsidies (i) received close to 35 % of agricultural-specific expenditures on 
average, (ii) tended to get stuck into agricultural budgets over time exhibiting sub-optimal execution 
rates, (iii) were primarily funded by national taxpayer while donors invested more on public goods. 
Findings confirm that input subsidies crowded out other spending categories likely more supportive of 
long-term agricultural development objectives. The chapter concludes that the political economy of 
input subsidies should lead to more concrete efforts to increase their efficiency and their policy 
coherence rather than seek their abolition.  
Chapter 5 focuses on estimating the supply response to price signals and other factors such as policy 
incentives.  While several studies already estimated the supply response of farmers in SSA, this 
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literature has used a variety of approaches and has generally concluded that price elasticities of supply 
were low or very low. However, only a few analyses have gone beyond estimating the aggregate supply 
response for the sector as a whole or the specific case of cash crops. In most cases, data scarcity 
especially on producer prices has been the main limiting factor. In this chapter, this question is revisited 
by focusing on the supply response of main staple food crops in selected SSA countries. The chapter 
builds upon the MAFAP dataset which provides prices at the producer, wholesale, and border levels 
for selected value chains. Using dynamic panel techniques, it is possible to test how acreage, 
production and yields respond to price signals and other non-price factors over a period (2005-2013) 
that includes the last two major food price crises.  
Results show that farmers producing staple food crops react to real price signals, even if with a limited 
intensity. Moreover, direct price incentives arising from border protection and government 
intervention in domestic markets and price shocks at the border also influence farmers’ decisions and 
are more important than macroeconomic policies. Results also show that omitting marketing costs 
from the supply response function leads to an underestimation of the price elasticity. Conversely, using 
wholesale instead of farm gate prices as proxy for producer prices leads to an overestimation of the 
price elasticity of supply. 
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There have been major changes in the world food economy over the past few years: oil prices were 
substantially higher from 2008 – 2013 than they were in the preceding two decades, biofuels demand has 
grown (see de Gorter et al, 2013 and Tyner, 2013 for differing views on how important this has been for 
the level of grain prices) and price volatility seems to have increased (with two major cereal price spikes, 
one in 2007 – 2008 and one in 2010 – 2011). At the same time, population growth continues (albeit at a 
slower growth rate than in the past), scarcity of natural resources such as land and water is getting worse, 
urbanization is reducing labour supplies in the countryside and economic growth in developing countries 
is leading to greater demand for livestock products that require large quantities of cereal as feedstock 
(Conforti, 2011). Last, but not necessarily least, climate change presents major uncertainties for 
agricultural production. These trends have led many to suggest that we are in an era of higher and/or 
more volatile food prices (e.g., Naylor and Falcon 2010; Dupont and Thirlwell 2009; Irwin and Good 2009; 
OECD-FAO 2014). 
 
When discussing higher food prices, reference is typically made to world prices denominated in US dollars. 
For developing countries, world market prices are crucially important for import bills, foreign exchange 
earnings, and as signals to guide resource allocation. But it is well-known that changes in world market 
prices are not always transmitted into changes in domestic prices due to transport costs, government 
policies, changes in exchange rates and market failures such as imperfect information (Hassouneh et al, 
2012; Conforti, 2004; Timmer, 1993; Dawe, 2009; Minot, 2010; Rapsomanikis, 2011; Short et al, 2014; 
Baquedano and Liefert, 2014). Furthermore, it is domestic prices that affect poverty and welfare, because 
these are the prices actually received by farmers and paid by consumers. These observations suggest that 
it is important to understand the behaviour of domestic food prices in addition to global prices, in 
particular since the world food crisis of 2007 – 2008.23 
 
When analyzing food prices, it is particularly important to understand the behaviour of cereal prices (as 
distinct from prices of meat, dairy, fruits, vegetables and other foods), because cereals are the most 
important expenditure item for the poor and food insecure, typically accounting for 50 percent of dietary 
energy supply and 20 – 25 percent of total expenditures for people in the bottom quintile of the income 
distribution (FAO, 2011). In addition, even though cereals are often missing many key micronutrients, 
cereal prices are crucial for nutrition because higher cereal prices can crowd out expenditures on more 
nutritious foods such as eggs, milk and green leafy vegetables (Block et al, 2004; Torlesse, 2003; de Brauw, 
2011). In this paper, we focus on the three main cereals consumed by humans: rice, wheat and maize. 
 
In the wake of the world food price crisis of 2007 – 2008, there has been a strong effort to collect data on 
domestic food prices. FAO has put substantial effort into constructing a database of domestic wholesale 
and retail prices for a number of food items for a large number of countries, and this database is freely 
                                                          
1 This paper is a joint work with three FAO colleagues David Dawe, Cristian Morales Opazo, and Guillaume Pierre, 
published under the title “How much have domestic food prices increased in the new era of higher food prices?” in 
July 2015 in Global Food Security, Vol. 5: 1-10. 
2 Just like world prices, domestic prices also influence resource allocation. 
3 We do not address the impact of food prices on poverty, which has been addressed elsewhere (Barrett and 
Bellemare, 2011; Ivanic et al, 2011; Robles and Torero, 2010; Headey, 2014; Dawe et al, 2010; Dorward, 2012). 
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available (FAO, 2014a)4. The ultimate data sources in most cases are official government sources (full 
details of specific sources for each country are available in FAO, 2014a). 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze these data to describe the behaviour of domestic staple food 
prices since the world food price crisis, including comparisons across regions, countries and the three 
cereals. After a description of the data and the methods used to analyze them, the remainder of this paper 
is split into four main sections: (i) broad patterns of domestic prices since 2007, including an assessment 
of how much domestic staple food prices have increased since that time; (ii) variability across regions and 
countries, as well as variability over time within countries (i.e., domestic price volatility); (iii) a comparison 
of price movements in world and domestic markets; and (iv) a comparison of the domestic price indices 
calculated here with other food price indices. These data and comparisons provide an assessment of the 
magnitude of domestic staple food price changes since the world food crisis. 
 
2.2 Data and methods 
 
The focus of this paper is on wholesale and retail prices, which are best viewed as consumer prices. This 
focus on the consumer is mandated by the scarcity of farm-level price data, which are not included in FAO 
(2014a). Collection of more frequent and systematic farm-level price data should be a major priority for 
understanding supply response and the food security of farmers who receive income from crop sales.5 
The focus of this paper is also on low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), where food constitutes a 
larger share of household budgets and high prices are more of a food security concern (Regmi and Meade, 
2013). 
 
Since our objective is to assess cereal price changes as experienced in LMIC, we measure price changes in 
local currency (LC) terms. Using local currency prices has the disadvantage that we cannot calculate an 
average price level across countries, since it is not possible to compare price levels if the prices are in 
different currencies. But the advantage is that price changes are then measured in a manner that is 
relevant to domestic consumers, as exchange rate movements and other factors can lead to very different 
price changes in local currency and US dollar terms (FAO, 2011; Dorward, 2011). 
 
Our first step was to bound the period of analysis. Starting the analysis in 2006 would have excluded a 
very large number of countries, while extending it into 2014 would have encountered a number of data 
gaps at the time of analysis. Thus, we analyze data over the period January 2007 to December 2013. 
 
The database in FAO (2014a) is extensive: there are data for wholesale and retail markets, for different 
qualities, different forms (e.g. grain and flour), and different cities/locations, although not all types are 
available for a given commodity in a given country. But there are numerous cases of missing values in 
many of these series. In order for a specific data series to be considered, we decided that it must have no 
more than two consecutive missing data points. In four cases, however, we made an exception to this rule 
in order to avoid discarding a commodity/country combination entirely: the best available data series for 
those four commodity/country combinations had at most six consecutive missing data points. In cases 
where there were four or fewer consecutive missing data points, linear interpolation between adjacent 
data points was used to fill in the missing values. In the other two cases where there were five or six 
                                                          
4 Thanks are due to Anthony Burgard, Youngran Choi, Cheng Fang, and FAO-GIEWS staff including Liliana Balbi, 
Fabio Palmieri and Paul Racionzer for their help in collecting and compiling the data used in this analysis. Thanks are 
also due to participants at an FAO seminar on this topic, who provided many helpful suggestions. 
5 FAO (2014b) and FAO (2014c) have helpful data on farm prices, but they are annual, not monthly. 
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consecutive missing data points, seasonally adjusted linear interpolation was used to fill in the data gap. 
Price series with data gaps longer than 6 months were dropped. 
 
Once the pool of “eligible” data series was determined, our first step was to select the data to be used for 
each country/commodity combination, because data are often available for multiple locations, multiple 
qualities or multiple marketing levels for a given staple food in a given country. We term each specific 
country/commodity combination (e.g. Kenya maize) a “case study.” In order to choose which data series 
to analyze for a given case study, a set of ordered selection criteria were applied. Our first criterion was 
to use, whenever possible, retail price data (58 case studies), the justification being that these are the 
prices paid by consumers. However, if no retail price data were available for a particular case study, we 
used wholesale prices (45 case studies), which are usually linked quite closely to retail prices. In the case 
of wheat, if there were data for both wheat and wheat flour, we used data on wheat flour on the grounds 
that it is closer to the ultimate form in which it is consumed. Overall, we used data on wheat flour in 17 
case studies, and data on wheat in 10 case studies. 
 
Our second criterion was based on quality. We chose the lowest quality available, on the grounds that 
lower qualities are more important for the poor. That being said, prices of different qualities generally 
seemed to move broadly together within the same country. 
 
Our third criterion was to use national average prices when available. When national average prices were 
unavailable, we used a weighted average price across all the markets in the given country for which data 
were available, using population weights obtained from Brinkhoff (2014), which collates demographic 
data from numerous national census bureaus. There were 30 case studies for which national average data 
were available, and an additional 21 case studies for which we calculated an average based on three or 
more locations. For the other 52 case studies, we used data from one (42 cases) or two (10 cases) locations 
in the country. 
 
Application of these criteria leads to a total of 103 case studies of cereals distributed across 59 countries. 
There were 44 country case studies for rice, 32 for maize and 27 for wheat/wheat flour. For rice, wheat 
and maize respectively, our country coverage accounts for 92, 67, and 54 percent respectively of direct 
human food consumption6 in LMIC. In all LMIC, including those for which we do not have price data, rice 
has the greatest total consumption among the three major cereals at 352 million tons (milled basis), 
followed by wheat at 337 million tons, with maize a distant third at 111 million tons. 
 
After selecting the data series to analyze, our second step was to transform data on nominal domestic 
cereal prices into real terms by dividing by the domestic consumer price index (CPI) (IMF, 2014), which 
adjusts for the impact of inflation that tends to raise all prices and wages over time. Such an adjustment 
is essential when examining price behaviour over a period of seven years, because domestic inflation often 
exceeds 10 percent per year in LMICs (at such a rate, prices will double in seven years). Ideally, we would 
like to divide the nominal price by a CPI that excludes the commodity in question, because such a 
procedure would give the true relative price increase of a given commodity. Such data are rarely available, 
however, so we divide by the aggregate CPI. When the real price of a commodity increases, use of the 
aggregate CPI in constructing the real price understates the true magnitude of the price increase relative 
to other commodities (Dorward, 2011 terms this the “denominator effect”). The magnitude by which the 
                                                          
6 FAO estimates human food consumption as a residual within a food balance sheet that utilizes data on or estimates 
of production, imports, exports, stock changes, feed, seed, industrial and other uses. 
 
19 | P a g e  
 
price increase is understated is greater if the share of the commodity in question in the CPI is relatively 
high, which will more often be the case in poor countries.7 
 
Because data are available for a large number of countries, it is useful to calculate some aggregate 
measures of the magnitude of changes in domestic cereal prices. To do this, we transform each series of 
real local currency prices into an index with base 100 in January – June 2007. We use January – June 2007 
= 100 rather than 2007 = 100 because for wheat, world market prices began to surge in May 2007, and 
we want our base period to be before the price shocks hit domestic markets. Ideally, it would be best to 
go back even further in time to 2005 or 2006 for the base period, but doing so substantially reduces the 
number of countries for which we have data. 
 
These national indices are then combined to form a composite index that incorporates all of the countries 
in the database, using as weights the share of consumption of each country in total human consumption 
of each cereal in LMIC in 2011 (the most recent year available). Because we do not have price data for all 
LMIC, we rescale the weights to sum to 100 for each cereal. Composite sub-indices are also calculated for 
Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
 
2.3 Results and discussion 
 
2.3.1 Broad patterns in domestic prices since 2007 
 
Our calculated composite indices for rice, wheat and maize (Figure 1; Figure 2; Figure 3) show that, 
comparing January – June 2007 with 2013 (annual average for 2013), (weighted) average real domestic 
prices in low and middle income countries increased by approximately 19 percent for rice and wheat and 
29 percent for maize. For all three of the commodities, domestic prices had increased by the middle of 
2008. But the increases were much less for wheat (which reached a local peak index value of 114 in May 
2008) and rice (a local peak index value of 119 in August 2008) than they were for maize, which reached 
a local peak index value of 140 in July 2008. 
 
One key reason for the difference between commodities is that the three largest LMIC (China, India, and 
Indonesia) insulated their domestic cereal prices from the world market by restricting/banning exports. 
Such a policy, if implemented effectively, can prevent domestic prices from rising (for details of the 
policies in these three countries, see Fang, 2010 for China; Gulati and Dutta, 2010 for India; and Syaifullah, 
2010 for Indonesia). At the same time, such policies cause world price increases to be larger than they 
would have otherwise been (Anderson, 2012), leading to more pressure on domestic prices in other 
countries that are not able to insulate themselves from world markets so easily. These three large 
countries account for 71 percent of our composite index for rice and 73 percent for wheat, but only 17 
percent of our maize index due to lack of data for India and Indonesia. The lack of maize price data for 
these two countries is unfortunate, but it is also true that maize is much less important as a human food 
in these countries compared to rice and wheat – we estimate that these three countries account for 65 
and 50 percent of direct human consumption of rice and wheat in LMIC, but less than 20 percent of direct 
human maize consumption in LMIC. 
 
                                                          
7 Dorward (2011) rightly argues that changes in nominal prices must be compared to something, and, in addition to 
the CPI, suggests other possible metrics: income, prices of other farm commodities, and farm input prices. 
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Figure 1: Indices of domestic rice prices, regional and global (January – June 2007 = 100) 
Note: The index for Asia is nearly identical to the global index and is thus hard to see. 
 
Figure 2: Indices of domestic maize prices, regional and global (January – June 2007 = 100) 
 
 
21 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 3: Indices of domestic wheat prices, regional and global (January – June 2007 = 100) 
Note: The vertical axis has been truncated at 210 in order to avoid flattening the indices other than LAC 
and maintain the same scale as used in Figures 1a and 1c. The values for November and December 2013 
for LAC are 234 and 227. This spike in the LAC price index in late 2013 is due to a price spike in Argentina, 
where domestic prices surged due to a 45% decline in production that led to a massive drawdown in 
stocks. This surge was temporary: prices declined sharply in 2014. 
 
By July 2010, the composite indices for all three commodities had declined compared to 2008, and were 
close to levels in the first half of 2007. But another shock to world cereal markets (this time confined to 
wheat and maize) led to increases in domestic prices once again. Again, maize was the most affected, with 
the composite index rising to 143 in July 2011. 
 
2.3.2 Variability across regions/countries and over time 
 
While the level of domestic market prices in 2013 was generally higher than it was before the world price 
shocks, this has not been true in all countries – indeed, the variability across countries is striking (see 
Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6, and Table 1). Across all the 103 case studies for all three staples, 28 percent 
had lower real prices in 2013 than in the first half of 2007 – this percentage is roughly similar across crops. 
Thus, while domestic prices have broadly trended upward since 2007, there are many exceptions, 
highlighting the importance of country-specific analysis (e.g. Abdulai, 2000; Bakhshoodeh, 2009; 
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Figure 4: National domestic price index in 2013 and domestic price volatility, rice. 
Note: The circled point represents world market prices. 
 
Figure 5: National domestic price index in 2013 and domestic price volatility, maize. 
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Notes: The circled point represents world market prices. Tanzania (220, 11.7%) and Malawi (274, 12.1%) 
have been omitted from the scatter to show the other values more clearly and to keep the scale identical 
with the scale in Figures 2a and 2b. 
 
Figure 6: National domestic price index in 2013 and domestic price volatility, wheat. 
 
Notes: The circled point represents world market prices. Argentina (334, 10.8%) has been omitted from 
the scatter to show the other values more clearly and to keep the scale identical with the scale in Figures 
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Table 1:  World and domestic real price changes (January – December 2013 versus January – June 2007) for selected countries and 
cereals 
Country Cereal Market %ΔPworld (USD) %ΔPworld  
(LC) 
%ΔPdomestic (LC) 
China Rice Whl, 2 provinces 15 -15 39 
Philippines Rice Ret, National 15 -12 18 
Bangladesh Rice Whl, National 15 -10 -8 
India Wheat Ret, 4 cities 36 17 -5 
Brazil Wheat Whl, National 36 16 1 
Peru Wheat Whl, National 36 7 1 
Nigeria Maize Whl, 1 city 39 0 38 
Ghana Maize Whl, 6 cities 39 59 40 
Mexico Maize Whl, 5 cities 39 41 15 
Note: All price changes are in real terms, adjusted using the US CPI for world market prices (in US dollars, 
USD) and using national CPIs for local currency (LC) prices. 
 
For example, in Bangladesh, real domestic rice prices in 2013 were 8% lower than in the first half of 2007. 
This is similar to the change in world prices in real local currency terms, as Bangladesh has a relatively 
open rice trade policy that allows the private sector to arbitrage price differentials with external markets 
(Dorosh, 2009).8 But in China and the Philippines, despite a decline in world rice prices measured in real 
LC terms, domestic prices have increased substantially due to rising costs of production and various 
support policies (see Gale, 2013 for China and Briones and Galang, 2014 for the Philippines), as well as an 
unwillingness to source cheaper supplies from world markets. This diversity of policies shows that the 
general increase in real domestic cereal prices in many countries that is captured in our index is not 
necessarily due to higher world market prices: more open trade would have led to lower domestic prices 
in many countries (as well as higher prices on world markets). 
 
There are many other examples of policy changes. In Mozambique, import tariffs on cereals were reduced 
substantially in 2008, and have subsequently been maintained at the new lower levels. Temporary policies 
also of course affect domestic prices, e.g. export bans (Tanzania maize in 2011) and public stock releases 
(Ghana maize in 2011). And foreign exchange policy can play a role, especially where these markets are 
thin, as in Ethiopia where the central bank reduced allocations of US dollars to wheat and maize importers 
in 2008, aggravating the effect of the world price shock on domestic markets. The key message is that 
domestic prices are driven by domestic policies in addition to world prices. 
                                                          
8 Note the large difference between changes in world prices in terms of real US dollars and in terms of real local 
currency in Table 1. In recent years, due to (real) depreciation of the US dollar against a wide range of developing 
country currencies, the change in world price in local currency terms has been smaller than in US dollar terms. 
Dorward (2011) provides additional arguments (other than real exchange rate changes) why real prices in US dollar 
terms are not globally applicable. 
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Price volatility also varies across commodities and countries. Domestic price volatility for maize is 
generally higher than for rice and wheat in all three regions (Table 2; this is not true for Asia, but we only 
have maize price data for two Asian countries, China and the Philippines).  
 
Table 2: Domestic price volatility by region by commodity (percent) 
 Africa Asia Latin America All 
Rice 7.0 4.3 4.1 5.1 
Wheat 6.7 4.3 5.6 5.2 
Maize 10.2 2.4 7.7 8.6 
Note: Price volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of ln(pt/pt-1), where pt is the real price at time 
t. Data used are monthly prices from January 2007 to December 2013. Averages reported in the table are 
simple averages across countries. 
 
 
This finding is consistent with a visual impression of Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3, where the maize price 
indices tend to show higher peaks and deeper troughs than those for rice and wheat. It is also consistent 
with FAO (2011) and Pierre et al (2013), which found that domestic rice and wheat prices in African 
countries were more stable than maize prices (as well as being more stable than prices of other staples 
such as cassava, sorghum and millet). Greater price volatility for domestic maize prices may be due to the 
fact that a lesser proportion of global maize production is irrigated (20 percent, compared with 62 percent 
for rice and 31 percent for wheat; Portmann et al, 2010). In addition to the smaller role of irrigation in 
maize production, domestic maize prices may be more prone to volatility (relative to rice and wheat) 
because of the very thin international market for white maize, which is the maize that dominates human 
consumption (the world rice market is also thin). This might lead to lack of connection between domestic 
and international markets, which lessens the potential for international maize markets to play a stabilizing 
role in domestic price formation. However, since white and yellow maize are substitutes (for farmers, if 
less so for consumers), the yellow maize international market might still be able to provide some stability 
to domestic prices in the event of domestic production shocks. The fact that large quantities of maize are 
used for biofuels might be another possible reason for greater domestic maize price volatility, although if 
this were a key driver one might expect that the mechanism would work primarily through more volatile 
world market maize prices and their linkages with oil prices. But world market maize prices are no more 
volatile than world market rice or wheat prices – the key difference is domestic price volatility. Thus, the 
reasons behind domestic maize price volatility need more investigation. 
 
For all three commodities, price volatility in Africa is substantially higher than in Asia or Latin America 
(Table 2). Higher domestic price volatility in Africa may be due to the fact that African countries are often 
reliant on imports for a large share of domestic consumption, especially for rice and wheat. But greater 
exposure to international markets can also stabilize domestic prices (e.g. Rapsomanikis and Sarris, 2008): 
as noted above, domestic rice and wheat prices in Africa are more stable than domestic prices of other 
staple foods. Besides exposure to international markets, there are other key factors that are also 
responsible for differing degrees of price volatility in different contexts: exchange rate volatility, 
infrastructure, domestic production volatility and domestic policies (Pierre et al, 2013; Kornher and 
Kalkuhl, 2013). Africa has generally worse transportation and communication infrastructure, as well as 
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greater domestic production volatility due to a lower proportion of irrigated land (Cassman and Grassini, 
2013). Poor infrastructure may also heighten the impact of oil price increases when moving cereals 
internally or across international borders. 
 
For a small selection of case studies (14, in eight different countries), data on both wholesale and retail 
prices were available in FAO (2014a) for the same quality and same location. In general, the percentage 
changes in the two measures (wholesale and retail) were similar. In eight cases, wholesale prices increased 
more (implying a narrowing of the wholesale-retail margin), while in the other six cases wholesale prices 
increased less (implying a widening of the margin). Thus, there was not any systematic substantial 
widening (or narrowing) of the wholesale-retail margin. This leaves aside the analysis of farm-wholesale 
margins, which are larger and more important to analyze. Unfortunately, the lack of farm price data 
precludes any systematic analysis of this question except in isolated cases, and is not discussed here. 
 
2.3.3 Price movements on domestic and world markets 
 
Comparison of the composite domestic cereal price indices (Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9), both 
weighted and unweighted, with the world price index shows that domestic prices are generally more 
stable for rice, wheat and maize, especially rice and wheat. Indeed, the most striking impression from 
these graphs is that the peaks in world prices are much higher than the peaks in the domestic price indices. 
 
For both rice and wheat, the simple average domestic volatility across all countries is 5 percent, compared 
with 8 percent for the volatility of world market prices (see the circled points in Figure 4, Figure 5, and 
Figure 6). Thus, world rice and wheat prices have volatility measures that are 56 and 58 percent higher 
than the average domestic volatility measure. 
 
Maize, however, is different. Volatility is 7 percent for world maize prices, but the average domestic 
volatility is 9 percent, higher than for world markets. Maize is also different in that world prices returned 
to January – June 2007 levels rather quickly (reaching an index value of 97 in November 2008), but the 
domestic price index remained relatively high for a much longer duration – by October 2010, it had only 
declined to an index value of 106, before turning up again in response to another world price shock. Thus, 
the duration of the shock to domestic prices was much longer than for world prices. 
 
Comparing world price volatility across the three cereals shows that rice is intermediate between maize 
and wheat, but that volatility measures are similar for all three. Thus, while the world rice market is “thin” 
in that a relatively small percentage of total production enters international trade, it is not clear that the 
world rice market is more volatile than world maize and wheat markets. This could be due to offsetting 
factors such as the greater share of global rice production that is irrigated. And domestic rice prices are 
as stable, or more so, than domestic wheat and maize prices. 
 
In terms of price levels in 2013 compared with the first half of 2007, Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 also 
show that the increases in world prices for rice, wheat and maize have been greater than for domestic 
prices for all but a handful of countries. Thus, while domestic prices have clearly increased since 2007 in 
most countries, it is also true that these price increases have been much less than those on world markets. 
Nevertheless, the observed increases in domestic prices are still substantial for the poor in many 
countries: e.g., a 20 percent increase in domestic prices for a family that spends 30 percent of its income 
on staple foods leads to a decline in real income of approximately 6 percent. 
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Figure 7: Domestic price indices (weighted and unweighted) and world price index, rice. 
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2.3.4 Comparison with other food price indices 
 
The composite domestic food price indices presented above exhibit behaviour that is substantially 
different than for other food price indices (Figure 10). This is not surprising, given that they have different 
objectives and measure different concepts. For example, the FAO Food Price Index (FAO 2014d) measures 
changes in nominal world market prices, with different commodities weighted by their shares in the value 
of international trade. This weighting procedure gives high weights to meat and dairy products, which 
together account for more than half of the index. In addition, it measures changes in world market prices, 
not domestic prices.  
 
The International Monetary Fund also calculates a food price index, and since 2007 it has behaved very 
similarly to the FAO food price index. There is also a version of the FAO Food Price Index that is deflated 
by the manufacturing unit value (MUV) index (World Bank 2014). This alternative index thus presents food 
price movements relative to the prices of manufactured goods (the MUV index excludes services, so it is 
not an index of general inflation). 
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Figure 10: Comparison of rice, wheat and maize domestic price indices with other food price indices. 
 
FAO also calculates a measure of global consumer food price inflation (FAO 2014e), which is a measure of 
changes in nominal domestic food prices, with different countries weighted by their share in global 
population. Within each country, different commodities are weighted by their share in total expenditures. 
This latter procedure gives higher weights to commodities that are relatively most important to the top 
half of the income distribution, since these are the people with most of the purchasing power and who 
account for most expenditures on food. This index also measures nominal prices, which tend to rise more 
or less continuously over long periods of time, as can be seen in Figure 10. Aggregate food price inflation 
is certainly important, but the weights used in constructing such measures do not reflect the expenditure 
patterns of the poor, which are more oriented towards staple foods. Thus, such an index may not be the 
most appropriate indicator for food security impacts, as it is the poor who lack access to food and are the 
most food insecure. 
 
The several indices discussed in this section contrast with the rice, wheat and maize indices presented in 
this paper. The latter measure changes in real domestic market prices, with different countries weighted 
by their share in global direct food consumption of each cereal. The focus of our indices on the three main 
cereals means a more narrow coverage, but a coverage that focuses on the commodities of most 
importance to the poor – thus, these indicators are helpful for assessing global food security. 
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2.4. Summary and conclusion 
 
The “food price crisis” has typically been viewed as a general phenomenon and interpreted from a global 
standpoint (von Braun et al., 2008; Wright and Bobenrieth, 2009). However, its effects have varied across 
commodities, regions and countries. In order to explore this issue further, this paper calculates a new set 
of food price indices. The indices presented here differ from existing price indices in that they calculate 
prices after adjusting for inflation; they focus on domestic prices, which are the prices actually paid by 
consumers; and they focus on rice, wheat and maize, the three most important sources of dietary energy 
for the poor and food insecure in developing countries. Because of these differences, the evolution of 
these indices over time differ from existing indices of world market prices and domestic food price 
inflation. 
 
The indices allow us to draw several conclusions. First, they show that domestic staple food prices were 
higher in 2013 than they were in the first half of 2007: weighted average real domestic rice, wheat and 
maize prices increased by 19, 19 and 29 percent, respectively. Second, they show that domestic prices 
have typically increased much less than world prices, and that domestic prices are less volatile than world 
prices (although maize is an exception to the latter point). This different behaviour of domestic prices is 
due to the impacts of policies, infrastructure and exchange rates, among other factors. Third, they show 
that domestic price indices broadly mirror the large world price spikes (i.e. price transmission elasticities 
in the face of large price shocks on world markets are positive in many but not all cases). Fourth, they 
show that domestic price changes have varied widely across countries, and that domestic price increases 
are not necessarily due to increases in world market prices. Finally, domestic maize prices are more 
volatile than domestic rice and wheat prices, and domestic cereal prices in Africa are more volatile than 
in Asia and Latin America. These conclusions underline the importance of country- and commodity-
specific analysis. 
 
The domestic price data analyzed here show that an era of higher food prices is currently upon us. To 
some extent, freely operating markets will bring forth additional private sector investment in response to 
the higher prices, but it is also important for the public sector (national governments and donors) to be 
aware of the higher prices and mimic market responses by increasing investment (especially in public 
goods such as agricultural research that may not be provided by the private sector in optimal amounts). 
The argument for additional investment is not necessarily an argument that higher prices increase 
poverty, but rather an argument about resource allocation – higher relative prices for staple foods indicate 
increasing scarcity and should therefore call forth additional investment in staple food production. This 
investment is likely needed in all countries to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon agro-ecological 
conditions. Higher relative prices for food could of course change rapidly, as commodity prices are volatile, 
but all investment is made in a context of uncertainty. 
 
The data might suggest that the resource allocation case for investment is less strong than would be 
implied by using only data on world market prices, although such a conclusion is made slightly problematic 
by the fact that percentage changes in prices can be different at different levels of the marketing system 
(Dawe and Maltsoglou, 2014) – the percentage changes in farm prices might be higher than those 
reported here, and farm prices should be a better indicator of staple food scarcity than retail prices. 
 
Thus, for future work, collection of farm price data is a key priority – farm prices do not necessarily track 
the wholesale and retail prices that are analyzed in this paper. Although it is not done here, partially due 
to a less extensive set of data, it would also be worthwhile to construct price indices for several less 
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actively traded staple foods: for example, beans and potatoes in Latin America and cassava, sorghum and 
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3 Policy or Markets? An Analysis of Price Incentives and Disincentives 
for Rice and Cotton in Selected African Countries9 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the three decades beginning in 1950, developing countries in Africa generally followed Prebish’s (1950) 
and Hirschman’s (1958) import substitution industrialization development paradigm, together with 
extensive intervention in the agricultural sector in the form of price and movement controls and parastatal 
monopolies responsible for processing and marketing of most agricultural commodities (Kherallah et al., 
2000). This was followed in the 1980s and 1990s by a deregulation agenda aligned with the Washington 
consensus.10 For agriculture, this lead to deregulation, market liberalization, and the elimination or 
restructuring of parastatals, restricting their role to such things as providing market information, 
maintaining food security stocks, etc. However, these various policies generally failed to deliver a number 
of their objectives (Williamson, 2000; Williamson, 2002; Stiglitz, 2002; Rodrik, 2006) and, in particular, did 
not result in the expected higher incomes for farm families, increased agricultural productivity and 
production in Africa which remains far below its potential (Byerlee et al., 2013). In more recent years, 
there has been considerable reversion, in some countries, a greater role to the government in agriculture 
(Kherallah et al., 2000).  
 
Governments in Africa have intervened extensively in the agricultural sector for both political and 
economic reasons.11 The most common justification for government intervention in developing countries 
is the need to spur economic development and enhance food security.12 The need to enhance food 
security and to protect consumers by assuring adequate supplies at affordable prices is commonly stated 
an objective of policies for cereals and other basic food commodities. The goals of protecting poor farmers 
from excessive market power by traders and processors, and a need to provide substitutes for missing 
markets (for credit and other agricultural inputs, and transportation and processing services) are also 
described as policy objectives.13 Sometimes the usual public functions related to provision of 
infrastructure, research, market standards and information, and enforcement of phytosanitary standards 
are used as a rationale, especially in the context of a parastatal with a mandate to support a specific 
commodity.  
                                                          
9 This essay is product of a joint effort with two FAO colleagues Cameron Short and Jesus Barreiro-Hurle. It was 
published in December 2014 in the Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, special issue, page 1–29. 
10 The Washington Consensus, promoted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the US 
Treasury Department, advocated for a restricted role for government and a much more market-oriented incentive 
system. It refers to a set of ten relatively specific economic policy prescriptions encompassing macroeconomic 
stabilization, economic opening with respect to both trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces 
within the domestic economy (Williamson, 1989). 
11 Lele and Christiansen (1989) describe the political objectives and constraints for agricultural policy in Africa. 
12 For example, the main policy objective for rice given in the Ghana National Rice Development Strategy (NRDS) 
is to “contribute to food security…increase income and reduce poverty” (Ghana Ministry of Agriculture, 2009).  
These same objectives, expressed in slightly different terms, can be found in the NRDS of all countries considered 
in this paper. See the Coalition for African Rice Development (CARD) website: http://www.riceforafrica.org.  
13 Akiyama et al. (2003) maintain that protecting farmers and consumers were the stated objectives of the control 
over marketing of agricultural products. They also describe the problem of missing markets for farm inputs 
following market liberalization as does Kherallah et al. (2000).  Lele and Christiansen (1989) emphasize how the 
absence of a credit market for small scale farmers in Africa has inhibited the development of markets for other 
purchased inputs. 
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Food insecurity can be the result of both policy and market failures. Food insecurity takes many different 
forms in Africa today, from isolated individuals and families with chronic inadequate access to food and 
nutrition, to sporadic regional shortages caused by drought and other similar events to large-scale 
famines. Households in many sub-Saharan countries and regions within them are normally self-sufficient 
in traditional staple food crops resulting in thin marketing structures. These market structures are 
incapable of providing fast and efficient response to shortages resulting in price spikes, severe shortages 
in both urban and rural areas, malnutrition and worse.14 Although food is a private good, we argue that 
food security is a public good.15 Policy objectives for food security are often expressed in terms of 
increased production or self-sufficiency of the staple crops, despite economic advice that self-sufficiency 
may be costly and not contribute meaningfully to the objective of improving food security (Sturgess, 
2008).  
 
Clearly distributional inequity is also a rationale for policies to increase food security as its impact is 
greatest on poor net food buyers. The objective of protecting small farmers from excessive market power 
by traders and processors also has a distributional equity dimension as well as a response to scale 
economies in processing and marketing in local African markets. Missing markets for credit and other 
inputs are likely related to the difficulty of enforcing repayment which has been a justification in the past 
for the parastatal monopsonies that can recover these costs in the payments for the farmers’ produce.1617  
 
The problem of developing policy measures to mediate market failures poses difficulties that challenge 
the most sophisticated governments in developed countries: governments may not be able to accurately 
estimate costs to regulate prices in a market where one or more agent has excessive market power or 
evaluate the true value of an externality or public good.18 There may be several different objectives and 
policies affecting a commodity, group of commodities or factors of production leading to policy 
dissonance. Policy dissonance or lack of policy coherence is generally the result of inconsistency between 
the objectives pursued by a government (higher commodity prices for farmers and lower food prices for 
consumers, for instance) and the set of policy instruments used to achieve them (a share of public 
resources allocated to develop irrigation schemes, adoption of a floor price for rice producers, 
removal/decrease or adoption/increase of a the tariff on rice imports, etc.) that are sometimes conflicting 
and may result in sub optimal or even adverse impacts (Angelucci et al., 2013). In most markets, prices 
                                                          
14 For instance, the Kenya maize supply was down by over a third following the long rains in June 2008 because 
civil unrest following the election in December 2007 and drought. [See the timeline in the report by the Africa 
Centre for Open Governance (2009). It wasn’t until March 2009 that large imports of maize began to fill the gap. 
See Tangermann (2011) on the need for emergency stocks in this type of situation. 
15 According to the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (2009), the “common elements of 
definitions of food security are availability, access, affordability, safety and resilience.” These elements of food 
security are similar to the elements that would go into definitions of personal security, security of personal property 
and well-functioning market that are part of the non-rival benefits of good governance. The concept of food security 
as a public good here is different from its discussion in the context of multifunctionality (where it is described as 
joint product of agricultural production) and recent efforts to promote food security as a “global public good.” 
16 The important role of information asymmetries in credit market failures has been demonstrated in a large number 
of articles summarized in Stiglitz (2001).   
17 This is also a justification for awarding monopsony status to private sector firms that supply credit and other 
inputs as is the case for cotton ginneries in Mozambique. 
18 See Boadway (1979) p. 32 on the problem of valuing public goods for the government decision-maker and p. 37 
on the problem of setting prices when there are increasing returns to scale.  According to Wolf (1979), “(nonmarket) 
outputs are usually hard to define in principle, ill-defined in practice, and extremely difficult to measure 
independently of the inputs which produce them.” 
 
37 | P a g e  
 
and costs are continuously changing but most policies or policy instruments, such as regulated prices, are 
rarely changed more than once per year. Moreover, prices when administered are sometimes set 
following perverse incentives as identified by Wolf (1979).  
 
Many of these issues are more acute for governments in developing countries. In many developing 
countries, the quality and quantity of agricultural statistics are low and, in the last decades, have 
undergone a serious decline compared to the average situation in industrialized countries (World Bank et 
al., 2011; FAO et al., 2012, Carfagna et al., 2013; Carletto et al., 2014; Morten, 2014). As recently pointed 
out by Annan (2013) and Wiggins and Leturque (2010), African governments have fewer resources for 
policy analysis and implementation which may result in what Wolf (1979) defines as non-market failure. 
While it cannot be expected that better statistics or strengthened capacities of the administration will 
eliminate non-market failures, the problem is generally aggravated by lack of reliable information and low 
staff capacities. The recurrent budget problem, for example, has been cited as reason for the failure to 
maintain roads and provide extension services to farmers. Equally important is that policy may be 
obstructed by the agents intended to implement it. This is a typical principal/agent problem, or 
“internality and private goods” non-market failure in the terms of Wolf (1979) that can be illustrated by 
institutional issues in the policy formulation-implementation-evaluation cycle (Benson, 2004; Bardham, 
2005). For instance, the Kenyan government initially imported maize in late 2008 to reduce the impact of 
the large shortfall in the maize supply at that time noted above.  This non-market action did not solve the 
issue of high prices as imported maize was sold to insiders at favourable prices who, in turn, captured 
many of the benefits.19 This is a case of the distributional inequity problem, the fourth category of non-
market failure described by Wolf (1979). Collusion between government and private agents is not 
exceptional in Sub Saharan African countries: Botswana was the only African country in the top 50 of the 
177 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in which countries ranked 
lower are considered less corrupt. Most African countries rank above 100 (Transparency International, 
2012). Poor infrastructure increases transaction costs but these are further exacerbated by the frequent 
police checks which provide opportunities for bribes and rents for those powerful enough to avoid this 
type of harassment.  
 
The original analysis for each country was undertaken by the Monitoring and Analysing Food and 
Agricultural Policies (MAFAP) programme of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and partners. 
MAFAP is working with national governments and other country partners to set up a sustainable and 
country owned system for monitoring, analysing and eventually reforming food and agricultural policies. 
As part of this programme, MAFAP has estimated nominal rates of protection (NRPs) for key agricultural 
commodities over time to measure the impact of policies as well as market and non-market failures20 on 
wholesale prices in major markets where domestically produced commodities compete with imports and 
on the prices received by farmers.21 The NRPs estimated build on the well-established method, notably 
by the OECD, for measuring market price support by comparing the observed international and domestic 
prices. The NRPs are intended to help policy makers and donors understand if policies are having a positive 
impact, to compare results across countries and over time and to focus on where changes could be made 
to reduce distortions resulting from both non-market and market failures. By referring to the NRP, policy 
                                                          
19 See Fengler and Kiringai (2009) and Africa Centre for Open Governance (2009) for details.  
20 Policy distortion is the impact of policy on prices, both the non-market failure component as well as the intended 
impact.  Both market and non-market failures are not disaggregated at this time. 
21 MAFAP is working on a market development gap (MDG) indicator to disentangle the explicit policy effects from 
excessive transportation and processing costs, obsolete technologies and bribes in the value chains.  It has also 
produced estimates of public expenditure for agriculture similar to the OECD’s estimates of PSEs.  These do not 
include market price support but the NRPs are intended as an indicator of the impact of this class of policies. 
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makers and their development partners can discern if the policies implemented, in particular trade and 
marketing policies, are achieving the intended objective, for example, in terms of protection of the 
domestic production. We report on estimates of NRPs for two representative commodities, rice and 
cotton, in nine African countries over the period 2005-2010. 
 
The next section presents the policy and market environment for the two commodities in the countries 
studied. We then provide a short summary of how NRPs are estimated and how the MAFAP method 
compares with some similar analyses found in the literature. The fourth section provides the results of 
the analysis while the final section provides a summary of the findings and some brief concluding 
comments. 
 
3.2 Policy context  
 
3.2.1 General Context and Policy for Cotton22 
 
Cotton is mainly produced in the arid and semi-arid regions of Africa, where it is currently one of the most 
viable cash crops despite the negative effect of subsidies and high levels of protection of many of the 
OECD countries on world prices (Baffes et al., 2009; de Gorter, 2012). In 2010, cotton was by far the most 
valuable export crop in Burkina Faso and Mali, third most important and only slightly behind coffee and 
tobacco in Tanzania, fourth in Mozambique and Malawi, and seventh in Uganda. Better policies and 
targeted public investments could help increase cotton productivity and production resulting in higher 
competitiveness of the cotton value chain.  Additional export opportunities could play an important role 
as a source of income and income diversification contributing to poverty reduction in these areas. It could 
also support the development of an African textile industry, in Kenya for example, to further integrate the 
economies of the East Africa Community (EAC), for instance.23 
In each country analysed, only a small number of companies, public or private, operate ginneries, each of 
which deals with hundreds if not thousands of small-scale farmers. Lele and Christiansen (1989) describe 
how parastatals were used to benefit colonial trading companies in West Africa and expatriate settlers in 
East Africa before independence. They add that political objectives after independence were further 
complicated by the unwillingness of African governments of the time to allow non-indigenous groups and 
relatively dominant local ethnic groups to “achieve a prominent position in politically sensitive or 
economically powerful arenas.”  
In addition to the political motivations, there were a number of economic arguments that favoured 
parastatal monopsonies. These provided a means of implementing the conventional development 
paradigm favouring taxing agriculture. Small scale African farmers were said to lack access to information, 
credit, and other inputs (Toulmin and Guèye, 2003; FAO, 2005). Parastatals monopsonies took on the 
                                                          
22 This section is based on papers on Uganda by Ahmed and Ojangole (2012); Mali by Balié (2012); Mozambique 
by Dias (2012); Burkina Faso by Guissou and Ilboudo (2012a); Malawi by Derlagen (2013); and Tanzania by 
Mwinuka and Maro (2013). See http://www.fao.org/mafap/products/country-reports-technical-notes/en/. 
23 Kenya signed preferential trade agreement with the U.S. in 2000 under the latter’s African Growth Opportunity 
Act, eliminating all duties and quotas on Kenyan textile exports to the U.S. Both textile exports and cotton lint 
imports from Uganda and Tanzania initially grew rapidly but peaked in 2004 constrained by the supply of cotton 
lint. 
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function of providing these with the certainty that they could deduct the costs out of the proceeds of crop 
sales. (Bates, 1981; Tschirley et al., 2009; Tschirley et al., 2010). 
There was, too, a perception that if government were not taxing agriculture, then others would:  
“The stated objectives of the control over marketing were to protect farmers and 
consumers from exploitation by merchants and middlemen, reduce price fluctuations, and 
ensure tax and foreign exchange revenues… Sometimes state ownership was viewed as a 
way of protecting farmers from the local monopolies of privately owned processing 
facilities.” (Akiyama et al., 2003, pg. 4) 
This perception applies particularly to cotton processing and trading and is a rationale for policy in the 
period under consideration. The Malawi Ministry of Agriculture (2006, pg. 3) complains that the cotton 
ginning “companies instead of competing to buy seed cotton…collude and in the process offer low farm 
gate prices.” Such a view is not surprising as there are only two cotton ginning companies in Malawi and 
about 120,000 cotton farmers, some of which are in the poorest regions of the country. There are many 
more ginneries in Tanzania but, according to Baffes (2002, pg.8), traders “in remote areas, especially in 
the eastern cotton growing area, are paid very little for cotton, in part because farmers were unaware of 
market prices and in part because of high transport costs.” Of course, the ginneries must offer a price high 
enough to provide an incentive for continued cotton production but low enough for the ginnery to be able 
to sell its cotton at a profit while deterring competition from new ginneries. 
This perception that there are pervasive increasing returns and missing markets for inputs affecting 
agricultural commodities in Africa has provided a rationale for government intervention. In short, these 
are the same types of concern which resulted in the explosion of marketing boards in Canada between 
1930 and 1970. Some economists have been critical of this type of rationale for the creation of producer 
run cartels in Canada and regulation to protect farmers such as regulated freight rates for grain, barriers 
to imports and single desk commodity buyers. Secondly, it is increasingly the case that governments are 
backing away from support for these measures. In part, this change in heart may have been fuelled by the 
realization that the claims of market failures made in the past may have been exaggerated or, mistaken. 
Alternatively, it may be that (information, communication, and transportation) technology and market 
structure (fewer farmers operating large commercial farms) have changed making these policies 
unnecessary. As in Canada, the consolidation of small-scale farms into fewer, large-scale, commercial 
family businesses and the development of modern transportation and communications systems could 
eliminate many market failures. Jensen (2007) describes how the cell phone is already making a difference 
for market information deficiencies in developing countries. 
All six countries studied have one or more agencies or parastatal organizations charged with promoting 
the cotton sector, but the degree of centralized direction exercised varies considerably from country to 
country. The private sector is now responsible for cotton ginning in all of the countries studied except for 
Mali and Burkina Faso where responsibility for cotton marketing is still vested in parastatals. Governments 
of both countries have set up regional companies that provide inputs to, and collect seed cotton from 
village level producer associations, process it in their ginneries and market the cotton lint, cottonseed and 
other by-products of the ginneries. They also play an important role in setting producer prices for seed 
cotton. However, in all countries studied ginneries operate well below capacity. 
The two companies in Burkina Faso are owned by a consortium of domestic and international agribusiness 
companies including Reinhart (Swiss), Cargill (US), Dagris/Geocoton (French), and Ivoire Coton (Côte 
d’Ivoire) as well as l’Union nationale des producteurs de coton du Burkina (UNPC-B). The latter is an 
umbrella organization for the 12,250 cotton producer associations. There are two companies in Mali, but 
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the Compagnie Malienne pour le Development des Textiles (CMDT) manages about 94 percent of the 
cotton produced. CMDT is almost entirely government-owned. In both countries, the companies operate 
in specific regions with an effective monopsony status. 
The industry is only slightly less concentrated in Mozambique. The Mozambique Cotton Institute (IAM) is 
the main cotton parastatal with responsibilities for the production of seed cotton, protection of 
stakeholders and fostering the development of the industry. It licenses eight ginneries which each have 
exclusive concessions to buy seed cotton in a specific region, fixes minimum pan-seasonal and pan-
territorial prices and is the buyer of last resort if the ginneries are not willing to buy seed cotton from 
some producers. 
The cotton value chains in the other three countries are far more market-oriented. The Tanzania Cotton 
Board (TCB) is primarily a regulatory agency that promotes the development of the cotton sector through 
setting quality standards, licensing post-farm gate businesses involved in cotton trade and processing, 
farmer education and ensuring the seed cotton market is competitive. There are about 500,000 cotton 
farmers in Tanzania who sell their seed cotton to cotton traders or directly to one of the 40 to 60 ginneries.  
Since 2007, a new contract farming system has been made available in Tanzania in which farmers can get 
credit and other inputs from a ginnery and agree to sell their seed cotton to the ginnery according to the 
terms of the contract. The TCB also operates a network of about 8,000 'buying posts’ for farmers not 
selling their seed cotton under contract. 
The Ugandan cotton sector is organized much like that in Tanzania. Ginneries in Uganda are privately 
owned and operated companies that market the cotton lint and cottonseed they produce. The 
Government of Uganda mandated the Cotton Development Organization (CDO) to promote, monitor and 
regulate. The ginneries in Uganda are also required to provide a certain amount of cotton seed to the CDO 
which in turn provides good quality, treated seed to cotton farmers without charge.  
Malawi’s Cotton Development Trust (CDT) brings together all stakeholders in the value chain: farmers, 
input suppliers, ginners and the Malawi Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. It recommends a 
minimum price for seed cotton each year to the government and advises on other aspects of policy for 
the cotton value chain. 
In all cases, ginnery costs are adjusted for the value of cotton seed produced and sold. In addition, there 
are some significant differences in what is included in the price at various points along the value chain and 
more particularly in terms of costs directly or indirectly supported by cotton growers. Where ginneries 
supply farm level inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and extension services) reported farm prices appear 
to be net of these input costs and as a result farm gate prices are lower than they would be if farmers 
bore these costs directly. Individual farmers and farmer associations store their seed cotton in their own 
silos in some of the countries studied (e.g. Tanzania). Farmers bear some or all transport costs in some 
countries (e.g. Uganda). In others, ginneries are responsible for transportation costs giving them more 
control over supply logistics (e.g. Mali and Mozambique). These differences affect the overall transport 
and storage costs, including opportunity costs, in the value chain and can explain some price differences 
at the farm gate although they result in relatively smaller differences in the nominal rates of protection. 
All countries studied have a complex policy framework for the cotton value chain as summarized in Table 
3. At the beginning of the crop year, all of the governments concerned publish administrative prices that 
are variously described as minimum, floor, forecast or indicative prices. In Mozambique and Mali, a final 
farm price is announced near harvest based upon prices that are likely to be realized from the sale of 
cotton lint available minus an estimate of market access costs. An administrative price determined later 
in the season is likely to be a better estimate of the competitive price but can still be distorted and difficult 
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to implement. When the minimum price has been set higher than what the ginners believe they can pay, 
governments may provide subsidies. For example, Mozambique has had to enforce its minimum price on 
at least one occasion since 2007 by buying seed cotton that ginneries were unwilling to purchase. The 
Instituto de Algodão de Moçambique (IAM) bought the unwanted cotton and presumably sold it at a loss. 
 












Burkina Faso 2005-10 2005-10 2005-10 2005-10  2005-10 
Malawi 2007-08  2005-10   2008-10 
Mali 2009-10 2005-10 2005-10   2005-10 
Mozambique 2005-10 2005-10 2005-10  2005-10  
Uganda 2005-10  2005-10 2008 2005-10  
Tanzania 2008  2005-10 2010   
Source: authors based on MAFAP information 
In Burkina Faso, the government and l’Agence Française du Développement has endowed a fund to 
subsidize farmers when realized prices at harvest are below the minimum price. The fund pays the 
difference between the realized price and the minimum. If global prices at harvest are above the minimum 
price, farmers in Burkina Faso receive an administratively determined premium with part of the extra 
revenue over 5 percent of the minimum going to the fund to support prices in other years that would be 
below the minimum.  
In Malawi, the government sets a “minimum price” that seems to function merely as a forecast. Prices 
paid to farmers by the two ginning companies in 2008 and 2010 were 63 percent and 46 percent higher 
than the minimum price respectively, but in 2009, they were 44 percent lower than the minimum price.  
In some countries, there is a tendency for the minimum price to become the final price. According to the 
Uganda Ministry of Agriculture, their indicative price was also the final price in all but three of the last 17 
years while Baffes (2002) and Baffes et al. (2008) report that in some cases traders in Tanzania collude to 
avoid paying more than the minimum price and in others farmers resist prices below the minimum.  
Except for Burkina Faso, the method for responding to prices below the administrative price appears to 
be more or less ad hoc. The willingness and ability of governments to support a minimum price clearly 
depends on the situation. Uganda provided price subsidies in 2007/2008 and Tanzania for the 2009/10 
crop year. In Uganda’s case, the realized seed cotton price was 50 percent below the minimum without 
the subsidy but the subsidy brought it up to 75 percent of the minimum. The subsidy amounted to 17 
percent of the realized price in Tanzania’s case. In general, governments find it difficult administratively 
to finance expenditures that are not foreseen in the national budgeting process. Large outlays may 
ultimately need to be accommodated by reduced expenditures elsewhere. The use of terms such as 
“indicative” and “reference” by countries of the East Africa Community (EAC) as well as minimum also 
suggests that minimum prices are something less than a guarantee.  
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In summary, the government plays a major role in the cotton sector of the countries studied. Policy 
appears to be most market-oriented in Tanzania both in terms of the role of the parastatal responsible 
for the sector and pricing policy. Tanzania has also recently introduced regional buying centres that would 
seem to be an attempt to provide a more competitive seed cotton market for farmers. However, reference 
prices in all three EAC countries may have an important role in determining prices farmers receive. As 
indicated above, the minimum price policy in Malawi was not enforced in at least one year of the three 
years for which we have data suggesting that it operates, effectively, like an unregulated monopsony. 
There is no competition among ginneries in Mozambique, Burkina Faso, or Mali as each has exclusive 
rights in specific regions of the country but is operating in a market with a regulated price. However, the 
ginneries in the two West African countries are essentially state enterprises while those in Mozambique 
are all private companies. There are quite different non-market approaches to address the perceived 
market failures in the cotton sectors of the six countries studied. Country differences in terms of 
regulations, as well as forms of support to the sector, will be captured by the NRPs and influence their 
relative levels.  
Overall, policies affecting cotton appear to be aimed at increasing returns and missing markets that 
disadvantage small-scale cotton farmers, while in the case of rice; food security is clearly a major policy 
objective as we will see in the next section. 
 
3.2.2 General Context and Policy for Rice24 
 
Net rice imports accounted for an average of 34 percent of domestic supply during 2005-2010 with the 
share ranging from 6 percent in Tanzania to 89 percent in Kenya. Although rice is mainly produced by 
small-scale farmers in the eight countries studied, it is not primarily a subsistence crop consumed on farm.  
Even in Mali with by the far the greatest consumption per capita, only 37 percent of the rice produced is 
consumed on-farm (Samake and Bélières, 2007). In general, rice is a cash crop produced in competition 
with imports and consumed mainly by middle- and high-income consumers, in urban areas, or on special 
occasions. The demand for rice is therefore expected to grow rapidly with rising incomes and urbanization. 
Most rice is produced using various irrigation systems although some dryland rice production takes place 
in all the countries studied.  There are a number of different irrigation systems in the Niger basin in Mali 
and Burkina Faso but irrigated rice production in other countries is mostly on irrigation schemes that were 
established by the governments concerned. The Mwea Irrigation in Kenya for example accounted for 88% 
of rice production between 2005 and 2010 according to Kenya National Irrigation Board (NIB) data.  
According to Ruigi (1986), the schemes adopted a paternalistic command and control management 
system with extensive powers over most management decisions vested in NIB administrators.  Plot-
holders did not and still do not own their land but are tenants with a renewable annual lease and pay an 
annual rent that in 2009 was about US$800/ ha (Gitau et al., 2011). In Tanzania for example, higher-level 
bureaucrats and politicians often intervene in land allocation cases on rice schemes but village leaders 
and the local elite are also important players that benefit from their involvement (Therkildsen, 2011).  
 
                                                          
24 This section is based on papers on Uganda by Ahmed (2012); Ghana by Angelucci et al (2013); Mali by Balié et 
al (2013); Tanzania by Barreiro-Hurle (2012); Nigeria by Cadoni and Angelucci (2013); Burkina Faso by Guissou 
and Ilboudo (2012b); Mozambique by Witwer (2012); and Kenya by Short et al (2012). See 
http://www.fao.org/mafap/products/country-reports-technical-notes/en/ . 
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The price spike in global commodity markets in 2007/08 was greater for rice than any other cereal (FAO, 
2010; Headey and Fan, 2010). The price spike together with import dependence and the prospects of 
rapidly increasing domestic demand focused concern on rice policy in most of the countries studied. The 
potential contribution of rice to increase the diversity in staple crop consumption, production and rural 
incomes were seen as additional benefits. Policymakers in the countries studied also appeared to be 
convinced that there were good prospects to increase rice production by their small-scale farmers. It is 
this combination of factors that made rice a priority commodity for policymakers in the countries studied. 
This priority given to rice by policy makers is illustrated in three policy areas: the National Rice 
Development Strategies (NRDS)25, additional budgetary resources for infrastructure for rice production 
and the tariff regimes that appear to protect rice more than other staple commodities. Tanzania’s 
objective, for instance, was to double rice production by 2018 to “develop the agricultural sector in order 
to attain the desired food security situation and growth for poverty reduction” according to its NRDS. 
Other countries included in this study have similar goals and ambitious targets. The Kenya government 
budgets in 2009 and 2010, for example, included new initiatives to rehabilitate and expand irrigation 
schemes that are mainly used for rice production. With regard to tariffs, the EAC agreed to a common 
external tariff (CET) of 75% while the CET for maize and wheat is set at 50% and 35%, respectively.26  
External tariffs generally are much lower for West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
countries but the CET for rice at 12% is higher than the 7% CET on wheat, millet and maize.  
The countries studied have used a very diverse set of input subsidies for rice over the six-year study period. 
These range from none, in Uganda and Tanzania, to comprehensive programmes in Nigeria and Ghana 
that are broadly targeted in terms of commodities and farmers. In between are programmes subsidizing 
fertilizers and seeds and benefitting a subset of rice producers such as Mozambique’s ‘rice packs’. Some 
programmes, such as fertilizer subsidies in Mali and Burkina Faso, were introduced as a response to the 
2007/08 food commodity price crisis in order to boost domestic production and reduce the dependence 
on international markets (Balié et al., 2013; Guissou and Ilboudo, 2012). Others were in place previously, 
such as Nigeria’s fertilizer subsidies, or were introduced following other drivers, such as the rice 
component of Kenya’s Economic Stimulus Programme.  
The input subsidy programmes, and the research and extension programmes under the Coalition for 
African Rice Development (CARD), may be important factors increasing the supply of rice (Druilhe and 
Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). Yields grew at an annual rate of 6.3 percent in the countries studied between 2005 
and 2010 while total production only increased at 4.8 percent because of a reduction in the area 
cultivated.  
Many of the countries studied also have parastatals for marketing major staple commodities. These 
generally have a dual function: to maintain a buffer stock that can be used to respond to exceptional 
shortfall in production resulting in a food security crisis for some segment of the population and to 
intervene when market prices for consumers rise above a ceiling level or fall below floor level for 
                                                          
25 All of the countries studied have prepared NRDSs in partnership with the Coalition for African Rice Development 
(CARD). CARD was established by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). The CARD strategy 
focuses on strengthening the production and multiplication of foundation and certified seed, research, agricultural 
extension, the development of agricultural land and water resources, and improved small-scale, post-harvest rice 
processing equipment. 
26  This was effective as of Jan. 1 2005.  The previous tariff in Tanzania, one of the governments arguing for strong 
protection, was 35% (Therkildsen 2011).   
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producers.27 Rice tends to be consumed mainly by middle and high income families and has not always 
been included in buffer stocks or price stabilization programmes. However, rice markets may be affected 
even when rice is not included in a buffer stock or price stabilization programme by spill over effects. 
The level of floor and ceiling prices has important consequences for how frequently market prices trigger 
government or parastatal intervention. An extremely low floor price will rarely trigger a purchase and 
conversely, a very high ceiling price will rarely trigger a sale. When the parastatal does engage in some 
sort of price stabilization intervention, this may well trigger losses which will eventually require transfers 
from the government budget. If sufficient funds are not available, or if the parastatal has insufficient 
stocks to meet demand at the ceiling price, then market prices may well go outside the floor-ceiling band.  
Regional and local governments in all countries studied may also affect rice markets by charges they levy. 
In Tanzania, for instance, a district sales tax is charged on grain ”exported” from the district to any 
destination. The tax rate varies from district to district between one and five percent. There are fees in 
some countries for grain transported through a district and for marketing it in local markets. Police checks 
along major transportation corridors are common and provide a venue for collecting district fees and an 
opportunity for extra-legal charges to avoid costly delays and/or avoid compliance with load limits and 
other regulations, all of which are a distributional inequity type of non-market failure.  
Burkina Faso and Mali have introduced new marketing policies or reverted to some pre-liberalization 
policies in response to the commodity price crisis of 2007/08. While it has been the case in Mali since 
2003, Burkina Faso began including rice in its food security stocks in 2008. Both countries used a direct 
price control approach to stabilize prices rather than the indirect approach of buffer stocks. Mali 
established price ceilings at both wholesale and retail in 2008/09. In 2005, Mali also set prices in response 
to a food security crisis in that year. In Mali, another important decision in 2007/08 was to mitigate food 
insecurity in the country by selling grain from national stocks at subsidized prices. Sales included maize 
(also exported in small volumes), millet and sorghum (very small volume traded, occasionally exported), 
and rice (massive volume imported).  
Burkina Faso prices were based on estimated costs of production plus a producer margin throughout 2008 
-2010. They also set margins through the rest of the supply chain implicitly controlling prices at all levels. 
All the countries studied belong to one or more preferential trade agreements (PTAs) which discipline 
their tariffs with each other and the rest of the world. They also seek to limit the effect of non-tariff 
barriers. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are members of the EAC. Kenya and Uganda are also members of 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Tanzania and Mozambique were 
members of COMESA but withdrew. They are both members of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). All four West African countries are members of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). Burkina Faso and Mali are also members of WAEMU. 
Mozambique’s SADC commitment specifies a zero tariff on rice imports from other SADC countries except 
South Africa throughout the 2005-2010 study period. The tariff on rice from South Africa was limited to 
7.5 percent in 2005 and 2006, four percent in 2007 and zero thereafter. There was no SADC agreement 
on common external tariffs during the study period. Mozambique’s MFN tariffs were 2.5 percent for the 
                                                          
27 Trying to use buffer stocks to stabilize prices has been criticized for a number of reasons: they replace private 
stocks, are subject to mismanagement and corruption resulting in high costs.  Significant non-market failures can 
also result: parastatal stock managers may exacerbate price fluctuations because they are not better at anticipating 
future supplies than private stock holders (Jane, 2011; Tangermann, 2011; Timmer, 2011; Demeke et al., 2014). 
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Harmonized System Code Customs Tariff (HS codes) that correspond to paddy, brown and broken rice in 
2009 and 2010 while milled rice (HS 100630) was subject to a 7.5 percent tariff.  
In the EAC, tariffs between Tanzania and Uganda and tariffs on imports by Kenya from Tanzania and 
Uganda were eliminated in January, 2005. Some imports from Kenya to Uganda and Tanzania were subject 
to tariffs, which declined linearly to zero over the period 2005-2010. In particular, the tariff on rice was 
10 percent in 2005 and declined to eight percent in 2006 and six percent in 2007. The EAC agreement on 
CETs sets the tariff rates for all three countries on rice imports from non-EAC countries at 75 percent or 
US$ 200/tonne, whichever is greater. However, Kenya received a two-year exemption in 2005, and a 
further two-year exemption in 2007 that set the tariff on rice imports from Pakistan at 25 percent. Another 
two-year exemption in 2009 set the tariff rate on imports from Pakistan at 35 percent. 
Tanzania’s rice exports to Uganda and Rwanda are subject to zero tariffs in accordance with the EAC 
agreement. EAC imports from some COMESA countries are also subject to zero tariffs on a reciprocal basis. 
Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are major destinations for Uganda rice exports, are 
included in these trade agreements.  
In addition, non-tariff charges at the border were disciplined. In compliance with the EAC agreement, 
Kenya charged an Import Declaration Form fee of 2.75 percent of the CIF value of the shipment. By 2009, 
this fee had been reduced to 2.25 percent. In Tanzania, the fee structure is more complicated but amounts 
to 1.4 percent of the value of the shipment plus additional charges per shipment. Uganda does not appear 
to charge custom and inspection services at the border.  
There are no tariffs on internal trade among members of the WAEMU and they have agreed to a CET 
structure similar to the EAC. There are four bands: medicines, agricultural inputs and capital are zero-
rated; raw materials, such as crude oil and cereals for industrial processing, face a five percent tariff; semi-
finished product including rice and other cereals are subject to a 10 percent tariff; and final goods are 
allotted a 20 percent tariff. Since Mali and Burkina Faso are also members of ECOWAS, imports are also 
subject to an ECOWAS levy of 0.5 percent. Mali also levies an additional one percent administration fee.  
ECOWAS has objectives similar to those in the EAC and WAEMU to eliminate tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
on internal trade and adopt a CET framework. It has succeeded on eliminating internal tariffs but has 
struggled with agreeing to a CET which was only adopted in March 2013 by the ECOWAS ministers of 
finance. Nigeria has been the ‘elephant in the room’ in this regard. It could not agree to proposals to 
harmonize with WAEMU and as a result, the current ECOWAS framework includes a fifth band at 35 
percent. 
There is a lack of consensus on what tariff Nigeria actually applies to rice imports. According to the WTO 
tariff database, Nigeria levied Most Favoured Nations (MFN) tariffs, which were five percent for paddy 
and brown rice and a 10 percent tariff for milled rice and broken rice in 2009 and 2010. But other fees 
were even larger than the tariffs according to the 2011 WTO Trade Policy Review. These consisted of the 
0.5 percent ECOWAS levy, a one percent fee for the Nigeria’s Comprehensive Import Supervision Scheme 
and a special 20 percent levy on rice. This makes for total ad valorem fees amounting to 26.5 to 31.5 
percent. A USDA Global Agriculture Information Network (GAIN) reports that tariffs for 2005-2007 were 
100 to 110 percent (Randon and David, 2010).  
Ghana also has a complicated fee structure. It consists of a tariff of 20 percent, the 0.5 percent ECOWAS 
levy, a Ghana Customs Network charge of 0.4 percent, an inspection fee of one percent, an Export 
Development and Investment fee of 0.5 percent, a National Health Insurance levy of 2.5 percent and the 
12.5 percent VAT. The VAT is not levied on domestic rice so it, like the other fees, is equivalent in impact 
 
46 | P a g e  
 
to a tariff on rice. The total of all these charges on rice imports amounts to 36.9 percent. However, the 
tariff portion was suspended in June 2008 before being reinstated in 2009.  
In addition, some of the countries studied have implemented trade bans from time to time. Mali banned 
rice exports in part of 2007 and all of 2008 while Tanzania threatened a ban on rice imports from COMESA 
countries in 2010. Tanzania had bans in place on maize exports over much of the study period which may 
have indirectly impacted rice value chains. 
 The information above is synthesized in Table 4 to provide an estimate of the tariffs and other charges 
levied on imports according to the major import source where the major source of imports are identified 
in trade statistics. These estimates are based on published information about current or recent tariffs and 
charges. In almost all instances, it has been necessary to infer that these are unchanged for some years. 
In cases where multiple tariff rates are available, the rate applicable to HS100630, milled rice, is given. 
Non ad valorem charges are not shown and these may be significant in some cases, such as Tanzania.  
Multiple tariff rates are shown in cases where there have been changes in tariff rates or other charges 
introduced in the middle of a calendar year. The reductions in tariffs in Burkina Faso, Mali and Ghana in 
2008 and 2009 are instances of changes that were intended to help consumers cope with high rice prices 
in those years. The increase in the tariff on rice imports by Kenya in 2009 was owing to its EAC 
commitments and the reduction in Nigeria in 2008 was related to its ECOWAS commitments. It is almost 
never clear when tariffs are reduced or suspended, and whether other charges are also suspended or 
remain in force, but the latter is generally assumed here. 
If the rice markets in the countries studied are efficient with a good price transmission from the border to 
the farm gate, these charges should be systematically reflected in the prices at the wholesale and farm 
gate levels. Changes in tariff rates, such as those seen in Kenya, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana and Nigeria, 
are expected to be reflected in similar changes in the prices at the wholesale and farm gate levels and are 
good indicators of the effectiveness of border measures in providing price incentives in these markets.  
Finally, the market segments between border and wholesale may still be impacted by both market and 
non-market failures.  Therkildsen (2011) shows that much of the rice imported in Tanzania since 2005 was 
exempted from the 75% tariff and suggests that this was due to the influence of four main traders which 
accounted for 74 – 93% of rice imports in this period.  Similarly, in Burkina Faso, imports are controlled by 
only two trading companies that are able to exercise market power and keep price high at both wholesale 
and retail levels so as to protect their own margins (Guissou and Ilboudo, 2012b). In Mali, three 
wholesalers control roughly two thirds of the rice imports and while they no longer can impose the price, 
they are able to exercise market power during the lean period for domestic production, and when markets 
can only be supplied by imports they control (Balié et al., 2013).   
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Table 4: Estimates of the sum of tariffs and other ad valorem charges affecting the landed cost of rice from the major import 
source of each country (%)   
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Kenyaa 27.8 27.5 27.5 27.5 37.3 37.3 
Ugandab 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 
Tanzaniab 76.4 76.4 76.4 76.4 76.4 NA 
Mozambiquec 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 
Burkina Fasod 13.5 13.5 13.5 13.5, 3.5 3.5, 13.5 13.5 
Malid 2.5 12.5 12.5 12.5, 2.5 12.5 12.5 
Ghanae 36.9 36.9 36.9 36.9, 16.9 16.9, 36.9 36.9 




Note: more than one tariff rate is shown in years in which there was a change in the rate levied.  
aEAC Gazette.  
bEAC CET. Tanzania classified as an exporter in 2010. 
CWTO MFN rate for 2009/10. 
dWAEMU rate with exemptions in 2008/09 for Burkina Faso and 2005 and 2008 for Mali. 2008/09. 
eWTO MFN rates for 2009/10 with exemption for 2008/09. 
fWTO MFN rates for 2009/10 and Randon and David (2010)reports for earlier years. 
 
3.3 Theory and method  
 
Estimates of the nominal rates of protection (NRPs) are used in this paper as indicators of the policy impact 
on prices. Some of the most seminal applications of NRPs and related concepts include Krueger et al. 
(1988), Monke and Pearson (1989), Tsakok (1990), and Anderson (2009). A detailed comparison of the 
application of NRPs and related concepts can be found in Balié and Maetz (2011). Consistent with the 
approach proposed by Krueger et al. (1988, 1991), NRPs have mainly been used to examine two situations: 
(i) direct taxation (or support) of the agricultural sector or a specific value chain through direct sector-
specific price policies (or interventions), and (ii) indirect taxation (or support) through trade policies, 
exchange rate and any other macroeconomic policies or non-agricultural sector specific policies. The 
analyses usually do not focus so much on specific year but rather on NRP time series and its trend. In 
almost all cases, the direct policy effect is equivalent to a tax on exportable goods and to a subsidy for 
importable goods while the indirect effect also result in taxes on agriculture which generally dominates 
the direct effect. For example, Quiroz and Valdes (1993) argue that, in the case of Zambia and Zimbabwe 
during 1980-87, there was a negative trend in nominal protection rate that was the result of increasing 
transport costs due to deterioration of infrastructure, lack of spare parts, and other factors that could 
here be qualified as non-market failures.  
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Some variations on NRPs found in the literature include the nominal protection coefficient (NPC), which 
expresses the result as a ratio rather than as percentage change.28 The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) 
at the farm gate is the sum of the NRP plus subsidies paid to the farmer expressed as a percent of the 
adjusted border price. The subsidies may also include the value of input subsidies whether provided as 
payments directly to the farmer or indirectly through policies which affect farm prices (Monke and 
Pearson, 1989). In a developed country context, NRAs are calculated by the OECD using the Producer 
Support Estimate data base (OECD, 2010). 
What follows is a description of how NRPs are being used in the context of MAFAP, a more detailed 
presentation of the method used to calculate NRPs in the framework of MAFAP can be found in Barreiro-
Hurlé and Witwer (2013). 
The point along the value chain where these indicators are calculated plays a key role. As described by 
Tsakok (1990), the border price and domestic price need to be compared at the same point in the value 
chain. This leads to a number of challenges in real world applications in terms of data requirements but 
also makes the calculation of these indicators meaningful for policy. Monke and Pearson (1989) calculate 
the indicators at the farm gate. Anderson adjusts farm prices instead of border prices and therefore 
reports indicators at the border. This paper is closest to Tsakok (1990) with NRPs estimated at the farm 
gate and wholesale which helps locate market and non-market failures along the value chain.  
To compare prices in a wholesale market for an imported commodity, an adjusted border price is needed 
to account for the costs incurred to take the commodity from a CIF position to sale in the wholesale market 
in question: 
 
𝐵𝑃𝑤 = 𝑃𝑏 + 𝑇𝐶𝑏.𝑤 + 𝑀𝑀𝑏.𝑤 (1) 
 
where BPw is the CIF price (or average unit value) of the commodity converted into domestic currency 
using an exchange rate;29 TCb.w includes all handling costs at the border, transportation and any processing 
costs between CIF and placement of the commodity on the wholesale market; and MMb.w are the 
importers’ normal marketing margins between the border and the wholesale market. The signs would be 
reversed in the case of an export and with the border price being an FOB price (or unit value). 
Note that the border price does not include the tariff and tariff equivalent charges. Similarly TCb.w includes 
only the resource costs of moving the commodity between border and wholesale, and MMb.w is a ‘normal’ 
marketing margin.  The adjusted border price at the farm gate would be  
 
𝐵𝑃𝑓 = 𝐵𝑃𝑤 − 𝑇𝐶𝑓.𝑤 − 𝑀𝑀𝑓.𝑤 (2) 
 
                                                          
28 The NPC is the ratio of the domestic price to the border price.  The NRP is the difference between the domestic 
price and the border price divided by the border price.  
29 The exchange rate used should reflect opportunity costs and should itself be adjusted in cases when the domestic 
currency is overvalued. African currencies have often been overvalued but most have been determined by market 
forces since about the 1980s. An exception is the CFA franc region in West Africa that has been tied to the French 
franc (and now the Euro) and Malawi for about 2008-10. Burkina Faso and Mali are included in the CFA franc 
region (Etta-Nkwellea et al., 2010).  
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where TCf.w include all handling costs at the border, transportation and any processing costs between the 
farm gate and placement of the commodity on the wholesale market; and MMf.w are normal marketing 
margins between the wholesale market and the farm. 
The NRP, expressed as a percentage, can then be calculated as the difference between the adjusted 
border price and the domestic price at wholesale and/or the farm gate: 
 
𝑁𝑅𝑃𝑤 = 100% × (𝑊𝑃 − 𝐵𝑃𝑤)/𝐵𝑃𝑤 (3) 
 
𝑁𝑅𝑃𝑓 = 100% × (𝐹𝑃 − 𝐵𝑃𝑓)/𝐵𝑃𝑓 (4) 
 
In the simplest case where tariffs are the only market imperfection, Anderson (2008) shows that the NRPs 
at the border are equal to the tariff. In the absence of market imperfections between the border and 
wholesale market, it can be shown that NRP at wholesale for an imported commodity is equal to the tariff 
and other tariff equivalent charges multiplied by the ratio of the border price to the adjusted border price 
at the wholesale level. We refer to this indicator as the theoretical NRP (TNRPw) which is calculated as 
follows 
 
𝑇𝑁𝑅𝑃𝑤 = 𝑇% × 𝐵𝑃𝑏/𝐵𝑃𝑤 (5) 
 
where T% is the tariff and other equivalent charges expressed as an ad valorum tariff. The difference 
between the NRPs and the expected NRPs disaggregate the effect of the tariff and other factors in the 
price gaps.  
Similarly, in the absence of market imperfections between the farm gate and wholesale the theoretical 




The theoretical NRP would be the measure if only a tariff where in place. The calculated NRP, in addition 
to the effect of the tariff, includes the effects of market imperfections (asymmetric access to information, 
market power, etc.) as well as the effect of other policy measures (such as market regulations), other fees 
and levies, and other measures adopted by governments to generate revenue, address market failures or 
pursue other objectives, all of which distort price transmission between the border and the farmer. The 
difference at the farm gate between the actual NRP and the theoretical NRP excludes the effect of the 
tariff and therefore, calculating the theoretical NRPs allows for some additional insight on the impacts of 
market and non-market failures.  
 




3.4.1 Results of the Analysis for Cotton  
 
Border prices for cotton are determined on an export basis for the countries studied so prices are 
expected to decline along the value chain from the border. For example, if the border price is $100 and 
transport and marketing margins between the border and wholesale are $10 then the price at wholesale 
would be $90. A 5 percent export levy, in the absence of other polices and market and non-market failures, 
would result in a wholesale price of $85 and an NRP at wholesale of minus 5.6 percent. In this case, costs 
and margins between the farm and wholesale of $25 would result in a farm price of $60 and an NRP at 
the farm gate of minus 8.3 percent. A subsidy that increased farm prices would result in less negative or 
positive NRPs at the farm but not affect NRPs at wholesale. Additional fees and charges or above normal 
marketing margins in the value chain would result in more negative NRPs.   
 
Table 5:  Farm gate nominal rates of protection for cotton 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Tanzania -33% -48% -35% -33% -4% -26% -30% 15% 
Uganda -14% -24% -19% -7% -4% -10% -13% 8% 
Mozambique -19% -26% -19% -39% -6% 18% -15% 19% 
Malawi -0% -16% -15% 51% 8% -30% 0% 28% 
Burkina Faso -5% 8% -2% 2% 15% 25% 7% 11% 
Mali 48% 8% 41% 26% 132% 11% 44% 46% 
 
Table 5 shows results for each of the countries studied for the 2005-2010 reporting period. Nearly all sales 
are direct exports by the ginning companies so the only market-determined prices are unit export values 
and farm gate prices. Therefore no indicators at the ginnery level are reported.  
The NRPs for the four eastern Africa countries are consistently negative with the only exceptions being 
2008 and 2009 in Malawi. The higher NRP in 2009 in Tanzania seems to indicate that farmers in that year 
mostly benefitted from the subsidy. The positive impact of the subsidy in Uganda in 2008 is also evident. 
NRPs at the farm gate are expected to be near zero in Uganda and slightly negative in Mozambique 
because of the export levy in that country. In fact, they average -13 percent in Uganda and -15 percent in 
Mozambique where they are also more variable as shown by the standard deviation. The average NRP of 
-30 percent in Tanzania indicates large price distortions in that country. These results indicate that farm 
level prices are lower than they would be in the absence of market and non-market failures. In 
Mozambique’s case, the monopsonies exercised by the ginneries would be the obvious explanation for 
                                                          
30 All the underlying data used for the calculations can be found in MAFAP Price Incentives and Disincentives 
Database, accessible at: http://www.fao.org/mafap/database. 
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lower farm gate price levels and the negative NRPs. It seems likely that the same explanation applies to 
Uganda and Tanzania despite the different approaches to regulating the ginneries.  
In Malawi’s case, the NRPs should be near zero between 2005 and 2008, and slightly more negative than 
-5 percent and -8 percent in 2009 and 2010, respectively. 31 Results show that the NRPs are in fact quite 
erratic. They vary from -16 percent and -15 percent in 2006 and 2007 to +51 percent in 2008 all when they 
should be near zero. For 2009, they are 8 percent, when they should be about -8 percent; and -30 percent 
in 2010, when they should be about -15 percent. It is likely that this is a result of the timing between 
deliveries and payments and how they are recorded by fiscal and calendar year. The average is a better 
indicator of the overall situation in Malawi, which indicates no distortion in farm gate prices in that 
country.  
The results for Mali show a situation where ginners are paying higher prices for cotton to farmers and 
then selling the cotton for export at prices below those paid to farmers plus their market access costs.32 
The treasury must eventually cover losses incurred by the ginners or the ginneries will go bankrupt and 
be unable to pay farmers. The consistent pattern of large positive NRPs in Mali is clearly not sustainable. 
There have been several bailouts of these companies in the past in Mali so the losses we report will likely 
result in another bailout.  
NRPs at the farm gate in Burkina Faso are generally small and positive averaging +7 percent over the six 
years. This is what would be expected based upon the patterns of subsidies and levies in the stabilization 
fund.33 However, the average NRP of +7 percent indicates the fund is gradually being depleted. To be 
sustainable, the fund should result in an average NRP of zero over the analysed period.  
In summary, the estimates for the cotton NRPs show a consistent pattern of market and non-market 
failures which reduce incentives at the farm level in the countries in eastern and southern Africa. We 
conclude that on balance the parastatals in Burkina Faso and Mali demonstrate the same sorts of non-
market failures that monopsonistic parastatals have demonstrated in the past arising from a combination 
of internalities and private goods and distributional inequity.  The non-market failures in the two countries 
in western Africa result in higher prices than justifiable by border prices. These are clearly the result of 
the subsidy in Burkina Faso and Mali, although the subsidy in Mali’s case is likely absorbed by the 
marketing parastatal. Neither is sustainable under current financial arrangements. It is not possible to 
determine a farm price such that the cotton ginning and marketing companies just cover their average 
costs until after the average selling price of the crop is known. Our results show rents are being 
consistently earned between the farm gate and export by the cotton ginning and trading companies. The 
various policies used to regulate the industry, mostly based on setting an indicative or reference prices, 
may mitigate but do not eliminate market failures in these value chains. 
                                                          
31 The Kwacha became slightly overvalued in about 2008. It is estimated that it was overvalued by 8% in 2009 and 
15% in 2010.  
32 Of course, there could be a problem with the data used: the reported export price for Mali is low relative to that 
found for the other countries in the study. An administrative estimate of 0.42 was used for the outturn ratio (ginning 
yield) in Burkina Faso and Mali for all years. FAOSTAT data indicates that the actual outturn ratios may be a bit 
lower. A lower outturn ratio would reduce the reference prices at the farm gate and increase the NRPs, indicating 
even larger subsidies. 
33 The year to year variation observed in the case of Burkina Faso is inconsistent with the pattern of contributions 
and withdrawals from the fund. As in Malawi, it is likely that this is an issue of the timing between deliveries and 
with the average being a more reliable indicator. 
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3.4.2 Results of the Analysis for Rice  
 
The large tariffs described in the policy section for rice need to be accounted for in evaluating NRPs for 
rice.34 For example, if the border price is $100 and transport and marketing margins between border and 
wholesale are $30 then the price at wholesale would be $130.35 A tariff of 40 percent, in the absence of 
other policies and market and nonmarket failures, would result in a wholesale price of $170 and an NRP 
at wholesale of +70 percent. Additional distortions between the border and wholesale, whether caused 
by additional government fees and regulations and/or non-competitive markets, would increase prices 
and NRPs at wholesale. If tariffs were the only distortion, costs and margins between the farm and 
wholesale of $25 would result in a farm price of $145 and an NRP at the farm gate of +45 percent. Any 
market and non-market failures between wholesale and farm gate would reduce prices and NRPs at the 
farm gate but not affect those at wholesale. However, any market and non-market failures between the 
border and wholesale would increase prices and NRPs at the farm gate. 
Table 6 shows results for each of the eight countries studied at both wholesale and the farm gate for the 
2005-2010 reporting period. The left-hand panel of Figure 11 shows the NRPs plotted against theoretical 
NRPs at the wholesale level given the tariffs in effect and the estimates of costs and normal marketing 
margins between the border and wholesale. Without distortions arising from the lack of well-functioning 
markets, NRPs at wholesale will equal the theoretical NRPs and the observations should cluster along the 
45° line while market and non-market failures should mark observations well above the 45° line.  
A large majority of the observations for the wholesale markets are well above the 45° line including all 
observations for Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso and Kenya, four of the six observations for Mozambique 
and three of the five observations for Tanzania. In all of these cases, prices at wholesale are much higher 
than expected indicating that in addition to border measures there are significant market and non-market 
failures in the value chains between the border and wholesale markets. These are caused by some 
combination of the effects of regulations, government fees and lack of competitive market structures in 
this market segment. Clearly, they result in much higher consumer prices than warranted by tariffs and 
the costs of bringing imported rice to market. They should result in much higher farm prices as well. 
Before turning to results at the farm gate, a possible explanation for the results for Mali is needed; these 
may be related to regulation. The government of Mali set wholesale ceiling prices for rice in 2005, 2008 
and 2009. The ceiling price was set well below access costs at least in 2008 and 2009. This might have 
resulted in a shortage of imports and the emergence of shadow market transactions not reflected in 
wholesale market prices. In Mali, rice is traditionally a far more important crop than in the other seven 
countries analysed. It is possible that other less formal pressures were in play in other years that resulted 
in gaps in reporting actual wholesale prices. The NRPs at wholesale for Uganda are also less than expected, 
perhaps because of similar issues. 
 
                                                          
34 Except for Tanzania in 2010 when rice was evaluated on an export basis so NRPs of zero are expected at both 
wholesale and farm gate. 
35 Using average values for rice over the six years and eight countries, costs and normal marketing margins between 
border and wholesale were 28% of the border price; costs and normal marketing margins from farm gate to 
wholesale averaged 24% of the border price.  
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Table 6: Nominal rates of protection for rice 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
 Wholesale NRP  
Kenya 85% 66% 85% 90% 95% 115% 89% 
Tanzania 20% 38% 27% 18% 46% 3% 25% 
Uganda 101% 140% 91% 52% 59% -3% 73% 
Mozambique 9% 16% 18% 67% 2% 7% 20% 
Ghana 46% 79% 74% 58% 30% 55% 57% 
Nigeria   68% 23% 47% 44% 45% 
Burkina Faso 73% 34% 26% 18% 55% 25% 39% 
Mali 0% -3% -14% -28% -21% -26% -15% 
        
 Farm Gate NRP  
Kenya 111% 84% 117% 106% 105% 115% 107% 
Tanzania 46% 85% 54% 26% 85% 2% 50% 
Uganda 150% 214% 89% 36% 42% -3% 88% 
Mozambique 22% 18% 37% 63% -9% 5% 23% 
Ghana 53% 87% 90% 86% 6% -8% 52% 
Nigeria   -46% -74% -72% -68% -65% 
Burkina Faso 105% 29% 22% 16% 41% 14% 38% 
Mali -1% -8% -20% -32% -28% -44% -22% 
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Figure 11:  Plot of NRPs versus theoretical NRPs 
  
Note: The 45° line for wholesale appears as a 30° line because of the scaling of the axes 
 
A simple comparison of the NRPs at the wholesale with the tariffs would seem to indicate that in most 
instances farmers are receiving the intended protection. On average, NRPs are somewhat larger than 
tariffs in all countries except Nigeria and Mali and much larger in the case of Kenya and Ghana. But this 
result is as much due to the market and non-market failures affecting wholesale prices as the tariffs.  
Farmers, in fact, are generally receiving far less than they should, given wholesale prices. This is shown in 
the right-hand panel of Figure 11 where NRPs at the farm gate are plotted against their theoretical NRPs. 
In the absence of additional market and non-market failures between farm gate and wholesale markets, 
these points should bunch closely along the 45° line.  
Only 38 percent of the farm gate observations in Figure 11 are within 20 percent of their expected levels. 
The other 62 percent of observations are all much lower than expected, consistent with market power 
asymmetries between farmers and traders, both private and public, in the value chain segment between 
the farm gate to the wholesale markets. This includes all ten observations in Kenya and Nigeria, five of six 
observations in Burkina Faso and Mali, four of six observations in Mozambique and three of six 
observations in Ghana and Tanzania. It is only Uganda where the majority of NRPs are at expected levels. 
Rice farmers should benefit from tariffs and other market and non-market failures between the border 
and wholesale that raise the wholesale price but they clearly do not in the majority of instances observed 
in these countries. Distortions between the wholesale market and the farm gate more than offset the 
additional protection provided by distortions between the border and wholesale. As was observed for 
cotton in the preceding section, other government policies, non-market failures and market failures such 
as lack of competition between the farm gate and wholesale may also have an impact on farm gate prices 
and NRPs.  
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3.5 Summary and conclusion 
 
Most African countries have gone through a similar cycle in the last three decades with respect to 
government involvement in the agricultural sector. In the three decades beginning in 1950, developing 
countries in Africa generally followed an import substitution policy together with extensive intervention 
in the agricultural sector in the form of price and movement controls and parastatal monopolies 
responsible for processing and marketing of most agricultural commodities. This began with a 
disengagement process in the 1980s and early 1990s driven by the lack of success of the earlier policies 
in delivering increased agricultural production or higher incomes for farm families and the Washington 
consensus for a restricted role for government and a much more market-oriented incentive system. 
Although the pendulum has swung back somewhat, commodity markets remain mostly liberalized and 
there is a new appreciation of the importance of market analysis.  
The MAFAP programme put forward by FAO provides a forum where participating African governments 
can exchange their experience and analysis of agricultural policy. At this time, a series of studies of 
commodity value chains have been completed that focus on estimates of NRPs. These, in turn, are based 
on a large number of recent studies of transportation and handling costs, value chains, parity pricing and 
the like. This paper summarizes and synthesizes the analysis of cotton and rice value chains.  
The price gaps, therefore, include the effects of market imperfections (asymmetric access to information, 
market power, etc.) as well as the effect of policy measures such as tariffs, other fees and levies, and other 
measures adopted by governments to generate revenue, address market failures or pursue other 
objectives, all of which distort price transmission between the border and the farmer. The price gap 
measures the actual impact on domestic prices. Disentangling the total price gap into its different 
components (market failure, policy, and non-market failure) is part of the analyst´s task based on the 
nature of the data available. In the most straightforward case (i.e. a single policy in the form of an ad-
valorem tariff) the difference between the value of the tariff and the price gap would be attributed to 
market failures (excessive access costs). However in reality this simple situation does not exist and 
additional intelligence is needed to identify the different components behind the difference.  
As is common to any study using secondary statistical data from developing countries, there are many 
possible sources of errors in the data that may influence results: border prices, costs incurred in moving 
a product between the border and wholesale, the wholesale price, processing costs, the costs associated 
with moving a commodity between the farm and wholesale markets, and farm gate prices. However, the 
consistency of results across different data sources, countries and commodities suggests some confidence 
in them and their implied conclusions. Future MAFAP work will include additional indicators and 
investigate alternative sources of data as well as other analytical approaches that may contribute to a 
better understanding of agricultural policies and their impact in the current African context. 
The governments studied have not been completely successful in eliminating rents and non-market 
failures in the cotton value chains. Therefore, results support the existence of non-market failures 
associated with the intervention on cotton value chains to solve market ones. The countries with 
traditional monopsony parastatals” (Bukina Faso and Mali), exhibit the traditional problems. One 
approach from the literature for a decreasing cost industry like cotton processing and marketing in Africa, 
is a policy under which the parastatals pay farmers a price that just allows them to recover the average 
costs incurred in marketing the crop. Alternatively, governments could follow a policy of charging marginal 
costs which would require regular subsidies to cover the parastatals’ losses. The selling price is generally 
not known in the case of marketing monopsony so the price paid to producers cannot be known, under 
either regime, until the entire crop is sold.  The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB), for example, paid farmers 
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a minimum guaranteed price upon delivery to the Board and a final pooled price at the end of the 
marketing year when all the wheat was sold and the marketing costs were known.  
It is clear that Burkina Faso’s parasatals are intended to operate on a breakeven basis over time similar to 
CWB.  The revolving fund is a device that allows the parastatals to recover losses in one year from retained 
profits in other years.  However, they have in fact been operating on a non-sustainable basis in the period 
analyzed in this paper apparently from pressure to maintain producer prices, a non-market failure that 
that Wolf calls derived externalities.  Losses may also be caused by inefficiencies, operating rules and 
principal agent problems but we do not have evidence for these sources of market failure. 
Similar problems beset the parastatals in Mali that tend to sell cotton at relatively low prices, pay low 
prices to farmers and have a negative operating margin. The low prices received may be a result of the 
principal agent problem or even the result of some sort of malfeasance that Wolf would classify as 
distributional inequity type of non-market failure.  The administrative price set at harvest in Mali may be 
considered one of the operating rules that Wolf describes leading to an “internality and private goods” 
type of non-market failure.  They too will require a bailout unless there are some major improvements in 
performance. 
The other approach in the literature is to regulate prices at average costs.  Again, for a marketing 
parastatal that exports this can only be done meaningfully after the crop is sold instead of at the beginning 
of crop season as is generally done in the countries analysed or at harvest in the case of Mozambique.  
Consequently the administrative prices should probably be thought of as indicative prices that chiefly 
serve as means of helping farmers decide whether they want to plant cotton or not.  These countries 
therefore may have concluded that their best option is to allow the ginning companies to earn the rents 
reflected in the farm level NRPs.  The use of things such as buying centres, production contracts and 
providing farmers with price information are all becoming more common in the EAC countries and may 
ultimately be the best approach to limiting rents in this industry. 
Rice is regarded by governments as a priority commodity in all of the countries studied in this paper with 
measures to improve production technology and high levels of border protection for the domestic 
industry. We found that consumers pay high prices for rice resulting from both the tariffs and other levies 
at the border as well as market and non-market failures in the border to wholesale segment of the value 
chain.  Unsuitable policy might be causing some of these price increases due to bribes levied at the ports 
and roads. However, before liberalization, imports were restricted through licensing and foreign exchange 
controls, allowing importers to earn large rents. Although these formal systems of controlling imports 
have been liberalized, it appears that competition among importers is developing only slowly and they 
are still able to exercise market power and earn considerable rents. Importing grain in bulk requires 
substantial financial resources and specialized knowledge of both international trade and markets. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that it takes several years for this to become a competitive activity. This is 
evidence of two types of non-market failures in this segment of the value chain: internalities and private 
goods and rent seeking resulting from distributional inequity based on power. 
The picture that emerges for the farm to wholesale segments of the rice value chains is similar. The gaps 
between wholesale and farm prices are much larger than market access costs. Again, bribes at road check 
points are certainly a factor as well as official charges by local governments such as the charges at district 
borders noted above for Tanzania. But these are not large enough to account for the price gaps observed 
suggesting rents are being earned in this segment of the value chain too. The rice schemes themselves 
may be the result of previous government strategies often including irrigation projects and still 
administered by government officials. It is frequently the case that a small number of privately owned rice 
mills are associated with each rice scheme in Africa. In other areas, the rice schemes may be operated by 
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cooperatives or government parastatals. In any combination of the above, there are systems of fees and 
charges for credit and other input repayment, grading the milled rice quality, and irrigation services that 
provide ample opportunity for non-market failure due to “Internalities and private goods” as well as rent 
seeking. 
Even when farmers are provided with incentives, such as import tariffs for rice, these are less effective 
than they otherwise would be due to imperfect price transmission along the value chain with rents being 
captured by intermediaries as described above. Therefore, tariffs to provide an incentive to increase yields 
and production are ineffective. They also do not contribute to the food security goal or improve incomes 
of poor farmers with the policy incoherence resulting in a derived externality type of non-market failure.  
An increase in rice prices for consumers which reduces affordability is expected. But if the incentive to 
increase production is not transmitted through the value chain, then there are no off-setting benefits in 
terms of the other elements of food security. The overall structure results in a lack of policy coherence, 
leading to higher food prices for urban consumers and little or no benefit to farmers. Again policies to 
encourage competition, such as increased transparency, providing frequent market information and 
initiatives like the cotton buying centres seem to be the best policies to reduce non-market failures for 
rice. 
This study underscores the importance of expanding agricultural sector analysis in Africa from the 
traditional policy focus towards the functioning of commodity value chains and interventions aimed at 
minimizing access costs to increase price transmission and market information to farmers. Higher prices 
for farmers should translate into higher incomes and more on-farm investments, as well as improved 
access to cheaper food for net-food buying households. Market and non-market failures will likely 
continue to challenge African policy makers for the foreseeable future. In future applied economics work, 
including through MAFAP, additional efforts are required to develop methods to more effectively 
disentangle the effects of market and non-market failures. Continued analysis and regional cooperation 
are needed to identify policy frameworks that reduce the risks of non-market failures and encourage the 
development of competitive markets in the African context.  
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As the Millennium Development Goals process ends in 2015, governments worldwide, not the least 
African governments, will seek to attain new Sustainable Development Goals for the year 2030. After 
being severely challenged in the mid-1980s and 1990s, with disappointing results for agricultural 
development and food security (Jayne et al. 2002; Dorward et al., 2004), the role of the African States 
in steering development is being reemphasized (Akyüz and Gore, 2001; Cabral and Scoones, 2006). 
This is particularly true of the agricultural sector, which is regaining prominence as an engine of growth, 
following decades of distrust by African policy-makers and the donor community alike (World Bank, 
2007; Diao et al.,2007; Wiggins, 2014). However, the modest record of African State interventionism 
and agricultural taxation of the 1970s, in terms of agricultural development (Krueger, 1990; Anderson 
and Masters, 2009; Diao et al., 2010), has led to intense debates on the adequate public policy stance 
governments should follow. A nexus, for these discussions, is the political economy (Anderson, 2010; 
Poulton, 2014), degree and form of intervention of the government in agricultural markets, in 
particular through public investment, to correct market failures, on one hand, and favour income 
distribution and poverty reduction, on the other (Benin et al., 2009). Indeed, with limited capacities to 
intervene through monetary policies (Weeks, 2010) and to enforce regulation, and for institutional and 
political reasons (Bates, 1981), African governments tend to put the fiscal policy, and especially public 
spending, at the centre of the public policy effort for agricultural development. This prominence of 
public spending as an avatar of public policy is accentuated by the role of aid in African countries, which 
leads donors to invest this peculiar policy space, albeit to a varied extent (Moss et al., 2006; Booth, 
2011; Booth and Golooba-Mutebi, 2014). In addition, public resources for the agricultural sector tend 
to be scarcer than for other sectors (Mogues et al., 2012).  
In such a context, monitoring and analysing public expenditures in support of food and agriculture 
(PEA) is of the utmost importance for African governments and donors alike. This stands true, in 
particular, for input subsidies. This form of public spending is indeed attracting a renewed interest 
from African policymakers since the 2000s (Wiggins and Brooks, 2010), sparkling intense discussions 
over its merits versus those of other types of agricultural expenditures such as research or 
infrastructure. It is however a paradox that, despite the emphatic debate on input subsidies, so little 
reliable, comparable and detailed evidence exists on the level and composition of this form of public 
spending in African countries (Mas Aparisi et al., 2015). Input subsidies are often seen as bulging, 
inefficient seeds and fertilizers’ programmes clogging agricultural budgets. But does this correspond 
to the actual trends of input subsidies in several African countries – their level, composition and 
technical efficiency37? The current paper aims to answer this question by reviewing the trends of input 
subsidies in nine African countries over the 2006-13 period. It uses the methodology and work carried 
                                                          
36 This paper is a joint work with two FAO colleagues, Léopold Ghins, Alban Mas Aparisi published under the 
title Myth and realities about trend and efficiency of input subsidies in Sub-Sharan Africa in the Development 
Policy Review, June 2016.  
37 In this essay, we refer to the definition of technical efficiency used by the World Bank’s Ag PER Toolkit (see 
p.19 for example). 
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out by the Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural Policies (MAFAP) programme, implemented 
by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in several developing countries.  
 
4.2 Method and data 
 
To analyse the trends of input subsidies in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, one needs to mobilize 
a dataset containing reliable and sufficiently disaggregated measures of spending on input subsidies 
and on other categories of PEA that are comparable across countries. The low availability of such data 
and the challenge it represents for policy research has been regularly flagged by the international 
community (AU, 2014; UN, 2014) and the academia (Benin and Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012). In this 
context, the current study chooses to use the PEA dataset recently compiled by the MAFAP programme 
of FAO. The purpose of MAFAP is to establish agricultural policy monitoring and analysis systems in a 
growing number of developing economies. 
To collect and classify PEA, MAFAP uses a specific methodology, which was developed with the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and builds on the Producer Support 
Estimate (PSE) framework for policy analysis. Expenditures are classified according to the way in which 
the policies they fund are implemented. The categories to which expenditures are allocated are 
designed to reflect the types of policies applied in African countries (Komorowska, 2010; OECD, 2010; 
FAO, 2015e). The categories used are listed in a classification table, which is given in Annex page 81and 
also contains the category definitions. As the same table and classification method was used in all 
countries in which a MAFAP PEA database was constructed, the amounts are comparable across 
countries. 
The table captures the following distinctions: 
i. A broad distinction between expenditures that are agriculture-specific (direct support for the 
agricultural sector), and agriculture-supportive (indirect support for the agricultural sector). 
ii. Within the agriculture-specific category, a distinction between transfers towards private goods 
(support for producers and other agents in the value chain, for example input subsidies), and 
transfers towards public goods (general or collective support for the sector, for example 
research).  
Within the MAFAP PEA classification, agriculture-specific expenditures are referred to as category 1. 
Input subsidies are a sub-component of agriculture-specific expenditures, and are defined as category 
B. This category is further disaggregated into “B1 - variable inputs” (seeds, fertilizers, energy, credit, 
etc.), “B2 - Capital” (machinery and equipment, on-farm irrigation, other basic on-farm infrastructure, 
etc.) and “B3 - On-farm services” (pest and disease control, veterinary services, on-farm training, 
technical assistance, extension, etc.). The sum of categories B1, B2 and B3 equals category B. As the 
whole MAFAP PEA table follows this “tree” structure, spending amounts are comparable across 
categories. In the current study, other categories are also used. When so, it is specified in the text. 
These other categories include “I - Agricultural research”, “K - Training”, “L - Extension” and “N - 
Agricultural infrastructure”.  
In order to analyse the series constructed on the basis of the MAFAP PEA methodology, this paper 
relies on descriptive statistics. Shares of particular spending categories within, for instance, 
agriculture-specific expenditures are computed and compared across countries. One also looks at the 
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evolution of spending amounts in nominal and real terms and at the trends of the agricultural public 
expenditure relative to the agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and total GDP over the years.  
The MAFAP PEA dataset contains yearly expenditure amounts for the categories listed in the MAFAP 
classification table. The dataset covers nine African countries, namely Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Uganda. The covered period 
is 2006-13, with variations across countries (see Annex page 81). When years were missing, averages 
were computed without including these years.  
For each country, each expenditure category and each year, the MAFAP PEA dataset provides with 
budgeted and actual expenditures. It also makes the difference between expenditures arising from 
national and donor sources. One can therefore compute, for instance, the share of actual, budgeted, 
donor or national spending within total PEA or within selected PEA categories, for each year. Given 
this structure and the data gaps, the MAFAP PEA dataset contains 62 observations for each year, 
category, spending type (budgeted or actual) and spending source (donor or national). Unless 
specified, the expenditure amounts used in the current paper correspond to total (donor + national) 
and actual (not budgeted) spending. 
The sources of the data gathered in the MAFAP PEA database are either official government sources 
(line ministries, statistical institutes or research centres) or donor sources. The major data sources are 
the ministries of agriculture and finance. The expenditure values were collected and compiled by the 
MAFAP country teams. The expenditures are grouped per program or project directed towards the 
agricultural sector and further disaggregated into activities. These activities are then associated to the 
categories in the MAFAP PEA classification table (FAO, 2015d).  
As all the expenditure amounts in the original MAFAP PEA database are expressed in nominal, local 
currency terms, these were converted into constant 2011 United States Dollars (USD) by first dividing 
the Local Currency Unit (LCU) series by a national inflation index whose value is 1 in 2011 and then 
dividing the amounts of that constant series by the 2011 LCU/USD exchange rate, for each year. 
However, the analysis relies heavily on comparisons of spending ratios, which remain identical, be they 
expressed in nominal currency terms or in constant 2011 USD. Moreover, expenditure amounts per 
farm or as a proportion of GDP or agricultural GDP were computed. A table providing with a list and 




Beyond the mere level of public expenditures allocated to the agricultural sector, their very 
composition is critical to ensure they are effective in fostering the agricultural sector’s development. 
This has been acknowledged politically by African States in the Malabo declaration of the African Union 
(AU, 2014).  
There is also a body of literature on the efficient allocation of PEA (Fan et al. 2008; Benin et al. 2009). 
It tackles, among other topics, the question of public resources allocation towards the provision of 
public goods over private goods, in particular input subsidies. It is frequently argued that the use of 
input subsidies has resurged in African States since the 2000s (Jayne and Rashid, 2013), not the least 
for the political benefits they reap (Chinsinga, 2012; Mason et al., 2013) and their straightforwardness 
as a policy measure (Wiggins and Brooks, 2010). These assessments tend to rely on case studies of 
input subsidy programmes and their associated budgeted expenditures (Baltzer, 2011; Ricker-Gilbert 
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et al., 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013). A shortcoming for this approach is that although some 
programmes may be labelled as “input subsidy programmes”, they are often used as vehicles for a 
breadth of other agricultural development activities, including those providing collective goods to the 
sector, such as training and extension or the construction of off-farm infrastructure (Komorowska, 
2010). It is therefore not straightforward to build on these studies to determine the exact portion of 
agricultural budgets that consists in input subsidies. Also, it is of interest to detail the interventions 
that stand behind spending on input subsidies, how these expenditures evolve through time and what 
is their execution rate. Further, the role of aid in funding input subsidies should be examined.  
4.3.1 The share of input subsidies in agricultural budgets varies across countries 
 
The MAFAP dataset reveals that over the period 2006-13, input subsidies have represented an average 
35 % of agriculture-specific expenditures in the countries that were analysed. 38 This average masks 
three main groupings of countries. Low spenders are Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, with respective 
shares of 12, 15 and 24 %. Average spenders are Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique and the 
United Republic of Tanzania (URT), with shares oscillating between 31 and 46 %. Malawi forms its own 
high-spending group, with a staggering share of 69 % (Figure 12).  
The same pattern can be observed when considering the average shares of input subsidies in GDP and 
agricultural GDP (Figure 12). Ghana is a specific case. Although input subsidies do constitute a large 
proportion of agricultural expenditures, at 36 %, they only account for 0,2 % of the country’s GDP and 
0,6 % of the agricultural GDP. There is indeed an important imbalance between public spending in the 
agricultural sector and the value added it produces. 
Figure 12: Share of input subsidies over agriculture-specific expenditures (right axis), agricultural GDP and overall GDP (left axis) 
in nine African countries, average 2006-13. 
  
Source: The authors. 
This overall pattern does not come as a surprise: the costs and benefits of Malawi’s colossal input 
subsidies programme have been intensely debated by the academia (Wiggins and Brooks, 2010; 
                                                          
38 The MAFAP methodology considers agriculture-specific and agricultural-supportive expenditures as PEA, 
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Shively and Ricker-Gilbert, 2013) and, generally, by actors involved in agricultural policies. The case of 
Malawi has often been considered a benchmark to evaluate the relevance of input subsidies in Africa.  
However, the results hereby presented suggest that Malawi’s specifics cannot be considered a 
metonymy of African countries’ expenditures pattern. Input subsidies do represent more than a third 
of the agricultural expenditure in most countries, but do not exceed half of it, except in Malawi. The 
outlier status of Malawi is even more visible if one considers expenditures on input subsidies as a share 
of GDP or agricultural GDP. Indeed, whereas the average share of input subsidies in overall GDP and in 
agricultural GDP stood below 1 and 2 % respectively in all other reviewed countries, in the case of 
Malawi, these shares stood at 2.6 and more than 9 %, respectively. 39  
 
4.3.2 The composition of input subsidies is more diversified than usually thought  
 
The very structure of input subsidies, for the period and countries analysed bears interesting 
characteristics. Input subsidies are frequently seen as a synonym for variable inputs, such as fertilizer 
and seeds. However, subsidized capital (on-farm equipment for instance) and subsidized on-farm 
services (inspection for instance) should not be overlooked (FAO, 2015e). Although variable inputs 
have accounted for 59 % of input subsidies, capital and on-farm services have benefited, respectively, 
from 32 and 10 % of them. Sahelian countries (Mali and Burkina Faso) have even subsidized capital, 
essentially on-farm irrigation, more than seeds and fertilizers (Figure 13). This is due to the geo-climatic 
characteristics of these countries, where access to water poses an important challenge. Kenya has also 
invested more in on-farm capital than in variable input subsidies. 
 
                                                          
39 With the exception of Burkina Faso, for which the average share of input subsidies within agricultural GDP 
stands slightly above 2 %.  
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Figure 13. Expenditures in support of on-farm services, capital and variable inputs for nine African countries, average for the 
2006-13 period, constant 2011 USD per farm. 
  
Source: The authors. 
Variable input subsidies have represented an average 23 % of agriculture specific expenditures for the 
nine countries over the period, and 17 % if Malawi is not included. Hence, our results show that 
subsidies to seeds and fertilizers represent a moderate part of agricultural budgets in all countries but 
Malawi. However and as already pointed out above, they occupy a lofty share of agricultural 
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Table 7: Share of variable inputs, capital and on-farm services expenditures over agricultural-specific expenditures in nine 






Burkina Faso 15% 24% 1% 41% 
Ethiopia 3% 4% 4% 11% 
Ghana 23% 9% 5% 38% 
Kenya 1% 8% 5% 14% 
Malawi 72% 2% 1% 75% 
Mali 20% 25% 0% 45% 
Mozambique 19% 9% 2% 30% 
Tanzania 35% 6% 2% 44% 
Uganda 19% 3% 1% 24% 
Average 23% 10% 3% 36% 
Average without 
Malawi 
17% 11% 3% 31% 
Source: The authors. 
 
4.3.3 Input subsidies are embedded in agricultural budgets over time displaying no better 
execution rates than other categories  
 
The MAFAP dataset shows that the share of input subsidies in the agricultural budget is not decreasing 
substantially over the eight-year period analysed, on average for all countries (Table 8). On the 
contrary, three countries display important positive growth rates: the United Republic of Tanzania (7.8 
%), Mali (7.5 %) and Malawi (6.42 %). The trend also verifies when considering the average growth 
rates of input subsidies per farm with +14%, +12%, +4% for Tanzania, Mali and Malawi respectively. 
This ratio applied to Burkina Faso and Ghana further indicates that these two countries could be 
clustered with the previous group as they have invested more resources on input subsidies per farm 
over time with growth rates of input subsidies per farm of +7% and +12% respectively.   
Mozambique, Ethiopia and Kenya exhibit negative growth rates. For Kenya however, it is rather the 
result of the substantial increase in agricultural-specific expenditures that occurred between 2007 and 
2008, which was not followed by a proportional increase in input subsidies. Furthermore, input 
subsidies per farm expressed in constant 2011 USD have increased significantly in all countries but 
Mozambique. Only in this latter country have expenditures on input subsidies, expressed in nominal, 
local currency terms, diminished substantially over the period. Overall, there is compelling evidence 
that input subsidies are not being phased out in the countries reviewed here.  
Our results tend to confirm the well-known tendency for input subsidies to morph into a recurrent 
expenditure once implemented, clogging agricultural budgets whereas they are intended to be a short-
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term measure (Wiggins and Brooks, 2010). 
 
Table 8: Share of input subsidies within agriculture-specific expenditures in nine African countries, and input subsidies per farm 
in constant 2011 USD, average exponential growth rates over the 2006-13 period. 
 Share of input subsidies within 
agriculture-specific expenditures, 
growth rate 
Input subsidies per 
farm, growth rate 
Burkina Faso -0.8% 13% 
Ethiopia -17.9% 16% 
Ghana 2.8% 48% 
Kenya -5.7% 15% 
Malawi 6.4% 29% 
Mali 7.5% 18% 
Mozambique -17.7% -5% 
Tanzania 7.8% 33% 
Uganda -1.3% 20% 
Average -2.1% 20.6% 
Source: The authors. 
The inertia of spending on input subsidies, or even growth for some of the countries studied, is all the 
more concerning given their already hefty share in agricultural budgets. Input subsidies account for an 
average 36 % of the agricultural expenditures, in the countries analysed and over the period (Table 8). 
Input subsidies per farm, expressed in constant 2011 USD, grew at an average rate of 20.6 % during 
the period considered and across all countries reviewed Agricultural research expenditure (ARE) per 
farm and agricultural infrastructure expenditure (AIE) per farm also grew positively, at about 26 % and 
29 % respectively, but they only accounted for ten and 11 % of agricultural budgets respectively (Figure 
14). Knowledge dissemination expenditure (KDE) per farm, which is recognized as a crucial area of 
expenditure to ensure effective uptake of research, increased at an average rate of about 21 %, which 
is about as much as expenditures on input subsidies per farm. In addition, ARE, AIE or KDE all 
represented less than 0.5 per cent of overall GDP or 1 per cent of agricultural GDP, on average for the 
reviewed period, considering all countries. By contrast, expenditures on input subsidies represented 
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Figure 14: Average exponential growth of the expenditures per farm on input subsidies, research, knowledge dissemination and 
agricultural infrastructure (in constant 2011 USD) in nine African countries, 2006-13 period, in %. 
 
 
Source: The authors. 
 
Our results also show that the budget execution rate of input subsidies – for the period and countries 
analysed – has also been less than optimal. It is measured as a ratio of actual expenditures over 
budgeted ones, namely the execution rate. Average execution rates for input subsidies have reached 
86 %, leaving room for improvement. However, such rates have been on par with the average 
execution rate for other categories of agriculture-specific expenditure taken together, which stands at 
83 %, leading to a differential of 3 % (Annex 4.6.4). 40 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the positive 
differential between input subsidies’ and agricultural expenditures’ execution rates turns to zero when 
the data for Malawi is counted out. Indeed, Malawi’s input subsidies have an unlikely execution rate 
of 103 %.  
By comparison, the average differential between input subsidies’ execution rates and those of ARE and 
KDE, with Malawi out, stands at four points and -1 point respectively. It is at -1 point for AIE. While the 
execution rates of input subsidies are not optimal, other contrasting expenditure measures such as 
knowledge dissemination or infrastructures exhibit the same problem. By contrast, agricultural 
research budgeted expenditure is better executed than other categories of agriculture-specific 
expenditures, mostly because it primarily includes spending on human capital (salaries of researchers). 
 
                                                          
40 These percentages refer to the differentials obtained when computing execution rates on the basis of total 
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4.3.4 Aid tend to focus on other categories than input subsidies 
 
Intuitively, donors should tend to support the provision of public rather than private goods. Indeed, 
they are inclined to perceive private payments as ineffective and unsustainable, whilst they are not 
after the political benefits that national governments may be seeking through input subsidies. This 
verifies in the data used here. The share of national expenditure is higher within total spending on 
input subsidies than within spending dedicated to the provision of selected public goods (agricultural 
research, knowledge dissemination and agricultural infrastructures) in most of the reviewed countries 
(Figure 15). 41 Excluding Kenya and Ghana, 70 % of expenditures on input subsidies originated from 
national sources on average over the period, whilst this share was of only 47 % for expenditures on 
agricultural research, knowledge dissemination and agricultural infrastructures taken jointly.  
Figure 15: Share of national expenditures within total expenditures on input subsidies (IS) and selected public goods (PG, defined 
as the sum of ARE, KDE and AIE), average for the 2006-13 period, in %. 
 
Source: The authors. 
 
It is also possible to look at the budget execution rate of input subsidies depending on whether they 
are funded by donors or not and across categories of interest. It seems relatively more difficult for 
governments to execute budget resources allocated to input subsidies than those dedicated to ARE 
or KDE (Annex 4.6.4). However, the differential between the execution rate of national AIE and 
agricultural-specific expenditures without AIE is bigger in absolute value than the same differential 
taken for input subsidies. Hence, input subsidies do not seem to be the most difficult expenditure 
category for governments to execute.   
Nevertheless, the national execution rates for input subsidies have been dwindling over the period, 
while donor execution rates, despite being lower, remained stable between 2006 and 2012 and even 
                                                          
41 Ghana and Kenya were removed from the dataset for the analysis of the role of aid, as due to data availability 
constraints, the expenditure data for these two countries omits a substantial portion of national and donor 
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increased in 2013 (Figure 16). This suggests that national governments are facing increasing difficulties 
in executing the budgeted amounts for input subsidies.42 
Figure 16: Average execution rates for input subsidies, donor and national expenditures, for seven African countries, 2006-13, in 
%.43  
 
Source: The authors. 
4.4 Discussion and conclusion 
 
At this point, it seems useful to relate the results presented in this paper to the existing literature on 
the topic and try to shed light on two broad questions flowing from this discussion:  (i) How can the 
inertia of the share of expenditure in support of input subsidies relative to the overall agricultural 
public expenditures be explained; (ii) how could the efficiency and/or effectiveness of expenditure 
devoted to input subsidies be increased? 
We believe that our results are generally in line with and add new information to the literature. The 
main findings can be summarized as follows.  
Although a substantial share of agricultural-specific expenditures were dedicated to input subsidies 
over the 2006-2013 period in the African countries covered in this study, wide variations in the level 
and composition of these expenditures can be observed. While Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda dedicated 
between 13 and 25 % of their agricultural-specific expenditures to input subsidies, Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Mozambique and the United Republic of Tanzania had shares fluctuating between 31 and 71 %. Malawi 
positions itself as an outlier, having allocated almost three-quarters of its agricultural-specific 
expenditures to input subsidies over the period. Despite this variety, input subsidies share the 
tendency of getting stuck in agricultural budgets. Their relative size tends to remain stable over time.  
                                                          
42 It is also possible to look at the evolution of donor and national execution rates for ARE, KDE and AIE. Doing 
so shows that over the reviewed period, the difficulty of executing budgeted resources has increased more for input 
subsidies that for other categories of spending. Indeed, the average growth rate of national execution rates for 
2006-13 of input subsidies, ARE, KDE and AIE was of -4,-2, 4 and 1 %, respectively.  
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In addition, maintaining expenditures on input subsidies can happen to the expense of other 
expenditure categories. As shown in this study, spending on knowledge dissemination exhibits a 
decreasing trend in the nine countries under review. Further, our results suggest that input subsidies 
exhibit sub-optimal budget execution rates.  
Finally, although this is not one of their distinctive features – expenditures allocated to knowledge 
dissemination activities or to agricultural infrastructures behave similarly –, execution rates for 
expenditures allocated to input subsidies originating from national sources have declined over the 
period under review, which echoes the difficulty of implementing such expenditure measures. 
As a result of this work, we believe two main myths should be nuanced.  First, contrary to what is often 
implicitly discussed in the literature, agricultural public expenditure in SSA are not always strongly 
biased towards input subsidies. The only country in our sample that spends more than 50 percent of 
its budget on inputs subsidies is Malawi, a country that should not be seen as a representative country 
but rather as a specific case.  Second, most studies have equated input subsidies with variable input 
subsidies on seeds and fertilizers while our results show that spending classified as input subsidies is 
much more diversified and includes investment in capital, for irrigation for example, or human capital, 
through extension services and training for example. 
Regarding the efficacy and/or efficiency of input subsidies, the literature offers a diversity of views 
depending on the way these subsidies are designed and implemented (Morris et al., 2007; Minot and 
Benson, 2009; Druilhe and Barreiro-Hurlé, 2012). For some authors, probably the majority, the lasting 
pre-eminence of input subsidies in agricultural budgets can be seen as a problem. They are generally 
considered too costly, with dubious benefits. Indeed, there is a broad consensus that, unlike input 
subsidies, public investment on agricultural research and infrastructure has a strong and long-term 
positive effect on agricultural productivity (Binswanger et al., 1993; Estache et al., 2005; Pinstrup-
Andersen and Shimokawa, 2006; Fan and Zhang, 2008). In addition, the inert weight of input subsidies 
in the countries’ budget can be considered a source of inefficiency in itself, as it prevents spending in 
other categories that have been deemed essential in many agricultural development strategies. This is 
referred to the crowding out effect of input subsidies (Jayne et al., 2013; Jayne and Rashid, 2013; Fan 
et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2009). Regarding the low execution rate of input subsidies, the evidence put 
forward in this paper echoes the concerns about the difficult implementation and management of 
input subsidy programmes (Baltzer, 2011). The fact that donor execution rates remained below 
national ones for the majority of the period under review is consistent with the overall pattern of public 
expenditures observed in countries that were analysed by MAFAP. Indeed, external funding tends to 
be poorly mainstreamed in national financial management systems, which in turn affects the ability of 
governments to effectively spend the money as was planned (FAO, 2014a). 44 Hence, not only are input 
subsidies exhibiting a tendency to morph into recurrent expenditures over time and to receive 
relatively more attention from national governments than from donors; they are also proving more 
and more difficult to be efficiently funded.  
Political economy arguments have often been invoked to explain the persistence of inputs subsidies in 
agricultural budgets. In the shortrun, policy makers have strong political incentives to provide funding 
in support of private goods whose benefits economically accrue to specific categories of agents and 
politically favour or reward specific fractions of the electorate at the expense of others. By contrast, 
public goods affect all agents indistinctively, which makes them less attractive from a policy maker’s 
point of view especially just before or right after an election (Bates, 1981; Poulton, 2012). The fact that 
donors tend to invest more in public goods than in private goods in the countries reviewed here 
                                                          
44 Average donor execution rates are below national ones also for ARE, KDE and AIE. 
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supports the political economy argument. In addition, for agents in the sector, getting a better access 
to private goods is a tangible sign of political action which is expected to provide benefits in the short 
run. On the contrary, the positive impact of spending on infrastructures or research will typically take 
time to materialize.  
However, other authors also recall that there are reasons for the existence of input subsidy programs 
that are not just self-interest and political. For example, in presence of important rural input market 
failures, as is often the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, governments have no choice but to intervene to 
replace or modify the market to help smallholders access the input they need. At the same time, there 
seems to be consensus in the literature on the need for governments’ interventions to target the small 
farmers who face insurmountable market failures (Wiggins and Brooks, 2010).  
Regardless of findings, positions or preferences expressed in the literature, it appears unlikely that 
input subsidies will be unilaterally discontinued. It is therefore suggested they be treated with 
pragmatism. So, the second question arises on how to improve existing and future input subsidy 
schemes?  
In this regard, one should note that fiscal policies cannot be considered in isolation with respect to 
other public policies. For example, moving towards smaller spending on input subsidies and higher 
spending on agricultural research and knowledge dissemination will only be beneficial if producers are 
located in an enabling market environment. One could hardly expect enhanced agricultural growth to 
be reached by reducing input subsidies and providing research and technical assistance if producers 
continue to perceive prices that are too low, possibly due to substantial market failures, inefficient 
markets, and/or distortive economic policies (FAO, 2015b; 2015c). In this case, a smooth transition 
should be ensured by simultaneously working on market quality but also through PEA interventions 
on, for example, infrastructures and marketing. Moreover, policy advocacy work surely needs to put 
the emphasis on curbing this category of public spending and increasing its overall effectiveness. This 
would imply enhancing the transparency and accountability of budgetary decisions, improving policy 
coherence with other policy objectives and measures and systematizing the targeting of beneficiaries. 
The latter is crucial to primarily support those small farmers that struggle to access inputs and are likely 
to experience a significant productivity increase if supported. Such practices are to be seen as a first 
practical step forward in the process towards more efficient and effective agricultural budget 
management in SSA. 
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4.6.1 MAFAP classification of public expenditures in support of the food and agricultural 
sector45 
1. Agriculture-specific expenditure – monetary transfers that are specific to the agricultural sector, i.e. agriculture is the only, or 
principal, beneficiary of a given expenditure measure 
    1.1 Payments to agents in the food and agriculture sector – monetary transfers to individual agents in the food and agriculture 
sector  
        1.1.1 Payments to producers – monetary transfers to individual agricultural producers (farmers) 
            A. Production subsidies based on outputs – monetary transfers to agricultural producers that are based on current output of a 
specific agricultural commodity 
            B. Input subsidies – monetary transfers to agricultural producers that are based on on-farm use of inputs: 
                B1 - Variable inputs (seeds, fertiliser, energy, credit, other) – monetary transfers reducing the on-farm cost of a specific 
variable input or a mix of variable inputs 
                B2 - Capital (machinery and equipment, on-farm irrigation, other basic on-farm infrastructure) – monetary transfers reducing 
the on-farm investment cost of farm buildings, equipment, plantations, irrigation, drainage and soil improvements 
                B3 - On-farm services (pest and disease control/veterinary services, on-farm training, technical assistance, extension etc., 
other) – monetary transfers reducing the cost of technical assistance and training provided to individual farmers 
            C. Income support – monetary transfers to agricultural producers based on their level of income 
            D. Other payments to producers – monetary transfers to agricultural producers individually for which there is insufficient 
information to allocate them into the above listed categories 
        1.1.2 Payments to consumers – monetary transfers to final consumers of agricultural commodities individually in the form of:  
            E. Food aid – monetary transfers to final consumers to reduce the cost of food 
            F. Cash transfers – monetary transfers to final consumers to increase their food consumption expenditure 
            G. School feeding programmes – monetary transfers to final consumers to provide free or reduced-cost food in schools 
            H. Other payments to consumers – monetary transfers to final consumers individually for which there is insufficient information 
to allocate them into the above listed categories 
        1.1.3 Payments to input suppliers – monetary transfers to agricultural input suppliers individually 
        1.1.4 Payments to processors – monetary transfers to agricultural commodities processors individually 
        1.1.5 Payments to traders – monetary transfers to agricultural traders individually 
        1.1.6 Payments to transporters – monetary transfers to agricultural commodities transporters individually 
    1.2 General support to the food and agriculture sector– public expenditures generating monetary transfers to agents of the agro-
food sector collectively 
            I. Agricultural research – public expenditures financing research activities improving agricultural production 
            J. Technical assistance – public expenditures financing technical assistance for agricultural sector agents collectively 
            K. Training – public expenditures financing agricultural training 
            L. Extension/technology transfer – public expenditures financing provision of extension services 
            M. Inspection (veterinary/plant) – public expenditures financing control of quality and safety of food, agricultural inputs and the 
environment 
            N. Agricultural infrastructure– public expenditures financing off-farm collective infrastructure 
                                                          
45 The table is taken from MAFAP, 2015a, p. 6-7. Itself, the table was based on the classification proposed in 
Komorowska, 2010.   
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N1. Feeder roads – public expenditures financing feeder roads 
N2. Off-farm irrigation – public expenditures financing off-farm irrigation 
N3. Other off-farm infrastructure – public expenditures financing agricultural infrastructure that are not feeder roads or 
off-farm irrigation 
            O. Storage/public stockholding – public expenditures financing public storage of agro-food products 
            P. Marketing – public expenditures financing assistance in marketing of food and agriculture products 
            Q. Other general support to the food and agriculture sector – other transfers to the agro-food agents collectively for which 
there is insufficient information to allocate them into above listed categories 
2. Agriculture-supportive expenditure – public expenditures that are not specific to agriculture, but which have a strong influence on 
agricultural sector development 
            R. Rural education – public expenditures on education in rural areas 
            S. Rural health – public expenditures on health services in rural areas 
            T. Rural infrastructure – public expenditures on rural infrastructure 
T1. Rural roads – public expenditures financing rural roads 
T2. Rural water and sanitation – public expenditures financing rural water and sanitation 
T3. Rural energy – public expenditures financing rural energy 
T4. Other rural infrastructure – public expenditures financing rural infrastructure that are not rural roads, rural water 
and sanitation, rural energy and other rural infrastructure 
            U. Other support to the rural sector – other public expenditures on rural areas benefiting agricultural sector development for 
which there is insufficient information to allocate them into above listed categories 
Total expenditure in support of the food and agriculture sector (excluding administrative costs) (policy transfers, PEAPT): sum of 
agriculture-specific and agriculture-supportive expenditure (1+2) 
Identifiable administrative costs for the food and agriculture sector: administrative costs include costs of formulation, implementation 
and evaluation of agricultural policies 
Total expenditure in support of the food and agriculture sector (including administrative costs) (PEA): sum of agriculture-specific 
expenditure, agriculture supportive expenditure and identifiable administrative costs for the food and agriculture sector 
(1+2+identifiable administrative costs for the food and agriculture sector). 
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4.6.2 Gaps in PEA time series, per country 
 
Table 9: Missing years in the PEA time series used for the analysis. 
Country Missing years within the 2006-2013 period 
Burkina Faso None 
Ethiopia 2013 
Ghana 2013 
Kenya 2006, 2013 
Malawi None 
Mali 2013 
Mozambique 2006, 2007, 2008 
United Republic of Tanzania 2006 
Uganda 2006 
Source: The authors. 
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4.6.3 Data description 
Table 10: Description of the data series used in the analysis. 
Source: The authors. 
Categories of PEA Unit Source Note 
Input subsidies    
Input subsidies, total Constant 2011 USD MAFAP, 2015b Spending on total input subsidies is MAFAP category B, the sum of B1, B2 and B3 
Variable inputs Constant 2011 USD MAFAP, 2015b Spending on variable inputs (seeds, fertilizers, etc.) is MAFAP category B1 
Capital Constant 2011 USD MAFAP, 2015b Spending on capital (machinery and equipment, on-farm irrigation, etc.) is MAFAP category B2 
On-farm assistance Constant 2011 USD MAFAP, 2015b Spending on on-farm assistance (pest and disease control, veterinary services, on-farm training, technical 
assistance, extension,…) is MAFAP category B3  
Agricultural research and 
knowledge dissemination 
   
Agricultural research Constant 2011 USD MAFAP, 2015b Spending on agricultural research is MAFAP category I 
Knowledge dissemination Constant 2011 USD MAFAP, 2015b Spending on knowledge dissemination was taken as the sum of MAFAP categories J (technical assistance), K 
(training) and L (extension) 
Infrastructures    
Agricultural 
infrastructures 
Constant 2011 USD MAFAP, 2015b Spending on agricultural infrastructures is MAFAP category N 
Other series used for the 
analysis 
   
Exchange rates Local currency 
unit/USD 
WDI, 2015  
Number of farms Number of farms WDI, 2015 Yearly rural population figures were taken from WDI, 2015. From these series, the number of farms in each 
country for each year was computed by assuming 6 dependents per farm 
Agricultural GDP Constant 2011 USD WDI, 2015 The “Agriculture, value added (current LCU)” series was taken on WDI, 2015 and then converted into constant 
2011 USD by multiplying the amounts for each year by the 2011 LCU/USD exchange rate. 
GDP Constant 2011 USD WDI, 2015 The “GDP (current LCU)” series was taken on WDI, 2015 and then converted into constant 2011 USD by multiplying 
the amounts for each year by the 2011 LCU/USD exchange rate.  
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4.6.4 Execution rates 
 
Table 11: Differential between the execution rates (ER) of input subsidies (IS), agricultural research expenditure (ARE), knowledge dissemination expenditure (KDE) and agricultural infrastructure 
expenditure (AIE) and the execution rates of agricultural-specific expenditure without said categories by funding source, in nine African countries, average over the 2006-2013 period, in % 
 Differential ER IS/non IS Differential ER ARE/non ARE Differential ER KDE/non KDE Differential ER AIE/non AIE 
 Donor  National Total Donor  National Total Donor  National Total Donor  National Total 
Burkina Faso -9% 4% -2% 19% 1% 18% -3% -6% -8% -4% -5% -9% 
Ethiopia -43% 1% -14% -27% -2% -16% 2% 2% 1% 10% -21% 8% 
Ghana 37% NA 37% 2% NA -1% -6% NA -8% -11% NA 2% 
Kenya NA -18% -22% NA 8% 14% NA 11% 12% NA 20% 25% 
Malawi 5% 3% 29% 89% -14% 1% 62% -2% -8% -19% -47% -60% 
Mali 4% 4% 7% 6% -8% -1% 1% -10% -6% -2% -4% -4% 
Mozambique -14% -1% 2% 8% 0% 3% 3% -3% -11% -6% 0% -4% 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
28% -31% -20% -9% 16% 13% -16% 17% 12% -25% -2% -12% 
Uganda -3% 9% 13% 5% 4% 1% -7% 7% 1% -1% -23% -17% 
Average 1% -4% 3% 12% 1% 4% 5% 2% -2% -7% -10% -8% 
Average without 
Malawi 
0% -5% 0% 0% 3% 4% -4% 2% -1% -6% -5% -1% 
Note: The expenditure data for Ghana and Kenya omits a substantial portion of national and donor expenditures, respectively (FAO, 2014b, 2015a). Therefore, the execution 
rates for these countries and funding sources were not included in the table. 
Source: The authors. 
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5 Price signals and supply responses for staple food crops in Sub 




Despite the wave of agricultural policy reforms carried out in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) during the last 
decades, the lack of results in terms of productivity and growth has been attributed – among other 
factors – to a weak or absent supply response to market signals (Di Marcantonio et al, 2014). During 
the 1960s and 1970s, some authors argue that this is particularly true for staple food crops because 
the marketing systems are less developed and production is mainly devoted to on-farm consumption, 
making price incentives of limited relevance for farmers’ decisions. Most governments in SSA used the 
argument that subsistence farmers do not respond to market signals and run a static business to justify 
an excessive taxation of the sector in favour of pro-urban and industry-oriented policies (Bates, 1983; 
World Bank, 2008). The rationale was that taxing agriculture would make additional resources 
available to be invested in other sectors without substantially slowing down overall growth (Helleiner, 
1975; Askari and Cummings, 1977; Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes, 1991; Schiff and Montenegro, 1997; 
McKay et al., 1998; Anderson and Masters, 2009).  
Since the 1980s and 1990s, governments eventually reduced the anti-agricultural bias (Anderson and 
Masters, 2009). Concomitantly, the assumption that farmers’ supply response is generally absent or 
very low has been less widely accepted as the literature has showed repeatedly that farmers including 
smallholders do react to price signals. Yet the argument is still attracting some degree of controversy 
in the academia as well as in policymaking circles (Townsend, 1999; Haile et al. 2015).  
The focus of research evolved over time and shifted towards understanding which internal and 
external factors limit the supply response to price incentives (Clover, 2003; Svendsen et al, 2007; Pratt 
and Yu, 2008). A consensus emerges around two points: i) the aggregate short-run supply response is 
quite inelastic, and ii) the supply response for individual crops is less inelastic than the aggregate 
because production factors can be easily moved across crops (Onal, 2012). In most cases, authors 
analyzed price elasticity with respect to either aggregate agricultural supply or individual cash crops, 
ignoring the specific case of staple food crops. These gaps in the literature can be explained by the lack 
of reliable and comparable cross-country data in SSA, especially for producer prices and marketing 
costs (Dawe et al., 2015).  
Understanding if and how the food supply in SSA as a whole reacts to price signals constitutes a 
valuable piece of information for policymakers engaged in achieving food security in the region. In fact, 
even if subsistence agriculture might not be considered as a major driver of economic growth, it still 
has a crucial influence on the livelihoods of the most vulnerable sub-groups of the population (Poulton 
et al, 2006). Moreover, shedding more light on the relationship between price signals and food supply 
could help to enhance smallholder market participation in SSA and, hence, advance the development 
                                                          
46 This paper is the result of a collaboration with two FAO colleagues, Emiliano Magrini and Cristian Morales 
Opazo, currently available as a Discussion Paper 1601 of the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural 
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agenda on what has been a priority topic for several decades (Barrett, 2008). Lastly, reliable 
information at regional level beyond the usual country-crop specific cases is needed to support better 
regionally integrated food markets in SSA in order for Africa to meet its own raising demand for food 
(World Bank, 2012).  
To help fill some of these gaps, we analyze the supply response for major staple food crops in several 
SSA countries. To do that, we use a recent dataset produced by the “Monitoring and Analyzing Food 
and Agricultural Policies” (MAFAP) programme of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) which 
provides detailed information on food crop prices, marketing costs and the effects of policy 
interventions for multiple value chains in ten SSA countries over the 2005-2013 period. In this study, 
we claim three contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to perform a cross-country analysis of the price elasticity of supply in SSA focusing exclusively 
on staple food crops instead of cash crops or aggregate sector level production. Second, we exploit the 
richness of the MAFAP dataset to capture the different contribution of the direct incentives arising 
from i) domestic market intervention and border measures, ii) the monetary policies – especially those 
influencing the exchange rate - and iii) the border prices in the formulation of the farmers’ price 
expectations and their relative impact on the supply response. Third, we demonstrate that estimates 
of the price elasticity of supply are biased when i) the wholesale price is used as proxy of the producer 
price; and ii) the marketing costs are omitted from the response function.  
The results show that short-run price elasticity of supply is always positive and statistically significant, 
irrespective of the proxies used to measure the agricultural supply –acreage, production or yield – and 
the expected prices – farm-gate or wholesale - in the response function. This suggests that Sub-Saharan 
farmers are capable of interpreting market signals and responding positively to price increases for 
staple crops. In particular, we observe the highest response for production (0.59) while for yield and 
acreage, the price elasticity is substantially lower (i.e. 0.30 and 0.22). We also find that the supply 
responses are significantly influenced by marketing costs paid by farmers to commercialize their 
product and – not surprisingly - by past and current weather shocks. In comparison, the prices of 
competing commodities and the cost of inputs have less important effects. By decomposing the 
expected price into three components – the nominal coefficient of protection, the real exchange rate 
and the border price – we find that farmers in SSA respond to price signals arising primarily from shocks 
in the international market and from direct incentives resulting from border measures and government 
interventions in domestic markets. On the contrary, they are less stimulated by macroeconomic 
policies affecting the exchange rate.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the methodology. Section 
three describes the dataset while section four presents the empirical strategy. Section five reports the 




Since the pioneering work of Nerlove (1956), economists have put a lot of efforts into investigating 
farmers’ response to price signals. The agricultural supply response in Sub-Saharan Africa has 
historically been subject to much debate (Schiff and Montenegro, 1997; Onal, 2012) and most authors 
have primarily focused on explaining why the supply response in this region was generally low. 
However, isolating the main factors constraining the supply response has proved to be a difficult task 
(Baffes and Gardner, 2003). There is a certain consensus on the role of structural and institutional 
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constraints (Kherallah et al., 2002) such as lack of complementary inputs, rural infrastructure, difficult 
access to credit, insufficient provision of extension services and lack of reliable insurance mechanisms 
(Binswanger et al., 1987; Key et al., 2000). In addition, authors like Bloom and Sachs (1998) argue that 
natural conditions such as low soil fertility and irregular rainfall further contribute to lower price 
elasticity of supply, especially in case of severe drought.  Other empirical results suggest that an 
unstable political environment adversely influences food supply via production inefficiencies and 
attenuates competitiveness (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1997 
and 1999).  
Haile et al. (2015) propose a thorough and useful review of the literature providing an extensive range 
of methodological approaches and empirical strategies in a variety of settings for measuring 
agricultural supply response. To decide on the best method to adopt for our analysis, a number of 
conditions have to be considered. Most of the literature focuses on the analysis of the supply response 
for specific country-crop case studies (e.g. Bond, 1983; McKay et al., 1998; Baffes, 2003; Thiele, 2003; 
Leaver, 2004; Muchapondwa, 2009; Vitale et al., 2009; Molua, 2010; Mkpado, 2012) either at macro 
level (e.g. Thiele, 2003; Barr et al, 2009; Imai et al., 2011; Onal, 2012; Haile et al, 2014 and 2015) or at 
micro-level, i.e. plot, farm, and household (e.g. Lansink, 1999; Vitale et al, 2009; and Yu et al, 2012). 
Only a few authors provide cross-country estimates of the price elasticity of supply (e.g. Binswanger 
et al. 1987; Subervie 2008). For example, Onal’s study (2012) proposes cross-country estimates of the 
price elasticity for SSA countries for export crops in Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia. For our own study, we decide to perform a cross-country analysis of the supply response for 
staple food commodities which are fundamental in terms of food security in Sub-Saharan Africa, i.e. 
cereals, tuber and roots, and pulses. 
To do that, we follow the standard model proposed by Nerlove (1956) based on the hypothesis that 
farmers partially adjust their output (𝑄) towards a desired level (𝑄∗) determined by an expected price 
(P∗)47. Unfortunately, neither 𝑄∗ nor P∗ are observable. In the literature, the preferred proxy for the 
desired output level is the acreage allocation because it is fully under farmers’ control and it is not 
affected by exogenous shocks that occur after planting (e.g. Askari and Cummings, 1977; Chavas et al., 
1983; Rao, 1989; Coyle, 1993; Vitale et al., 2009; Haile et al.,2015). However, the resulting price 
elasticity of supply can be considered a lower bound of the farmers’ response to price signals because 
it does not capture the choices made between planting and harvesting (Rao, 1989; Oyejide, 1990; Haile 
et al., 2015). In this respect, to estimate the supply responses part of this literature employs not only 
acreage as an output proxy but also production and yield as complementary dependent variables 
(Braulke, 1982; Coyle, 1999; Weersink et al., 2010; Onal, 2012; Yu et al., 2012; Haile et al., 2015). We 
prefer to follow the latter approach, using all three proxies in estimating the supply response for the 
following reasons. First of all, the price elasticity estimates highly depend on the choice of the proxy 
(Rao, 1989), therefore combining a broader set of output measures will provide more robust estimates. 
Second, the possibility for farmers to adjust planted acreage is likely to be limited due to rigid patterns 
of land use which, in the case of staple food crops in SSA countries, are determined by subsistence 
needs and constraints on arable land availability (Askari and Cummings, 1977). Lastly, while the best 
estimator of farmers’ production decisions is arguably planted acreage, we could only obtain data on 
harvested acreage which, if used alone, could reduce the accuracy of our results.  
Choosing the proxy for the expected output price P* is another crucial methodological consideration, 
which entails two different problems: a) choosing the price series that is actually driving the farmer 
                                                          
47 Another common approach is to estimate the supply function derived from a profit maximizing framework 
with the joint estimation of output supply and input demand functions. However, this approach requires detailed 
information on all the input quantities and prices. 
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decision and b) adopting the appropriate farmers’ expectation hypothesis to determine which variable 
needs to be inserted in the empirical model. As pointed out by Askari and Cummings (1977), the 
researcher must select the price series which could support the best answer to the question: why 
would farmers produce more? If farmers do not market the crop they produce, then the price variable 
does not interest them. Nonetheless, if farmers seek to produce more it is usually to increase their 
income and be able to buy a broader range of goods. Hence, they will adjust their production decision 
looking at the price of their crop relative to those of other goods. Of course, in the literature on 
developing countries, the implicit assumption is that farmers want to increase the possibility of 
diversifying their consumption and are expected to react to changes in relative prices. These changes 
are usually captured by the crop price deflated by the consumer price index.  
The literature on SSA countries estimates price elasticities of supply using - if available - the farm-gate 
price. The underlying assumption is that this price drives farmers’ decisions. However, many 
exceptions have been made because it is generally difficult to assemble reliable producer price series 
in SSA countries (Dawe et al., 2015). As a consequence, most of the cross-country studies investigating 
the effect of price movements on agricultural supply have used less desirable variables such as the 
wholesale and retail prices or even the international price deflated by domestic price indexes. These 
are sub-optimal choices because farm-gate price and other domestic prices such as wholesale and 
retail behave differently in most SSA countries(Dawe et al., 2015), mainly due to incomplete price 
transmission along the domestic value chain (Meyer and von Cramon Taubadel, 2004). In the following 
sections, we show how using wholesale prices as a proxy for farm-gate prices biases the resulting price 
elasticity estimates.  
For modelling farmers’ price expectation, there are three well-known and widely applied hypotheses: 
a) naïve expectations (Ezekiel, 1938); b) adaptive expectations (Nerlove, 1958); and c) rational 
expectations. The first hypothesis assumes that prices do not change and the expected price is equal 
to the most recent observable one. The second hypothesis is also backward looking but assumes that 
farmers make adjustments in formulating price expectations in order to correct for past errors. Finally, 
the last hypothesis assumes that farmers efficiently use all the available information in predicting 
future prices. Following the Nerlove model, we assume adaptive expectations because they are more 
efficient than naïve expectations and more realistic than the rational expectations. For most farmers 
in SSA countries, accessing reliable, timely and up-to-date information on prices is problematic. Even 
if they have the opportunity to receive such market signals, they often lack the means to process them 
(Chavas, 2000 and Haile et al., 2015). The standard version of the Nerlovian partial adjustment model 
consists of the following functional forms: 
 𝑄𝑡
∗ = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑃𝑡




∗ + 𝜂(𝑃𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑡−1
∗ ) (2) 
 
 𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛾(𝑄𝑡
∗ − 𝑄𝑡−1) (3) 
 
where 𝑄𝑡
∗ and 𝑄𝑡 denote desired and actual level of output (acreage, production or yield) at time t, 𝑃𝑡
∗ 
and 𝑃𝑡 the expected and observed price, and X represents other exogenous factors affecting the supply 
at time t, such as price of competing crops, fixed and variable production costs, weather variables and 
technological changes. 𝜂 and 𝛾 are the expectation and adjustment coefficients. The reduced form is 
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 𝑄𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝑏3𝑋𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 
 
(4) 
with 𝑏2 measuring the short-run price elasticity of agricultural output. Equation (4) is the basic dynamic 
function considered in our analysis where 𝑄𝑡, 𝑄𝑡−1, 𝑃𝑡−1 and the set of exogenous factors are selected 
according to the choices described above. More specifically, we assume that farmers’ decisions on 
acreage are based on the price expectations available at planting-time regarding the output price at 
harvest-time, marketing costs, competing crop prices, input prices, and other exogenous factors such 
as previous weather shocks. We also assume that once acreage has been allocated, farmers adjust 
their production decisions by increasing or decreasing the intensity of their farming activities during 
the growing season according to other factors such as current weather conditions (Oyejide, 1990). 
Following the existing literature, when we use production or yields as dependent variable in equation 
(4), we augment the set of variables in 𝑋𝑡 to include contemporary weather shocks, and drop 
competing crop prices and past weather shocks because they do not influence the farmers’ choices 
between planting and harvesting (Haile et al., 2015).  
 
For each output variable, we provide estimates of equation (4) alternating the farm-gate price and 
wholesale price for the same value chain as proxy for the past price, i.e. 𝑃𝑡−1. Following World Bank 
(1994), Mamingi (1996) and Thiele (2003), we decompose the price 𝑃𝑡 into its different components 
to trace separately the impact of direct incentives arising from border protection and government 
intervention in domestic markets, macroeconomic policies such as the exchange rate policy and 































= 𝑁𝑃𝐶 ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝐵 
(5) 
 
where 𝑃𝑁 is the nominal price at farm gate, CPI is the consumer price index used to calculate the real 
producer price 𝑃, e is the nominal exchange rate (domestic units per US$), 𝑊𝑃𝐼𝑈𝑆 is the US wholesale 
price index and 𝑃𝑁
∗  the nominal price of the commodity at the border, expressed in US$. As shown in 
the last term of Equation 5, the real producer price can be finally re-written as the product of three 
elements: i) the nominal protection coefficient (NPC); ii) the real exchange rate (RER); and iii) the 
border price expressed in real terms (𝑃𝐵). To embed them into the Nerlove model, we follow Chavas 
et al. (1983) and Parrott and McIntosh (1996) assuming that the expected price is a weighted average 
of these three elements. Therefore, we substitute equation (5) in (4) and we obtain: 
 
𝑄𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝑏2[𝑎1𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝑎2𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝑎3𝑃𝑡−1
𝐵 ] +  𝑏3𝑋𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡  
 
 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝑃𝑡−1
𝐵 +  𝛽5𝑋𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 (6) 
 
where 𝛽2 = 𝑏2𝑎1, 𝛽3 = 𝑏2𝑎2 and 𝛽4 = 𝑏2𝑎3.  
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The NPC compares the farm-gate price with the maximum the farmers would get from selling their 
product on the world market. A ratio above (below) one indicates that producers of a specific 
commodity receive direct price incentives (disincentives) resulting from trade and domestic market 
policies and overall market performance. Clearly, we expect a positive supply responses to an increase 
in the NPC.  
The RER measures the price ratio between tradeable and non-tradeable goods and it is influenced by 
macroeconomic policies, such as monetary and fiscal interventions (Mamingi, 1997). An increase in 
the RER – corresponding to a devaluation in real terms of the domestic currency – is expected to 
increase farmers’ incentive to produce because it raises the price of tradeable relative to non-
tradeable goods. Finally, the border price captures the impact of price changes on the international 
market and we expect it to have a positive impact on the agricultural supply.  
For estimating equation (4) and (6), we require a rich dataset with information on outputs, prices at 
different points of the value chain, marketing costs, a measure of policy support and other exogenous 
factors that influence farmers’ decisions on staple food crops. Most of this information is provided by 
the MAFAP dataset (MAFAP, 2015) which covers more than 70 agricultural value chains spread over 
ten different SSA countries from 2005 to 2013. These countries are Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. For each value chain, farm-gate, 
wholesale and border output prices are collected together with the respective marketing costs, which 
include transport costs, processing costs, handling costs, taxes, fees and commercial margins of 
different agents. The ultimate data sources in most cases are government institutions such as statistical 
offices and research centres48.  
In our analytical framework, the farm gate price is defined as the amount received by the producer for 
selling a unit of a good (i.e. tonne) as output minus any value added tax (VAT), or similar deductible 
tax paid by the purchaser. Similarly, the wholesale price is defined as the price observed in the market 
where the domestically produced commodity competes with the internationally traded commodity. It 
represents a point in the value chain between the farm gate and the point of entry (exit) of imported 
(exported) commodities (MAFAP, 2015). Finally, the border price represents the FOB (CIF) price for 
exported (imported) goods, with the underlying assumption that international prices can be 
considered as a valid benchmark for prices undistorted by domestic policies and free of influence of 
domestic market failures49.   
                                                          
48See Table 16 in the Appendix for detailed information on specific data sources. 
49 For more information on the methodology, see (MAFAP, 2015) at www.fao.org/in-action/mafap. 
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Table 12:  Dataset Coverage 
Country Crop Period     Country Crop Period 
Burkina Faso Maize 2005-2013   Kenya Potatoes 2005-2013 
Burkina Faso Sorghum 2005-2013   Malawi Maize 2005-2013 
Burkina Faso Rice 2005-2013   Mali Maize 2005-2012 
Ethiopia Maize 2005-2012   Mali Sorghum 2005-2012 
Ethiopia Wheat 2005-2012   Mali Rice 2005-2012 
Ethiopia Sorghum 2005-2012   Mali Millet 2005-2012 
Ethiopia Barley 2005-2012   Mozambique Maize 2005-2013 
Ethiopia Beans 2005-2012   Mozambique Rice 2005-2013 
Ghana Maize 2005-2013   Mozambique Cassava 2005-2013 
Ghana Rice 2005-2013   Nigeria Sorghum 2005-2010 
Ghana Cassava 2005-2011   Nigeria Rice 2007-2010 
Ghana Yam 2005-2012   Uganda Maize 2005-2013 
Kenya Maize 2005-2013   Uganda Wheat 2005-2013 
Kenya Wheat 2005-2013   Uganda Rice 2005-2013 
Kenya Sorghum 2005-2013   Uganda Cassava 2005-2013 
Kenya Rice 2005-2013   Tanzania Maize 2005-2013 
Kenya Cassava 2005-2012   Tanzania Rice 2005-2013 
Kenya Beans 2005-2012         
Source: FAO-MAFAP Database 
In our analysis, we use a subset of the MAFAP database that only includes staple food crops. We 
consider ten commodities belonging to three main commodity groups considered essential for food 
security in SSA: cereals (maize, wheat, sorghum, rice, millet, barley); roots and tubers (cassava, yams, 
potatoes); and pulses (beans). Since not all the staple food crops are produced in the ten countries 
represented in our dataset, our panel data is unbalanced. Consequently, we decided to work with 
country-commodity pairs in the empirical analysis (see sections 4 and 5). Table 12 provides a full list of 
the 35 value chains used for our empirical exercise together with the period covered by the dataset. 
The most represented country is Kenya - with seven value chains - while Malawi has only one value 
chain. Maize is present in all countries except in Nigeria. Although in some countries the number of 
commodities may appear limited, Figure 17 shows that their relevance for food security is substantial. 
The commodities in our dataset cover over 45% of the total food supply (kcal/capita/day) in the 10 
countries we consider, and over 50% in six of these countries.  
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Figure 17: Percentage Coverage of the Total Food Supply, by country (avg. 2005-2013) 
 
Note: Authors’ calculations from FAOSTAT (FAO, 2015). 
 
We deflate farm-gate and wholesale prices and marketing costs using the consumer price index (CPI) 
provided by World Bank (WDI, 2015), assuming that farmers react to the relative prices of the 
produced crop with respect to the prices of the others goods in the market. Accounting for price of 
other good is coherent with our assumption that farmers want to improve their food security status 
buying other goods than those they produce. Additionally, it allows us to obtain price proxies 
expressed in real terms. Ideally, we would deflate prices using a CPI that excludes the commodity in 
question to obtain the true relative price of that commodity. However, such data are not available. 
Finally, we take from the World Bank (WDI, 2015) the US wholesale price index and the official nominal 
exchange rate necessary to calculate the nominal protection coefficient, the real exchange rate and 
the real border price.  
Besides the data on prices, we also need data on agricultural output, competing output prices, input 
prices and weather conditions. For the dependent variables – commodity-specific acreage, production 
and yield for each country – we use data provided by FAOSTAT (FAO, 2015). Recall that FAO data on 
acreage refer to harvested area and not to the actual variable of interest, which is planted area. Using 
the harvested area could bias the results because it may differ from planted area as result of factors 
outside the farmers’ control. In order to capture the effect of competing commodity prices on acreage 
decision, we use the producer price index of the respective food group, i.e. cereals, roots and tubers, 
and pulses provided by FAOSTAT (FAO, 2015). Ideally, we would use the price of the actual competing 
commodity, but the unbalanced nature of our panel prevents us from adopting this solution. As for 
the proxy of the relative cost of inputs, we use the ratio of the annual West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
oil price index (Energy Information Agency of the United States, 2015) to the producer price index for 
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the aggregate agricultural sector (FAO, 2015). This ratio can also be interpreted as a measure of 
profitability (Askari and Cummings, 1977).   
Finally, to capture the influence of weather conditions on agricultural supply, we use different weather 
variable depending on the proxy selected to estimate supply in the response function. For planted 
acreage, farmers are likely to take into consideration what happened in the past to formulate their 
decision. Some studies employ past yield shocks (with respect to a long-run trend) as a proxy for 
weather and other natural shocks effects (e.g. Roberts and Schlenker, 2009; Roberts and Schlenker, 
2013; Haile et al., 2015). The main limitation of this approach is that the deviations from the trend are 
completely attributed to weather-related events while there might be other exogenous factors 
influencing them (Roberts and Schlenker, 2009). Nevertheless, the same proxy cannot be used to 
explain production and yield responses because a) after planting, it cannot be argued that the past 
natural shocks influence the intensity of farming; b) using the yield shocks in the production or yield 
function raises endogeneity problems due to likely collinearity with other variables, especially the 
lagged dependent variable. Accordingly, some authors control for contemporaneous weather and 
other natural shocks to explain production and yield response by employing direct information on 
weather variables such as precipitation, moisture and temperature (Askari and Cummings, 1977). This 
is often hampered by the lack of primary data sources in developing countries – especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa –due to the limited coverage of weather stations in agricultural areas (Rojas et al., 
2011). We address this constraint using an FAO indicator based on remote sensing data, i.e. the 
Agricultural Stress Index (ASI). The ASI captures the anomalous vegetation growth and potential 
drought in arable land during the cropping season. Specifically, the ASI measures the temporal 
intensity and duration of dry periods and estimates the percentage of arable land affected by drought 
(FAO, 2015)50. The information collected using satellite technology to generate the ASI is synthesized 
at the country level and can therefore be employed in the supply function to estimate the effect of 
weather-related conditions occurred between planting and harvesting. Descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the empirical analysis are given in Table 17 of the Appendices. 
5.3 Empirical model 
 
The supply response functions estimated in this study are based on equation (4) and (6) presented in 
section 2 and take the following forms: 
  
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏2𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑏3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 
 
(7) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐶𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐵 +  𝛽5𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑡𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 (8) 
 
where 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 indicates the level of acreage, production or yield for the country-commodity pair i – for 
example maize in Kenya - at time t, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 the farm-gate or wholesale price of the same pair i at time t-
1, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 the vector of control variables, while 𝑡𝑖 and 𝜂𝑖  are – respectively – a time trend capturing 
technological and structural changes and a country-commodity fixed effect to capture heterogeneity 
across different value chains. For equation (8), NCP, RER and 𝑃𝐵 indicate, respectively, the nominal 
                                                          
50 For more information on the ASI, refer to http://www.fao.org/climatechange/asis/en/ 
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coefficient of protection, the real exchange rate and the border prices in real terms while 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 is a 
normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance 𝜎2.  
Due to a relatively limited number of observations for each country-commodity pair, we pool the data 
and test for specific country/commodity-specific heterogeneity (see Table 12). This specification allows 
us to exploit all the panel dimensions of the dataset and obtain short-run cross-country price 
elasticities for staple food crops in SSA relying on robust inference (Onal, 2012). The vector of control 
variables, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡, contains different elements depending on the supply proxy used for estimating 
equation (7) and (8), as discussed above. For acreage, we include marketing costs, the producer price 
index of the respective food group, the real oil price, yield shocks, a dummy for the food price crises, 
and a time trend. For production and yield, we drop the proxy for the competing price and the yield 
shocks and add the ASI. All the continuous variables used for estimating the model – except for the 
Producer Price Index and the ASI - are in logarithmic form so that coefficients can be interpreted in 
terms of percentage changes, which is particularly convenient for analyzing the short-run price 
elasticity. 
There are a number of reasons why endogeneity might affect our estimates. Estimating equation (7) 
and (8) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or Fixed Effects(FE) would yield biased estimates because 
of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the country fixed effect – the so-called 
dynamic panel bias (Nickell, 1981). As extensively discussed in the literature - even after the within-
group transformation – the lagged dependent variable 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 would still be correlated with the error 
term, providing biased and inconsistent estimates for the fixed effect estimator. The problem becomes 
smaller as the length of the panel (T) grows (Nickell, 1981 and Roodman, 2009a). However, our data 
only include 9 years. The most common solution to the dynamic panel bias problem is the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).One option is to use 
the difference-GMM estimator which consists of first differencing the data to eliminate the fixed-effect 
and, then, of instrumenting the first-differenced equation with the lagged level of the series. A more 
suitable alternative in our setting is to estimate the system-GMM as proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). They refine the difference-GMM by transforming the instruments themselves in order to make 
them exogenous to the fixed effects (Roadman, 2009). In other words, they propose to estimate a 
system of equations in both differences and levels, where the instruments for the levels equation are 
the lagged first-differences of the series (Bond et al., 2001). Blundell and Bond (1998) show that when 
T is small there are significant gains in applying the system-GMM rather than the difference-GMM, 
provided that the initial conditions are not correlated with the fixed effect. Moreover, the difference-
GMM performs quite poorly when series are persistent or close to being random walks, while the 
system-GMM estimator is consistent in the presence of unit roots (Bond, 2002; Binder et al., 2005).  
In order to validate the system-GMM estimates, sensitivity analyses and robustness checks on the 
instrument choice and serial correlation are required. To avoid the instrument proliferation problem, 
we follow Roodman (2009b) by “collapsing” the instrument matrix and checking if we can exclude 
longer lags instead of using all the available information. Since the GMM estimator can be influenced 
by this choice, we test its stability by showing how the coefficients vary with the number of chosen 
lags51. Once the number of instruments has been fixed, we test both the validity of the full set of 
instruments using the Hansen test and the validity of a subset of instruments – precisely those for the 
levels equation based on lagged differences of the dependent variable– calculating the difference-in-
Hansen statistics. The latter test is necessary because the original Hansen test may be weakened in 
case of instrument proliferation. Moreover, it allows us to confirm the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
                                                          
51 While Hendricks (2012) highlighted this problem, the literature does not provide more robust guidance on how 
one should choose the optimal number of lags in a dynamic panel data setting. 
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assumption on the initial conditions (Roodman, 2009b). The other statistic reported is the Arellano-
Bond test for autocorrelation which looks at the second-order correlation in difference to test for the 
first order serial correlation in levels of the error term. As additional robustness check, we compare 
the system-GMM estimates with estimates obtained with OLS, FE and difference-GMM. The main 
purpose is to verify that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable lies in the credible range 
defined by Roodman (2009a), which is between the FE coefficient (lower bound) and the OLS 
coefficient (upper bound). Finally, we use the Windmeijer (2005) correction to obtain robust standard 
errors since two-step GMM estimates are biased downward in finite samples.  
5.4 Results  
 
Before estimating the supply function, we control for the stationarity of the variables in our dataset. 
We use two panel unit root tests suitable for unbalanced panel dataset, the Im-Pesaran-Shin test and 
the Fisher-type test. In both cases, the null hypothesis is that all the panels contain a unit root. Table 
18 in the Appendix shows that only acreage, production, producer price index and real oil price are not 
stationary in levels while all of them are stationary once differenced. As far as the first-difference 
variables are stationary, the presence of some non-stationary variables in levels is not an issue 
considering that it will be addressed by the GMM during the differencing process, giving consistency 
to the estimates (Yu et al., 2012).  
Table 13,Table 14,Table 15 show the results of the empirical estimation of equation 7 and 8 using 
acreage, production and yield as dependent variables, respectively. For each table, column (1) and (2) 
report the supply response using – respectively - the lagged farm-gate and the wholesale price to proxy 
the expected price. We note that the short-run price elasticity of supply is always positive and 
statistically significant, no matter which dependent variable or price we use in the response function. 
More specifically, if the own-price of any given staple food crops at farm-gate level increases by 10%, 
acreage rises by 2.2%, production by 6% and yield by 3.0%. At the same time, if we consider the 
wholesale price as proxy of the farmers’ expected price, the results show that a 10% rise in price will 
cause an increase of 3.9% in acreage, 6.2% in production and 4.0% in yield. Looking at this initial set of 
results, we can make several observations. First of all, farmers in SSA are able to interpret the market 
signals and respond positively to an increase of the real price of staple food crops, as suggested by 
economic theory. Furthermore, the results show that farmers use price information not only to decide 
how much acreage to plant, but also to modify their farming intensity during the cropping season. 
Nevertheless - although the estimated price elasticities are positive and statistically significant in all 
the cases - they are quite small and range from 0.216 to 0.596. Production and yield responses are 
higher than those for acreage, confirming that acreage should be considered as a lower bound for the 
total price elasticity of supply (Rao, 1989).  
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Table 13: Empirical estimates of the annual acreage response  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Area (t-1) 0.976*** 0.970*** 0.989*** 
 [0.051] [0.060] [0.074] 
FG Price (t-1) 0.216***   
 [0.066]   
WS Price (t-1)  0.394***  
  [0.103]  
Nominal Coefficient of Protection (t-1)   0.312** 
   [0.156] 
Real Exchange Rate (t-1)   0.020 
   [0.220] 
Border Price (t-1)   0.289** 
   [0.147] 
Marketing  Cost (t-1) -0.167** -0.352*** -0.119 
 [0.065] [0.096] [0.161] 
Producer Price Index (t-1) -0.032 -0.049 -0.185* 
 [0.081] [0.079] [0.106] 
Yield Shock (t-1) 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.033*** 
 [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] 
Real Oil Price (t-1) -0.143 -0.184 -0.189 
 [0.144] [0.173] [0.178] 
Food Crises 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.062 
 [0.027] [0.035] [0.042] 
Time Trend -0.012 -0.015 0.013 
 [0.016] [0.017] [0.020] 
    
Observations 273 273 273 
Number of Instruments 22 22 24 
F-Test  for Joint Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.621 0.409 0.376 
Diff-in-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.443 0.408 0.298 
AR (1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) Test 0.153 0.134 0.143 
Note: coefficients are two-step system-GMM estimates with the lagged dependent variable and the price variable treated as 
predetermined. In parentheses, robust standard errors with the Windmeijer (2005) correction finite sample are reported. All 
the instrument matrices are “collapsed”. The Diff-in-Hansen test reports the p-values for the validity of the additional moment 
restriction necessary for system GMM. The AR(1) and AR(2) report the p-values for first and second order autocorrelation of 
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Table 14:  Empirical estimates of the annual production response 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Production (t-1) 0.851*** 0.865*** 0.857*** 
 [0.122] [0.106] [0.072] 
    
FG Price (t-1) 0.596***   
 [0.136]   
WS Price (t-1)  0.621***  
  [0.166]  
Nominal Coefficient of Protection (t-1)   0.559** 
   [0.258] 
Real Exchange Rate (t-1)   0.399** 
   [0.156] 
Border Price (t-1)   0.688*** 
   [0.151] 
Marketing Costs (t-1) -0.351** -0.429* -0.315** 
 [0.154] [0.219] [0.156] 
Agricultural Stress Index  -0.565* -0.481 -0.527** 
 [0.320] [0.414] [0.245] 
Real Oil Price (t-1) -0.501* -0.334 -0.369 
 [0.285] [0.308] [0.307] 
Food Crises 0.036 0.042 0.075* 
 [0.036] [0.038] [0.045] 
Time Trend -0.040*** -0.035** -0.045*** 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.011] 
    
Observations 273 273 273 
Number of Instruments 19 19 22 
F-Test  for Joint Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.487 0.297 0.927 
Diff-in-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.937 0.451 0.577 
AR (1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) Test 0.139 0.331 0.156 
Note: coefficients are two-step system-GMM estimates with the lagged dependent variable and the price variable treated as 
predetermined. In parentheses, robust standard errors with the Windmeijer (2005) correction finite sample are reported. All 
the instrument matrices are “collapsed”. The Diff-in-Hansen test reports the p-values for the validity of the additional moment 
restriction necessary for system GMM. The AR(1) and AR(2) report the p-values for first and second order autocorrelation of 
the first-differenced residuals. Stars  ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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Table 15: Empirical estimates of the annual yield response 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Yield (t-1) 0.998*** 0.961*** 0.970*** 
 [0.063] [0.062] [0.065] 
FG Price (t-1) 0.297***   
 [0.097]   
WS Price (t-1)  0.406**  
  [0.180]  
Nominal Coefficient of Protection (t-1)   0.212* 
   [0.122] 
Real Exchange Rate (t-1)   0.231 
   [0.199] 
Border Price (t-1)   0.384*** 
   [0.123] 
Marketing Costs (t-1) -0.273*** -0.367* -0.264 
 [0.094] [0.187] [0.187] 
Agricultural Stress Index  -0.446** -0.427* -0.401* 
 [0.203] [0.230] [0.230] 
Real Oil Price (t-1) -0.207 -0.149 -0.211 
 [0.271] [0.258] [0.297] 
Food Crises -0.072* -0.040 -0.038 
 [0.038] [0.040] [0.038] 
Time Trend -0.027** -0.020* -0.030*** 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] 
    
Observations 273 273 273 
Number of Instruments 19 19 22 
F-Test  for Joint Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen Test (p-value) 0.584 0.333 0.891 
Diff-in-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.436 0.648 0.704 
AR (1) Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR (2) Test 0.357 0.435 0.608 
Note: coefficients are two-step system-GMM estimates with the lagged dependent variable and the price variable treated as 
predetermined. In parentheses, robust standard errors with the Windmeijer (2005) correction finite sample are reported. All 
the instrument matrices are “collapsed”. The Diff-in-Hansen test reports the p-values for the validity of the additional moment 
restriction necessary for system GMM. The AR(1) and AR(2) report the p-values for first and second order autocorrelation of 
the first-differenced residuals. Stars  ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of significance, respectively. 
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From tables 13, 14 and 15 we also see that the elasticity of supply with respect to the wholesale price 
(reported in column 2) is always higher than the elasticity with respect to the farm-gate price (reported 
in column 1). On average, this upward bias seems to be around 0.1, with a range that goes from 0.03 
for production to 0.18 for acreage. The result can be explained referring to the work of Gardner (1975) 
on vertical price transmission. He shows that the elasticity of price transmission of the retail price with 
respect to the producer price is less than unity while other authors apply the same logic to the price 
spread between wholesale and farm gate price (e.g. Brummer et al., 2009). If this relationship is true, 
the price elasticity with respect to the farm gate price (𝑏2
𝑓𝑔
) is equal to the price elasticity with respect 
to the wholesale price (𝑏2






𝑤𝑠. As a consequence, 𝑏2
𝑓𝑔
 will always be lower than 𝑏2
𝑤𝑠 as 
reported in tables 13, 14 and 15. Therefore, using wholesale prices to analyze supply responses instead 
of farm-gate prices might overestimate the supply response because it implies assuming perfect price 
transmission between different segments of the value chain. However, the literature extensively 
showed that this is often not the case in developing countries, mainly because of market failures – 
imperfect competition, high transaction costs, information asymmetries – and policy interventions 
(Key et al., 2000; Rapsomanikis et al., 2006; Short et al., 2014; and Balié and Morales Opazo, 2016).   
 
Figure 18: Price elasticity with and without marketing costs 
 
Note: price elasticity (FG & WS Price) represented in the figure are obtained using the two-step system-GMM estimates 
described in table 13, 14 and 15. Solid line reports the coefficient including the Marketing Cost in the regression (With MC) 
while dotted line reports the same regression excluding the marketing cost as covariate from the model (Without MC). The 
amplitude of the lines indicates the 90% confidence interval of the coefficient. 
Besides the output price of the crop they produce, farmers also react to other factors such as the 
marketing costs (transport, processing, handling, taxes, fees and margins) paid to other agents along 
the value chain. As already mentioned, thanks to the flexibility and richness of the MAFAP dataset, we 
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are able to control for specific country/crop marketing costs in our regression and the results we obtain 
are quite clear. As shown in tables 13, 14 and 15, the higher the marketing costs the lower the supply 
response, confirming that excessive marketing costs might prevent farmers to fully exploit market 
signals. The reported coefficients for the marketing costs are so close to those reported for the price 
elasticities that positive price shock, even substantial, might be easily offset by a similar increase in, 
for example, transport costs or local transit taxes. To further clarify the importance of introducing 
marketing costs in the supply response function, Figure 18 reports how the price elasticity of supply 
would change estimating equation 5 with or without them. As expected, not considering the marketing 
costs would bring the price elasticity estimates downward. This is explained mainly by the positive 
correlation between marketing costs and the farm-gate and wholesale prices. The bias can turn out to 
be quite substantial and more than 0.3. In this respect, our exercise suggests that the observed low 
elasticities obtained by previous empirical estimates may not be entirely due to the lack of response 
from farmers but also to the difficulty to control for such marketing costs. In other words, previous 
studies may not have fully captured that - beyond the price signals - market imperfections are of critical 
importance in driving the supply response. This appears to be a useful finding for policy makers as it 
stresses the importance of addressing market functioning notably through targeted public investments 
to, for instance, lower transport costs or improve governance to eliminate illicit taxes along the value 
chain.  
In table 13, the PPI of the food group containing the competing crops turns out to be negative – as 
expected - but not statistically significant. The non-significance of the coefficient can have one 
economic and one methodological explanation. Economically, it might indicate that once we control 
for more important factors such as the own-price and the marketing costs, the price of the competing 
crops is not a crucial factor in determining the farmers’ decision on acreage. Indeed, the lack of 
significance of this factor has already been observed by other empirical works (Onal, 2012 and Haile 
et al., 2015). From a methodological standpoint, we cannot control for specific competing crops 
because our panel is unbalanced and prices are not available. As a consequence, the PPI of the 
competing group (e.g. cereals for maize or roots and tubers for cassava) may not fully capture those 
cross-price effects (e.g. wheat or rice price on maize). The real oil price in our results displays the 
expected negative sign but it is never statistically significant, except in column (1) of table 14. This 
negative sign confirms that the higher the cost of inputs, the lower the level of agricultural output. The 
lack of statistical significance can be explained by the fact that the input usage in SSA is quite limited, 
especially for the case of the staple food crops analyzed in this paper. Moreover, the oil price might be 
only weakly correlated with the price of the relevant basket of inputs, which also varies from country 
to country and crop to crop.  
The weather proxies - yield shocks for acreage in table 13 and the Agricultural Stress Index for 
production and yield in table 14 and 15 – always show the expected sign52. In our experiment, the yield 
shocks turn out to be positive and statistically significant indicating that past positive deviations from 
the long-term trend are an incentive to expand the planted acreage. At the same time, the ASI is always 
negative, confirming that long and intense dry periods during the growing season reduce production 
and – consequently – yields. Lastly, we augment our supply functions introducing a dummy controlling 
for the recent food price crises (2008 and 2011) and a time trend to capture any other shocks due to 
institutional or unobservable factors. Interestingly, during the price crises, acreage has been – on 
                                                          
52 Yield shocks are calculated as the jack-knifed residuals obtained from separate regressions of yield on time trend 
for each country-crop pair. We do not employ OLS residuals because they would give biased estimates of the 
errors (Roberts and Schlenker, 2009). 
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average – 10% higher than the usual level while production increased but only by 3-4% resulting in a 
reduction in yields.  
Finally, in column 3 of table 13, 14 and 15, we replace the observed price with the nominal protection 
coefficient, the real exchange rate and the border price expressed in real terms. As explained above, 
the purpose is to disentangle the effect of the observed price into three components: the direct 
incentives arising from border measures and interventions in domestic markets, the macroeconomic 
policy and the price variations in the international market. Results show that the three variables have 
a positive impact on the supply response, respecting the expected sign. Direct incentives and changes 
in the border price significantly stimulate the farmers’ response in all cases while the real exchange 
rate is statistically significant only in table 14. It means that macroeconomic decisions, especially on 
the exchange rate influence production decisions while they are not affecting acreage allocation and, 
consequently, yields.  
In order to validate the results obtained with the system-GMM estimator, we report some sensitivity 
analyses and robustness checks. The first test regards the sensitivity of our estimates to alternative 
number of lags used as instrumental variables. Figure 19,Figure 20 and Figure 21 in the Appendix show 
how the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and the price elasticity for – respectively – 
acreage, production and yield change according to the maximum lag selection. As expected, a limited 
number of instruments return less efficient point estimates with higher confidence intervals 
(Roodman, 2009b). Considering the importance of the point estimates for the present work, especially 
for price elasticity, we prefer to use all the available lags (i.e. eight) as instruments to ensure higher 
stability to our coefficients. The downside of this choice is that we risk overfitting the lagged dependent 
variable, pushing its coefficient towards the one obtained with OLS. Nevertheless, the reported figures 
show that reducing the number of lags changes neither the autoregressive coefficient nor the price 
elasticity substantially.  
The Hansen J-statistics for over-identifying restrictions reported in tables 13, 14 and 15 also confirm 
the goodness of the instrument set.  In all cases, the p-value is higher than 10%, indicating that the null 
hypothesis of joint validity cannot be rejected. Following Roodman (2009b), we also use the difference-
in-Hansen test to check if the lagged differences of the dependent variable are good instruments for 
the levels equation in order to verify the Blundell-Bond hypothesis on the system-GMM initial 
conditions. The exogeneity of this subset of instruments is confirmed in all cases, with p-values at least 
greater than 15%. The AR(1) and AR(2) tests in tables 13, 14 and 15 report the Arellano-Bond test for 
first and second-order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals. In all cases, the test for AR(1) 
rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation while the test for AR(2) fails to reject it, showing no 
evidence of autocorrelation at conventional levels of significance in our estimates.  
Lastly, we check the robustness of our results by verifying that the estimated coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable range between the fixed-effects estimate – which should be biased downward - 
and the OLS estimate – which should represent an upper bound (Roodman, 2009a).  Figure 22, 23 and 
24 in the Appendix compare the autoregressive coefficient and the price elasticity for – respectively – 
acreage, production and yield obtained using OLS, Fixed Effects, difference-GMM and system-GMM. 
In all the cases, the system-GMM coefficient on the lagged dependent variable lies between the FE 
and OLS estimates. As already noted by Haile et al. (2015), the autoregressive coefficient for the 
difference GMM behaves quite differently from the system-GMM, with an estimate closer to the FE 
and – in some cases – even below the credible bound. This and the fact that the system-GMM better 
handles the high persistence of the output supply both support our choice of the system-GMM 
estimator. Finally, Figure 22, Figure 23 and Figure 24 show that the model selection substantially 
influences the estimates and it suggests that both OLS and FE results are always close to zero while 
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GMM results give higher elasticities. Earlier estimates that were largely based on OLS and FE might 
have therefore contributed to the consensus that farmers in SSA do not react to price incentives.  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Better understanding if and how farmers react to price signals is one of the key priorities for policy 
makers interested in designing effective strategy to reduce or eliminate food insecurity in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. We shed more light on this topic by providing a cross-country analysis of the supply response 
for the major staple food crops in ten SSA countries over the period 2005-2013. To do that, we rely on 
a recent dataset produced by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in the framework of its 
“Monitoring and Analyzing Food and Agricultural Policies” (MAFAP) programme. 
The results of this empirical exercise show that farmers in SSA are actually capable of interpreting 
market signals and responding to changes in staple crop prices. However, the magnitude of the 
response is small and, often, partially or totally muted by other factors. We also find that the supply 
responses are significantly influenced by transaction costs paid by farmers to market their product. In 
this respect, we also suggest that results of the previous empirical works observing lower or even 
absent supply response to price shocks were not driven only by the impact of price signals but also by 
the impossibility to control for offsetting elements such as high marketing costs. Not surprisingly, we 
also find that past and current weather shocks play an important role in explaining the farmers’ 
decisions and supply performances while the cross-prices of the competing commodities and the cost 
of inputs seem to be less important. By decomposing the expected price into three components – the 
nominal coefficient of protection, the real exchange rate and the border price – we find that farmers 
in SSA respond to price signals arising primarily from direct incentives generated by border measures 
and government interventions in domestic markets and shocks in the international market. On the 
contrary, they are less stimulated by macroeconomic policies affecting the exchange rate. 
We consider the findings of this cross-country analysis useful for policy makers seeking evidence to 
support and improve food security in the SSA region through a better management of their own 
agricultural resources. Producers of staple food crops can exploit market opportunities but their 
response to price signals is still too low. Governments should move public resources away from current 
discretionary interventions and redirect them towards more effective investments such as transport 
and other physical infrastructures, market information systems, research and technology, extension 
services but also transparent market regulations. An increase in the the provision of these public goods 
is likely to support a more effective price transmission along the value chains and stimulate a more 
active smallholder market participation capable of properly reacting to price signals.  
Moreover, while national-level efforts are necessary, they are not sufficient to guarantee food 
availability and access in the region. Although it is well known that Sub-Saharan Africa has the potential 
to massively increase its agricultural production and drastically reduce food insecurity, farmers have 
not exploited much of the growth opportunities of the last decade such as the recent high prices for 
staple food crops (Saghir, 2014). As indicated by the World Bank (2012), this failure can be partially 
explained by the lack of coordination between governments to remove the unnecessary barriers to 
the creation of a fully integrated African market to boost regional staple food trade and most likely 
help increase the currently low supply response for staple food crops to price signals. Should the 
governments decide to tackle these major policy failures, they would not only make faster progress to 
reduce food insecurity but also create the condition for those regional complementarities to 
materialize and boost overall growth. 
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5.7 Appendices  
 
Table 16: Data Sources for producer, wholesale, border prices and marketing costs 
Country Institution Link 
Burkina Faso Ministère de l'Agriculture de l'Hydraulique et des Recherches Halieutiques http://www.agriculture.gov.bf/ 
Ethiopia Ethiopian Development Research Institute http://www.edri.org.et/ 
Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture http://www.mofa.gov.gh/ 
Kenya Kenya Agicultural and Livestock Research Organization not available  
Malawi Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security http://www.malawi.gov.mw/  
Mali Institut d'Economie Rurale  http://www.ier.gouv.ml/  
Mozambique Ministro da Agricultura e Segurança Alimentar http://www.masa.gov.mz/  
Nigeria Federal Ministry of Agriculture/National Bureau of Statistics  http://www.fmard.gov.ng  
Uganda Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries http://www.agriculture.go.ug/  
Tanzania Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives http://www.agriculture.go.tz/ 
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics of selected variables, by country (2005-2013) 
            
    
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Ghana Kenya Malawi Mali Mozambique Nigeria Uganda Tanzania 
Area Mean  13.01 13.84 13.00 12.10 14.28 13.61 13.41 15.26 11.89 14.30 
SD 1.31 0.76 0.76 1.45 0.11 0.57 1.06 0.58 1.69 0.74 
Production Mean  13.42 14.34 14.57 13.08 14.89 14.00 13.99 15.61 12.99 14.76 
SD 1.04 1.01 1.34 1.38 0.35 0.35 1.62 0.44 2.21 0.54 
Yield Mean  9.62 9.71 10.78 10.19 9.82 9.60 9.79 9.55 10.32 9.67 
SD 0.34 0.30 1.00 1.25 0.35 0.58 1.00 0.20 0.86 0.26 
FG Price Mean  11.72 8.23 5.87 10.03 9.87 11.83 8.69 10.26 13.24 13.12 
SD 0.20 0.29 0.75 0.44 0.38 0.44 0.43 0.15 0.47 0.63 
WS Price Mean  11.99 8.39 6.21 10.34 10.62 12.05 9.08 11.26 13.53 13.37 
SD 0.13 0.25 0.81 0.45 0.32 0.40 0.49 0.47 0.59 0.57 
NCP Mean  0.83 0.70 0.71 1.22 0.57 0.77 0.60 0.45 0.84 1.07 
SD 0.28 0.30 0.48 0.62 0.08 0.35 0.30 0.13 0.29 0.43 
RER Mean  497.40 13.78 1.47 86.75 172.46 501.51 30.01 163.65 2138.26 1425.36 
SD 31.66 2.05 0.08 16.27 28.19 34.34 2.69 14.03 159.19 127.38 
BP Mean  5.74 6.06 6.12 5.50 5.30 5.99 5.97 6.01 5.79 5.87 
SD 0.27 0.26 0.38 0.69 0.25 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.44 
Market Cost Mean  11.61 7.69 6.10 9.37 9.85 11.38 8.80 10.66 12.81 12.14 
SD 0.37 0.32 0.68 0.54 0.00 0.26 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.39 
PPI Mean  1.31 2.26 1.70 1.40 1.73 1.32 2.18 1.42 2.12 1.50 
SD 0.21 0.93 0.53 0.38 0.60 0.35 0.92 0.41 0.73 0.47 
Y. Shock Mean  0.08 -0.05 -0.30 -0.06 -0.03 0.17 -0.62 0.20 0.00 -0.04 
SD 1.12 0.91 1.36 1.32 1.22 1.35 3.06 1.63 1.20 0.92 
ASI Mean  0.05 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.11 
SD 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.16 
Oil Price 
Mean  0.61 0.42 0.49 0.60 0.50 0.63 0.49 0.58 0.41 0.62 
SD 0.09 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.11 
            
Note: Area, Production, Yield, FG Price, WS Price, Border Price, Marketing Costs and Real Oil Price are expressed in logarithmic form. 
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Table 18: Unit Root Tests for Panel Data 
      
  
Im-Pesaran-Shin     Fisher (ADF) - Inverse Chi Square 
 
H0: Non-stationarity  H0: Non-stationarity 
  
Level Difference  Level Difference 
       
Production 0.182 0.000  0.967 0.000 
Area 0.097 0.000  0.995 0.000 
Yield 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
FG Price  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
WS Price  0.001 0.000  0.000 0.000 
NCP 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Real Exchange Rate 0.013 0.000  0.007 0.000 
Border Price 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Marketing Cost  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Producer Price Index  1.000 0.000  1.000 0.000 
Agricultural Stress Index  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
Real Oil Price  0.397 0.000  0.951 0.010 
Yield Shock 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
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Figure 19: Point Estimates with Alternative Maximum Lag Lengths for Instruments 
 
Note: Figure reports the lagged area and price elasticity coefficient estimates using alternative maximum 
number of lags to be used as instruments. The point estimates and the 90% confidence interval are obtained 
using the two-step system-GMM estimates described in table 13.  
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Figure 20: Point Estimates with Alternative Maximum Lag Lengths for Instruments 
 
Note: Figure reports the lagged production and price elasticity coefficient estimates using alternative maximum 
number of lags to be used as instruments. The point estimates and the 90% confidence interval are obtained 
using the two-step system-GMM estimates described in table 14.  
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Figure 21: Point Estimates with Alternative Maximum Lag Lengths for Instruments 
 
Note: Figure reports the lagged yield and price elasticity coefficient estimates using alternative maximum 
number of lags to be used as instruments. The point estimates and the 90% confidence interval are obtained 
using the two-step system-GMM estimates described in table 15.  
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Figure 22: Point Estimates using Alternative Econometric Models 
 
Notes: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effect (FE) regressions are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by country-commodity. Two-step system-GMM (SYS-GMM) and difference-GMM (DIFF-GMM) regressions 
use robust standard errors with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction and treat the lagged dependent variable 
and the price elasticity as predetermined. The instrument matrices in the GMM models are collapsed.  
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Figure 23: Point Estimates using Alternative Econometric Models  
 
Notes: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effect (FE) regressions are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by country-commodity. Two-step system-GMM (SYS-GMM) and difference-GMM (DIFF-GMM) regressions 
use robust standard errors with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction and treat the lagged dependent variable 
and the price elasticity as predetermined. The instrument matrices in the GMM models are collapsed.  
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Figure 24: Point Estimates using Alternative Econometric Models  
 
Notes: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effect (FE) regressions are calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by country-commodity. Two-step system-GMM (SYS-GMM) and difference-GMM (DIFF-GMM) regressions 
use robust standard errors with Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction and treat the lagged dependent variable 
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6 Discussion  
 
The food and agricultural policies adopted by governments in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) since their 
respective independences have gone through a number of phases characterized by changing objectives, 
intensities of state intervention in the economy, levels of protection or taxation in agriculture, and 
amounts of public spending and aid to agriculture (Balié and Maetz, 2011). There was no systematic 
tracking of these changes and their implications for agricultural development and rural transformation, 
poverty eradication and food security, for example.  
Following a first experiment by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988), the research project led by Kym 
Anderson (Anderson and Kurzweil, 2008; Anderson and Nelgen, 2012) bridged this gap in the literature by 
estimating distortions to agricultural incentives in a large number of developing countries. More recently, 
the FAO implemented the Monitoring and Analyzing Food and Agricultural Policies (MAFAP) programme 
with the objective, among others, to update and further develop this kind of dataset. In particular, the 
MAFAP programme seeks to establish country-owned and sustainable systems to monitor, analyze, and 
reform food and agricultural policies to enable more effective, efficient and inclusive policy frameworks 
in a growing number of developing and emerging economies. In that sense, the MAFAP project tries to 
more sustainably bridge this information and capacity gap. 
The various chapters of this dissertation build on data and results of the MAFAP programme.  
Chapter 2 concludes that policies adopted by governments, for example, in response to price shocks in 
international markets alter the transmission of international price signals to farmers in developing 
countries. We also find that other factors play a role in this inadequate price transmission such as 
transport costs, changes in exchange rates, for example. Moreover, it also appears that the price changes 
in any particular country are not necessarily due to changes in world market prices, which suggests that 
domestic market conditions, largely determined by the policy environment, play an essential role. Finally, 
we also find that price movements in Africa exhibit different patterns than those in other regions with 
higher level of price variability for maize and rice mostly due to domestic market conditions.  
Chapter 3 investigates the case of rice and cotton which are two key commodities for several SSA countries 
and concludes that observed market distortions reflect the combined effects of market and policy failures. 
In the case of rice, these prevent border protection from reaching farmers while raising consumer prices. 
Cotton ginning and marketing is concentrated in a small number of private sector companies in most 
countries studied. The farm-level nominal rates of protection (NRPs) provide evidence of market failures 
in these countries that may be mitigated by policies that set indicative prices and encourage competition. 
Interestingly, the NRPs point at non-market failures in the two countries that maintain parastatal 
monopsonies for cotton. 
Chapter 4 finds that input subsidies can be seen as a peculiar option of public support to agricultural 
production. Input subsidies account for close to 35 % of agricultural-specific spending on average.  
Furthermore, these expenditures tended to get stuck into agricultural budgets over time and exhibit sub-
optimal execution rates. Input subsidies are primarily funded by national taxpayer money while donors 
tend to invest more on public goods. These findings confirm that input subsidies tend to crowd out other 
spending categories likely more supportive of long-term agricultural development objectives.  
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Chapter 5 explores the effects of market price signals and policy interventions on the supply response of 
farmers in SSA and find that farmers in SSA are actually able to respond to higher prices with increased 
production even if with a limited intensity. Moreover, results show that direct price incentives arising from 
border protection and government intervention in domestic markets and price shocks at the border also 
influence farmers’ decisions and are more important than macroeconomic policies. Moreover, omitting 
marketing costs from the supply response function leads to an underestimation of the price elasticity. 
Conversely, using wholesale instead of farm gate prices as proxy for producer prices leads to an 
overestimation of the price elasticity of supply.  
As seen throughout the chapters, government interventions in markets are pervasive. In the literature, it 
has often been argued that direct government intervention can be justified to overcome market failures 
or is needed in the early stages of agricultural development when conditions are less favourable (Dorward, 
Kydd and Poulton, 2007; Barret, 2008; Brooks, 2010). The challenge is then to find sets of policy 
instruments which minimize some of the highly undesirable consequences of intervention, rather than to 
regard these consequences as sufficient reasons in themselves for excluding any form of price 
intervention (Howell 2005; Devereux 2009).  
Recent MAFAP updates of the NRPs in 11 African countries53 between 2005 and 2013 show that countries 
still intervene extensively in their agricultural sector through policies which distort markets as well as 
investment efforts. These policy decisions include a wide spectrum of policy measures ranging from highly 
distortive administered producer or consumer prices, to border protection or export restrictions, to 
slightly less distortive inputs subsidies, and more WTO-compatible types of direct or indirect transfers to 
agents or groups of economic agents to support marketing, research, extension, infrastructures (feeder 
roads, storage facilities, etc. ).  
In the countries studied, there is an apparent gradual convergence towards an average protection of 
farmers slightly above zero and trending around five percent under regular market conditions (Figure 25). 
This suggests that on average the extent of distortions in output markets tends to diminish over time with 
a progressive evolution from a situation of net taxation to a stabilization at a very moderate level of 
protection on average for the countries studied. However, the wide bounds of the 1st and 3d quartiles of 
Figure 25 indicate that the average NRP hides substantial heterogeneity across countries. This is likely the 
consequence of various ad-hoc trade restrictions, price policies, parastatal intervention, fluctuating 
budget execution rates and a volatile investment climates. Moreover, two episodes of negative average 
incentives can be observed around 2010 and 2013 due to strong international market movements and 
domestic market rigidities that protected domestic markets to the detriment of farmers. 
                                                          
53 Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and Senegal 
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Figure 25:  Average Nominal Rate of protection in 11 Sub Saharan Countries  
Source: author based on MAFAP data, 2016 
Burkina Faso, and Tanzania, Uganda,  
In Figure 26, we report the NRP changes between years 2005-09 and 2010- 14. Overall, we observe that 
with a few exceptions the pattern of distortions has not substantially changed in the last decade. While a 
few countries exhibit lower level of incentives in 2010-14 compared with 2005-09, others have either 
witnessed a change in sign or increased disincentives. Changes for some countries are worth noting. 
Burkina Faso and Kenya are the only countries that increased the level of incentives although this increase 
is moderate in the case of Burkina Faso and larger for Kenya. Four countries have actually reduced their 
incentives over time including Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and to a much lesser extent Burundi, where 
incentives basically remained unchanged. Tanzania can also be seen as an outlier given its relatively high 
level of support throughout the period analyzed. Ghana appears to be the only country that moved from 
substantial disincentives to a situation of moderate price incentives while Mozambique evolved in the 
opposite direction with much more pronounced price disincentives for the 2010-14 period. Ethiopia, 
Malawi, and Mali maintained substantial price disincentives with the situation actually worsening in 
Malawi and Mali over time.  
Overall, heterogeneity prevails in the group of countries studied. As already discussed above, these results 
appear to be quite volatile over time and prone to trend reversal as a result of changing modalities and 
depth of policy interventions. Sustaining efforts for a systematic measurement of these policy effects 
appears necessary in the medium /long run to make the policy environment more conducive to 
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Figure 26: Nominal rates of protection, individual African focus countries, unweighted averages 2005-09 and 2010-14 
 
Source: author based on MAFAP data, 2016 
 
It was already pointed out that the type of government intervention matters a lot because some 
instruments are more distortive than others (see chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5). Those that affect agents directly 
including producers, consumers, and other agents along the value chain are more likely to distort markets 
than the “general sector” categories of spending such as research, training, or budget outlays in support 
of rural development more generally. While trade and price policies are recognized as potentially highly 
distortive of market price signals, we find that these distorted market signals may also result from various 
forms of market failures (chapters 2, 3 and 5). They often translate into excessive marketing costs incurred 
by economic agents and primarily farmers in getting goods to markets because of poor infrastructures or 
obsolete processing technology, and by malfunctioning markets resulting, for example, from monopolistic 
(or monopsonistic) practices and rent capturing that may be observed along the value chain (Omamo, 
1998; Shepherd, 2007). The finding of the important role played by marketing margins (chapter 3 and 
chapter 5 in particular) in the production function echoes the role attributed to the market failures in 
various sections of this dissertation. As substantial price distortions and market imperfections pervade 
the agricultural sector across SSA economies, there appears to be ample scope to measure and monitor 
not only the effects of explicit policy support but also the effects of implicit policies in the build-up of the 
price wedges at producer level in particular.  
As suggested in chapter 2, domestic prices of specific commodities adjust more or less rapidly to changing 
conditions in international markets due to domestic policy effects but also because markets are less 
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3, because in some areas or specific value chains traders can exercise market power, farmers will end up 
receiving lower prices for their products or paying more for the inputs they purchase (Ebata et al., 2015).  
 
In one recent study, Shimeles et al. (2015) examine the fertilizer retail-import price gap in 14 African 
countries between 2002 and 2013. They find that the price differential is generally large even after taking 
into account domestic transport costs. They explain that these price deviations indicate market power by 
importers/suppliers which are the result of a lack of competition accepted by governments in exchange 
for political rent. Overall, they conclude that market imperfections and inefficiencies are linked to the 
quality of the regulatory and policy environment in Africa.   
Similarly, Figure 11 in chapter 3 reports distribution of observed and theoretical values of NRPs for rice 
and points at a combination of market and policy failures as one of the key explanations for excessive 
distortions of price signals at farm level. Distortions between the wholesale market and the farm gate 
more than offset the protection between the border and wholesale and result in a net taxation effect for 
farmers.  
These examples suggest that it is important for governments in SSA to invest in public goods such as 
infrastructures (Jacoby, 2000, World Bank, 2007). In SSA like in other developing regions, such public 
investments appear necessary to reduce the bulk of agricultural production disincentives that farmers 
face (Mérel et al., 2009). For instance, recognizing that farm-gate prices are also determined by distance 
to markets as well as traveling time (Ebata et al., 2015), policy makers may value information on 
alternative interventions and compare potential payoffs of an investment in rural roads to reduce 
transportation costs relative to a change in trade policy, for example (Jacoby and Minten, 2009). 
Conceptually, this set of costs due to market power, lack of public goods provision, obsolete technologies 
and the like, results in an additional price wedge and could be referred to as a “market development gap”.  
Arguments abound in favour of a systematic measurement of such a market development gap.  However, 
as we have seen throughout this dissertation, while an abundant literature exists on measuring the effects 
of price and trade policies on agricultural commodities since the seminal work by Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes (1991) followed by the assessment of distortions to agricultural incentives (Anderson, 2009), much 
less empirical analysis is available on the effects of market failures on production disincentives. This is 
most likely due to the difficulty of disentangling the effects of explicit policy instruments from other 
factors that influence price levels. In addition, this topic is much less relevant for high income countries 
where most of the OECD-type policy measurement work has been carried out. Important challenges 
related to data scarcity in developing countries as well as methodological options have also prevented 
researchers from further investigating this topic.  
In future empirical research, there seems to be a need to identify the major sources of market 
development gaps in African commodity markets, and to propose a methodological framework for 
measuring these gaps. One possibility that is currently investigated but not developed further in this 
dissertation is to capture the market development gap as a residual of the total price gap and the 
estimated policy-induced price gap. Such information seems useful for policy makers as breaking down 
prices gaps permits to differentiate between explicit policy protection and excessive costs and rents 
benefiting particular agents in the value chain. To demonstrate the validity of the concept and its 
measurement, the proposed methodology would need to be applied to several commodities across 
countries and determine whether the estimation of the market development gap helps to better 
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understand the factors driving the important disincentives affecting producers in developing and 
emerging economies even in cases where the Nominal Rate of Protection and/or the Producer Support 
Estimate (PSE) are close to zero suggesting no policy distortion.  
Moreover, some limitations to the traditional policy measurement exercise need to be mentioned, 
particularly those resulting from partial equilibrium approaches. Results usually need to be interpreted 
with care as no single indicator is able to capture all policy effects. As was previously noted, production 
incentives can arise from many sources but in most studies they have been measured against changes in 
support provided to farmers through markets or indirect and direct monetary transfers.  
On the expenditure side, it is obvious that the investment of public resources in rural areas, for example, 
for roads, irrigation, transport, storage, but also education and health care, provides direct and indirect 
incentives to producers. This type of support is what the WTO has been trying to measure and classify in 
its green, blue and amber boxes. The latter includes all domestic support measures considered to distort 
production and trade (with some exceptions) and is expressed in terms of a “Total Aggregate 
Measurement of Support” (Total AMS) which includes all supports for specified products together with 
supports that are not for specific products, in one single figure. Similarly, the OECD captures the overall 
support received by producers through its aggregate PSE indicator. While the PSE is only one of several 
indicators which measure assistance to producers, it is probably the most popular in policy as well as 
academic circles. The PSE mainly focuses on the measurement of the gross costs to consumers and 
taxpayers of the transfers to the agricultural sector. But, conscious of the PSE limitations, the OECD also 
publishes the Total Support Estimate (TSE) which adds to the PSE an estimate of the General Services 
provided to producers (GSSE) encompassing collective subsidies in kind to farmers such as agricultural 
research, extension, sanitary services, infrastructure, marketing promotion, etc.  
Several other dimensions of potential policy effects are not captured in the PSE family of indicators. As 
we pointed out above when we discussed the market development gap, specific measurement problems 
such as benefits or costs to producers that might arise from informal transaction costs, externalities, 
market failures, any other behind-the-border policies and underinvestment in public goods, are not 
integrated in most analyses. In addition, existing methods and resulting indicators have failed to solve 
major problems or limitations resulting from some highly questionable assumptions in the African context, 
such as competitive markets, perfect information, and the generally high degree of substitutability 
between commodities. Africa is also characterised by extreme product heterogeneity compared with the 
situation in Asia or Latin America. This fact has also contributed to explain the different pattern of 
agricultural transformation relative to the trajectories of other regions of the world. In that sense, partial 
equilibrium-based indicators do not constitute dynamic measures of policy signals that would permit an 
adequate description and explanation of transformative processes in agriculture. 
In SSA, monetary transfers in support of the agricultural sector arise from national budgets as well as 
international aid. Aid can take many forms including the provision of global budget support, financing of 
sector wide approaches or funding more specific programmes and projects. As such, aid flows add to the 
incentive structure of SSA economies. This point was not extensively developed in this dissertation but it 
appears important to discern whether resources are being allocated to priority areas as defined by 
governments, whether these transfers address investment needs, and whether they are consistent with 
the system of incentives that is in place. Regardless of whether they arise from national budgets or aid, 
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effective monitoring and evaluation of public expenditures is vital for well-functioning and accountable 
governments as it allows assessments of the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of allocations of large 
amounts of government resources and for guiding future investment priorities in the agricultural sector, 
in particular. These are some of the main reasons why tracking of public expenditure and aid flows is seen 
as an important exercise for reviewing and analysing government policies.  
Finally, we realize that the results discussed in this dissertation are too partial to provide a complete 
picture of the role of policies in support of production incentives and their effects on market distortions. 
There are many opportunities for future research to expand and deepen the topics investigated in this 
dissertation.  
As there is general recognition of the need to rely on more than one indicator to adequately depict the 
extent and depth of policy support and derive meaningful and reliable conclusions, we find value in the 
idea of a systematic effort to estimate production incentives combining three main elements: (i) spending 
in support of the agricultural sector including both national expenditures and aid, (ii) price incentives or 
disincentives resulting from explicit policies, and (iii) estimating the price wedges due to the so called 
“market development gap”. Systematic measurement and reporting of these three main dimensions 
would represent an ambitious and innovative attempt to measure the overall support or taxation from 
one nation to its farmers. As such, we encourage academic circles and institutions interested in this topic 
such as the OECD, IFPRI, World Bank and the FAO through its MAFAP programme to continue and expand 
their policy measurement and monitoring work.  
As suggested above, we believe that empirical research could focus on better establishing the concept of 
the market development gap and the way to measure it. Attempts to measure it could also lead to 
interesting empirical analyses from which a new set of policy recommendations could emerge.  
Moreover, most of the results presented in this dissertation focus on the effects of policy support and 
market distortions in output markets. It is acknowledged that to account for the full spectrum of policy 
distortions, there is a need to also incorporate policy effects on input markets. In that sense, computing 
effective rates of protection (ERP) for a growing number of countries in SSA appears to be the logical next 
step, for example in the context of the MAFAP programme assuming that data are readily available for 
both output and input markets.  
In addition, we showed that trade, market and price policies are key to influence the speed and depth of 
the production response. However, the main linkages between the various policy instruments used by 
governments and their effects in support of accelerated agricultural transformation need to be better 
established and explained. It is proposed to also focus on the role of policies in shaping a favourable 
enabling environment for structural transformation of agriculture in SSA and especially small holders. 
Considering that widespread food insecurity in SSA countries is in itself a market failure (Rocha, 2006), 
more work could focus on the linkages between trade policy and food security. Indeed, after the 2007-08 
crisis, most governments in SSA as well as in the rest of the developing world demonstrated mistrust and 
reluctance to rely on international markets as a means of achieving food security of their population. In a 
number of cases, this has led to a renewed interest in policy measures that focus on food self-sufficiency 
at national or regional levels, as opposed to self-food reliance for which international trade plays a major 
role for food availability, access, and stability. In some cases, this shift is explained by the belief that some 
countries can actually be either structurally or temporarily vulnerable to trade for their food security. 
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More research is needed to support this argument and identify those countries for which trade could be 
seen as a threat to food security and why. Moreover, such research should also investigate the types of 
policies that could underpin an effective role of markets and trade.  
While chapter 5 of this dissertation indicates that farmers in SSA respond positively to price increase, as 
well as other factors including policy incentives and efficient marketing margins, the results do not provide 
information on the supply response to declining prices. This makes it difficult to test hypotheses of supply 
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